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by Shuang LIU 
 
This thesis explores the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by decision 
makers in a speculative financial market. In particular, this thesis aims to investigate the 
extent  to  which  bettors  in  the  HK  and  UK  horserace  betting  markets  anchor  their 
subjective  judgements  of  horses’  winning  probabilities  on  publicly  available 
information.  
To achieve this, four hypotheses are developed to test the existence of anchoring 
effects, the strength of the anchors, the impact of bettors’ expertise on their probability 
judgements, and differences in market behaviour between the HK and UK markets.  
This  is  the  first  study  which  explores  anchoring  effects  in  a  real  world 
environment using a large amount of quantitative data and the results offer a new and 
surprising perspective on anchoring effects. In particular, the empirical results suggest 
that overall, no significant anchoring effects exist in the HK and UK horserace betting 
markets  on  the  information  associated  with  horses’,  jockeys’  and  trainers’  past 
performance, horses’ post-positions, or the performance of previous  favourites. This 
finding challenges results of previous studies which suggest that anchoring is a wide-
spread  decision  bias.  This  contrast  may  be  explained  by  the  characteristics  of  the 
naturalistic  environment,  by  the  features  of  the  judgemental  procedure  in  horserace 
betting, and by the market data employed in this study. In addition, the existence of 
some anchoring effects on particular information, namely, on horses’ post-positions in 
the  HK  market  and  on  the  performance  of  previous  favourites,  may  be  due  to  the 
characteristics of each market.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The rationality of human behaviour  and the quality of human judgement have 
been explored by researchers within disciplines such as economics, management, and 
psychology. Traditional economic theories assume that individuals are able to gather all 
the information they need without time and cost constraints and that they have sufficient 
intellectual capacity to solve complicated decision tasks (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 
1944; Savage, 1954).  However, in the real world, individuals are not fully rational. 
Under time and/or cost pressure and within the constraints of their limited knowledge 
and  cognitive  capacity,  people  employ  simple  ‘heuristics’  to  undertake  complex 
decision tasks (Simon, 1955, 1956; Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974). These rules of 
thumb are useful in making rapid decisions but may also result in systematic biases 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974).  
One  of  the  commonly  used  and  investigated  heuristics  is  the  anchoring  and 
adjustment heuristic. Laboratory research suggests that people make absolute estimates 
(the  target  value)  by  starting  from  an  initial  value  (the  anchor  value)  and  make 
adjustments upwards or downwards from the anchor. However, these adjustments are 
often insufficient (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Two types of anchoring effects have 
been identified. One is traditional anchoring effect which involves a two-step judgement 
procedure: individuals first compare the target value with an anchor value and then 
make an absolute estimate of the target to achieve their final answers (e.g., Cervone and 
Peake,  1986;  Joyce  and  Biddle,  1981;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999b;  Quattrone, 
Lawrence,  Warren,  Souza-Silva,  Finkel  and  Andrus,  1981;  Russo  and  Schoemaker, 
1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The other is basic anchoring effect which arises 
even when individuals are not required to make direct comparisons between anchor   2 
values and target values (Brewer and Chapman, 2002; Wilson, Houston, Etling and 
Brekke, 1996).  
The majority of the literature focuses on traditional anchoring effects. The effects 
have  been  demonstrated  in  a  variety  of  judgemental  contexts,  such  as  general 
knowledge questions (e.g., Mussweiler, 2001; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974; Wong and Kwong, 2000), estimates of self-efficacy (Cervone 
and Peake, 1986), probability estimates and gambles (e.g., Carlson, 1990; Chapman and 
Johnson, 1994; Davies, 1997; Englich, Mussweiler and Strack, 2006), negotiations (e.g., 
Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Kristensen and Garling, 
2000; Ritov, 1996), judicial judgements (Chapman and Bornstein, 1996; Englich and 
Mussweiler, 2001; Farina, Arce and Novo, 2003), real estate judgements (Northcraft 
and Neale, 1987), and auditing judgements (Joyce and Biddle, 1981).  In addition, a 
number  of  factors  have  been  demonstrated  to  influence  the  degree  of  anchoring, 
including the sources of anchors (self-generated or externally provided) (e.g., Cervon 
and Peake, 1986; Davies, 1997; Hinsz, Kalnbach and Lorentz, 1997; Mussweiler and 
Neumann, 2000; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997), the relevance of anchors to targets (e.g., 
Cervone and Peake, 1986; Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b; 
Mussweiler  and  Strack,  2000b;  Strack  and  Mussweiler,  1997),  and  the  level  of 
knowledge or experience of decision makers (e.g., Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; 
Diaz, III, 1997; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Northcraft and 
Neale, 1987; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Moreover, anchoring effects have been 
demonstrated to be durable, even when absolute estimates are made one week after the 
appearance of anchors (Mussweiler, 2001).     
Whilst  the  existence  and  durability  of  anchoring  effects  have  been  widely 
demonstrated  in  a  large  number  of  laboratory-based  and  field-based  studies,  little 
investigation has been conducted in real world decision-making environments. It has 
been argued that although experiments enable researchers to investigate the influence of 
each discrete factor under manufactured and highly controlled conditions (Collis and 
Hussey,  2003;  Robin,  1993),  they  cannot  completely  reflect  or  simulate  real  world 
environments and may omit vital elements of real world settings (Bruce and Johnson, 
1997; Liu and Johnson, 2007). For example, experiments are often associated with low-
risk  tasks  in  stress  free  settings  whilst  real  world  decisions  are  generally  made  in 
stressful environments with high-stake tasks (Anderson and Brown, 1984; Yates, 1992).   3 
In addition, participants used in laboratory experiments are often students who lack the 
experience of solving the constructed tasks, whereas decision makers in the real world 
often face similar tasks many times and thus have more experience or knowledge in 
solving the problems. Moreover, the students in laboratory experiment are aware of 
their involvement in an experiment. Therefore, different behaviours may be expected 
between laboratory subjects and real world decision markers (Bruce and Johnson, 1997).   
To fill the gap between laboratory and real world studies on anchoring, this study 
focuses on a real world environment in which judgements are made where participants 
are not watched or manipulated by researchers. The data generated from such real world 
environments  are  even  distinguished  from  those  made  under  the  real  world  field 
experiments. The former is considered ‘real’ (i.e., individuals make judgements without 
being aware that their judgements will be studied), and sometimes instant if a quick 
response is required, and dynamic if a fast feedback-loop is involved in the judgemental 
procedure. Having identified a clear gap in the existing literature, this study explores the 
degree  to  which  that  decision  makers  in  a  real  world  setting,  the  horserace  betting 
market,  employ  the  anchoring  and  adjustment  heuristic  when  making  betting 
judgements. In particular, the study examines the extent to which bettors in the Hong 
Kong  and  the  UK  horserace  betting  markets  anchor  their  subjective  probability 
judgements  on  certain  publicly  available  information  concerning  horses’  winning 
probabilities.    
The  reminder  of  this  chapter  outlines,  respectively,  the  research  objectives, 
research scope, research questions and hypotheses, and research methodology of this 
study. Finally, the structure of the thesis is outlined and justified.  
 
 
1.2 Research Objectives  
 
The research objectives to be achieved in the current study are as follows:  
1. To provide a broad and extensive review of the existing literature on anchoring 
effects, including an analysis of papers exploring the definition, underlying mechanisms, 
causes and influential factors of this judgement bias, based on both laboratory and real 
world anchoring studies.    4 
2. To explore anchoring effects in a new dynamic real world environment, the 
horserace betting market, using  econometric techniques to analyse large datasets, in 
order to see if there are differences in the degree and strength of anchoring displayed 
between this environment and those discussed in laboratory-based studies.  
3. To investigate the existence of anchoring effects and the strength of anchors in 
the horserace betting market.  
4. To examine the influence of bettors’ expertise on their degree of anchoring on 
specific pieces of information.  
5. To understand the similarities and differences between the anchoring displayed 
by bettors in the HK and UK horserace betting markets.  
 
 
1.3 Research Scope  
 
Most previous studies investigate anchoring effects using experiments conducted 
in  psychological  laboratories  (laboratory-based  studies)  or  real  world  environments 
(field studies). However, this study explores anchoring effects in a dynamic real world 
environment, the horserace betting market, using real and instant decision making data, 
which  is  distinct  from  any  existing  literature.  This  study  seeks  to  contribute  to  the 
existing literature from the following perspectives:  
1.  This  study  provides  an  extensive  review  of  existing  literature  on  anchoring 
effects, including the analysis of the definition of anchoring, classification of anchoring, 
and underlying mechanisms of anchoring. In addition, the study reviews all the factors 
investigated in previous studies, which are considered to cause and influence anchoring 
effects, from both the external (related to the decision tasks) and internal (related to 
decision  makers)  perspectives.  The  review  provides  a  broad  and  extensive 
understanding  of  existing  anchoring  studies  and  provides  a  useful  approach  to 
categorising previous studies.   
2. This is the first study to explore anchoring effects in a real world environment 
using  real,  instant  and  dynamic  decision  making  data.  In  particular,  the  real  world 
environment employed in this study, the horserace betting market, provides an ideal 
environment in which a large number of judgements and decisions are made based on a 
large  amount  of  public  information;  this  is  quite  distinct  from  the  environment   5 
constructed  in  laboratories.  In  addition,  this  is  the  first  time  that  horserace  betting 
market data is used to explore real world anchoring effects.  
3. The data employed in this study to detect anchoring effects is much larger than 
that employed in any previous laboratory or field studies. An entire record of all the 
races run on the two racetracks (Sha Tin and Happy Valley racetracks) in HK from 
1998 to 2007 (in the pari-mutuel system) is used in this study. Similarly, records from 
the bookmaker betting system for all races run on 38 racetracks from 1996 to 2007 in 
the UK horserace betting market are employed. There are in total 66,244 horses (5,133 
flat races) in the HK database and 554,830 horses (49,881 flat races) in the UK database.  
4.  This  study  demonstrates  that  anchoring  effects  in  the  real  world  are  more 
difficult  to  detect  than  those  demonstrated  in  laboratory  and  field  experiments.  In 
particular, no significant anchoring effects are found on information such as horses’, 
jockeys’ or trainers’ past performances in both the HK and UK markets, even when the 
anchor is relevant and prominent (e.g., an outcome has been repeated three times). In 
addition, the research finds that expert bettors do incorporate public information more 
appropriately than casual bettors. However, none of the casual and expert bettors are 
found  to  anchor  their  subjective  probability  judgements  of  horses  winning  on  the 
information tested in this study. Therefore, anchoring in the real world is either weaker 
or more complex than has been thought by previous researchers.  
5. This study demonstrates that a mis-specification of a problem can be easily 
caused by combining or splitting data inappropriately. For example, bettors in the HK 
market are found to anchor their subjective judgements on horses’ post-positions in a 
race at the ST racetrack. However, this cannot be detected in tests using the market data 
as a whole (i.e., it can only be observed when the data are split according to certain 
criteria).  Therefore,  the  way  information  is  presented  and  categorised  should  be 
carefully considered in future research which studies anchoring. 
6. The cross-market tests to be conducted in this study aim to explore market 
differences in the use of anchoring. The cultural difference may be one of the reasons 
which cause these differences. Although the impact of the culture on people’s decisions 
is difficult to measure, it is assumed to be observed by comparing the results of similar 
tests in different markets (the horserace betting markets in HK and UK in this study).  
 
   6 
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Three broad research questions are derived from the literature in relation to the 
anchoring effect in real world environments. To answer these questions, four specific 
hypotheses associated with a dynamic real world environment, the horserace betting 
market, are developed, as follows.  
Research  question  one  investigates  whether  the  anchoring  effects  caused  by 
relevant or less relevant information exist in real world environments and how strong 
the  anchors  need  to  be  to  lead  to  anchoring  effects.  Two  specific  hypotheses  are 
developed to answer this question.  
1.  The  anchoring  factor  hypothesis:  Bettors  in  the  horserace  betting  markets 
anchor their judgements of a horse’s winning probability on information associated with 
(i) the past performance of the horse, (ii) the past performance of the horse’s jockey or 
trainer, (iii) the post-position of the horse, and (iv) the performance of the favourite in 
the previous race(s).  
2. The anchoring strength hypothesis: Anchoring effects in the horserace betting 
market are fragile and they only occur if the anchor is based on consistent results in the 
previous (i) two races,  or (b) three races (i.e.,  the anchors based on more than one 
previous race).  
Research  question  two  is  concerned  with  whether  the  degree  of  anchoring  is 
affected by the degree of expertise of decision makers in real world environments. To 
examine  this  research  question,  a  hypothesis  concerning  the  utilisation  of  bettors’ 
expertise in betting judgements is described as follows.  
3. The expertise hypothesis: Bettors with greater expertise are subject to a lower 
level of anchoring than those with less expertise.  
Finally,  the  third  research  question  explores  to  what  extent  the  degree  of 
anchoring is affected by the cultural environment in which decisions are made. The 
hypothesis associated with this research question is as follows. 
4. The market hypothesis: The degree of anchoring effects varies between the HK 
and the UK horserace betting markets.  
Justification for each of these hypotheses will be provided in the research design 
and methodology chapter, Chapter 3.  
   7 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
A positivism paradigm is adopted in this study. Under this paradigm, a deductive 
approach,  a  positivistic  strategy,  and  a  quantitative  research  method  are  considered 
appropriate  to  empirically  explore  the  research  questions.  A  full  discussion  of  the 
research design and methodology, including the research paradigm, approach, strategy 
and methods, is provided in Chapter 3. The research questions and hypotheses are also 
discussed in that chapter, as well as the data employed and the variables developed.  
 
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This study is structured in five chapters (see Figure 1.6-1).  
The first chapter provides a brief introduction on the motivation, objectives, scope, 
and  methodology  of  the  study.  Since  the  majority  of  existing  studies  have  been 
associated with laboratory or field experiments, this study aims to explore anchoring 
effects in a real world environment, the horserace betting market. A structure of the 
thesis is finally provided together with an outline of the contents of each chapter.  
Chapter  2  provides  an  extensive  review  of  the  anchoring  literature,  based  on 
laboratory  and  field  studies.  Two  types  of  anchoring  effects  are  defined:  traditional 
anchoring effects involve a comparison between the target and anchor values before 
absolute estimates are made, whereas basic anchoring does not require such comparison. 
Four alternative underlying mechanisms have been developed to explain why anchoring 
occurs.  The  demonstration  of  anchoring  effects  has  been  concerned  from  different 
aspects,  such  as  the  judgemental  contexts  of  anchoring  (e.g.,  general  knowledge, 
judicial judgements, negotiations), the sources of anchors (self-generated and explicitly 
provided), the relevance of anchors to targets (relevant and irrelevant), and the expertise 
of individuals (experts and novices). All these factors can have different impacts on the 
degree of anchoring effects.   
Based  on  the  literature  review  provided,  three  research  questions  concerning 
anchoring effects in real world environments are derived in Chapter 3. To answer these 
questions,  a  positivism  research  paradigm,  a  deductive  research  approach,  and  a 
quantitative research method are identified to be appropriate to this study. As a result,   8 
four specific hypotheses are developed to explore the degree to which that decision 
makers in a real world setting, the horserace betting market, employ the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic when making betting judgements. In particular, these hypotheses 
explore the existence of anchoring effects in this market, the impact of anchor strength 
on bettors’ judgements, the impact of expertise on the degree of anchoring, and the 
difference  of  anchoring  between  HK  and  UK  markets.  The  data  and  modelling 
procedures employed in this study are described in detail in this chapter.  
The  results  and  analyses  of  hypothesis  tests  are  provided  in  Chapter  4.  In 
particular, the extent to which bettors in the HK and UK horserace betting markets 
anchor their subjective judgements on certain publicly available information concerning 
horses’ winning probabilities (e.g., horses’, jockeys’ and trainers’ past performances, 
post-positions  of  horses,  and  previous  favourites’  performances)  is  examined.  The 
impact of the strength of anchors on bettors’ judgements is investigated by observing 
the influence of an anchoring factor when a result is repeated two or three times. The 
exploration of experts and non-experts in anchoring effects is conducted by analysing 
the weekday and weekend races and by investigating early and late bets in each race. 
The results suggest that overall no significant anchoring effects exist in the horserace 
betting markets. This is clearly inconsistent with previous studies. A number of reasons 
are raised to explain the discrepancies between the findings of this study and previous 
literature. The implications of the findings are discussed at the end of the chapter.  
A  summary  of  the  main  findings  and  discussions  is  provided  in  Chapter  5, 
together with a review of the research questions and hypotheses conducted in this study. 
A number of theoretical and methodological contributions are addressed in this chapter, 
followed by the limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
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Figure 1.6-1 Flowchart of the structure of the thesis 
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1.7 Conclusion 
 
A number of heuristics and behavioural biases have been investigated in previous 
studies. This study focuses on one of these, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, and 
explores to what extent decision makers in a real world environment,  the horserace 
betting  market,  employ  this  heuristic  and  anchor  their  judgements  on  the  publicly 
available information. By employing a large amount of real market data from the HK 
and UK horserace betting markets, this study seeks to fill the gap between experimental 
and real world studies and provides a new insight of anchoring effects in the real world.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ANCHORING EFFECTS: THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Of all the ways of defining man, the worst is the one which makes him 
out to be a rational animal.  
                                                                                                   Atanole France 
(Montier, J., Behavioral Finance: A User’s Guide,  p.1) 
 
This chapter provides a broad but profound review of the existing literature on 
judgements, heuristics, and particularly, on anchoring effects. A number of research 
questions are therefore derived from this extensive review and some hypotheses are 
consequently developed to explore these questions in the following chapters.  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Traditional economic theories assume that individuals are fully rational and are 
able  to  maximise  expected  utilities  when  they  make  decisions  (von  Neuman  and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954). However, observation suggests this is not the case 
in the real world. For example, people in the real world may not have the time or ability 
to obtain all the information that they need, and they may not have sufficient knowledge 
or appropriate skills to solve complicated decision tasks (Camerer, 1998; Gigerenzer 
and  Selten,  2001;  Keren,  1996;  Shiller,  1999;  Simon,  1955,  1956;  Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1974).  
To relate economic theories to real world situations, Herbert Simon (1955, 1956) 
proposed a ‘bounded rationality’ model to explain how people behave when they have 
limited information, are under time pressure, and/or do not have appropriate knowledge 
or skills. Within this model, people do make rational decisions, but only within their 
limited knowledge and computational capacities. In particular, they use simple rules of   12 
thumb,  ‘heuristics’,  to  reduce  the  complexity  of  decision  tasks  and  make  rapid  but 
rational decisions. A simple example is that if someone is asked to estimate how far an 
item is from him/her, a quick way of getting a reasonable answer is to assess how large 
the item is: the smaller it looks, the further the distance.  
However, although heuristics are useful in making rational and rapid decisions, 
they may also lead to systematic biases (e.g., Cervon and Peake, 1986; Goodwin and 
Wright, 2004; Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Keren and Teigen, 
2004; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). One of the most common heuristics (anchoring 
and  adjustment),  has  received  considerable  attention  in  the  literature.  In  particular, 
individuals who use this heuristic to make estimates start from an initial value (the 
anchor) and adjust this upwards or downwards to obtain the target value of the decision 
task. Previous studies suggest that these adjustments are often crude and insufficient 
(e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b; Northcraft and Neale, 
1987; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
Two  types  of  anchoring  effects  have  been  identified:  traditional  and  basic 
anchoring.  Generally,  traditional  anchoring  effects  involve  two  judgement  steps: 
individuals  first  compare  the  target  value  with  an  anchor  value  and  then  make  an 
absolute evaluation of the target to arrive at their final judgement (e.g., Cervone and 
Peake, 1986; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b; Quattrone et al., 
1981; Russo and Schoemaker, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Whereas a second 
form  of  anchoring,  basic  anchoring,  arises  when  individuals’  final  judgements  are 
influenced  by  anchor  values  even  though  they  are  not  required  to  make  direct 
comparisons between initial values and final judgements (Brewer and Chapman, 2002; 
Mussweiler and Englich, 2005; Wilson et al., 1996). Experimental results suggest that 
due to the lack of a comparison process between anchors and targets, basic anchoring 
effects are fragile and can easily disappear (Wilson et al., 1996).  
The  majority  of  the  literature  focuses  on  traditional  anchoring  effects,  which 
provides a profound basis for the basic anchoring study. In these studies, a number of 
factors  have  been  demonstrated  to  affect  the  degree  of  anchoring:  for  example,  the 
sources of anchors (self-generated or externally provided), the relevance of anchors to 
targets,  and  the  level  of  knowledge  or  experience  of  decision  makers.  Individuals 
anchor their judgements more on self-generated rather than externally provided anchors 
because they are more likely to confirm internally generated knowledge (self-generated   13 
anchors) and view it as relevant to the targets (e.g., Cervon and Peake, 1986; Davies, 
1997; Hinsz et al., 1997; Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Northcraft and Neale, 1987; 
Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). A number of studies suggest that anchoring effects occur 
even  when  the  anchor  value  is  unreasonable,  implausibly  extreme,  or  completely 
irrelevant to the target value (e.g., Cervone and Peake, 1986; Chapman and Johnson, 
1994;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999b;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  2000b;  Strack  and 
Mussweiler,  1997).  It  is  also  suggested  that  even  those  with  relevant  experience, 
knowledge or expertise are subject to anchoring effects (e.g., Diaz, III, 1997; Joyce and 
Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Tversky and 
Kahneman,  1974)  but  to  a  less  extent  than  those  without  these  advantages 
(Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b).  
It  is  noted  that  most  studies  exploring  anchoring  effects  are  undertaken  in 
laboratories and only a few are developed with tasks in naturalistic environments. These 
studies often analyse the judgements of individuals under artificial conditions where 
they are aware that they are being monitored (which may result in modified behaviour). 
The main findings of these experimental studies are reported in this chapter. A more 
criticised justification about differences between laboratory and naturalistic studies will 
be  discussed  in  full  detail  in  Chapter  3  when  identifying  appropriate  research 
methodology for this study. According to those differences, an analysis of anchoring 
effects  in  a  naturalistic  environment  in  which  individuals  do  not  know  that  their 
decisions are being investigated is required to fill the gap between laboratory and real 
world studies.  
Consequently,  this  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2.2  starts  with  the 
background  of  rationality  assumptions,  summarises  the  development  of  rationality 
theories and provides a general review of heuristics and biases explored in judgement 
and decision making. Studies investigating the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic and 
the  anchoring  effects  are  reviewed  in  Section  2.3  in  full  detail.  In  particular,  two 
different types of anchoring (the ‘contrast’ and ‘assimilation’ anchoring) are introduced 
in  Section  2.3.1. What this  study  explores  are  two  judgement  biases  caused  by  the 
assimilation anchoring – ‘traditional’ and ‘basic’ anchoring effects. The definitions of 
these two effects are provided in Section 2.3.2, the underlying mechanisms of these 
effects are discussed in Section 2.3.3, and the explorations of objective and subjective   14 
factors which may affect the degree of anchoring effects are presented in Section 2.3.4. 
Finally, a summary of the exploration and some conclusions are provided in Section 2.4.  
 
 
2.2 Background 
 
Expected utility theory has dominated economic theory since the 1940s. In the 
following few decades, economic researchers devoted countless effort to the technical 
details and measurements of expected utility and how to apply the theory to different 
areas such as risk-sharing and asset pricing (Camerer, 1998). Even so, it has been shown 
that individuals do not perform strictly according to the basic requirements of rationality, 
at least in certain circumstances (Shiller, 1999). Consequently, a number of alternative 
theories are developed to explain the phenomena or effects which do not follow the 
principles of expected utility theory. The development of economic theories and human 
behaviour research is briefly reviewed in this section as an introduction to the heuristic 
and bias literature.  
 
2.2.1 Traditional Economic Theory 
 
The rationality of human behaviour  and the quality of human judgement have 
been explored by researchers in economics, psychology, and other fields such as animal 
biology  and  artificial  intelligence.  Traditional  economic  theories  assume  that 
individuals are both ‘economic’ and ‘rational’. In particular, a rational agent or what 
has been termed an ‘economic man’ is supposed to have “knowledge of the relevant 
aspects of his environment” (Simon, 1955, p. 99), to have well-organised, stable and 
coherent preferences, and certain computational skills which enable him to rationally 
maximise those preferences (Rabin, 1998).  
To explain how individuals and organisations should behave rationally, a series of 
theories and models have been developed. Expected utility theory is one of those which 
has dominated the rationality study in the past couple of decades. The key principle of 
this  theory  is  that  the  utility  of  a  risky  gamble  should  be  the  probability-weighted 
average of the utilities of its possible outcomes (von Neuman and Morgenstern, 1944; 
Savage, 1954). As a reasonable and rational person, each individual will calculate the   15 
utility of each choice and choose the one which can achieve the highest preference scale 
(utility).  The  underlying  assumption  of  this  approach  is  that  individuals  are  able  to 
gather all the information that they need without time and cost constraints and that they 
have sufficient intellectual capacity and knowledge to maximise their expected utility 
when solving complicated decision tasks (Camerer, 1998; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; 
Keren, 1996; Shiller, 1999). Consequently, the concept of ‘rationality’ and the process 
of calculating probabilities, utilities, and optimal decisions are adopted in many other 
disciplines such as animal biology and artificial intelligence (Gigerenzer and Selten, 
2001).  
Although  the  notion  of  rationality  and  the  exploration  of  technical  details  of 
expected  utility  have  dominated  economic  theories  since  the  1950s,  a  relaxing  but 
competing  notion  of  ‘bounded  rationality’  emerged  at  about  the  same  time  (Simon, 
1955, 1956).  
 
2.2.2 Bounded Rationality Theory 
 
The notion of ‘bounded rationality’ is a modification of the ‘rationality’ notion in 
economics and human behaviour theories. As suggested by Simon (1955, 1956, 1990), 
the bounded rationality concept is like a pair of scissors with the ‘cognitive limitations’ 
of actual humans as one blade and the ‘structure of the environment’ as the other blade 
(Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; p. 4). In particular, bounded rationality theory accepts 
limited information obtained by individuals due to the time and cost constraints, and 
limited  information  processing  capacities  of  individuals  due  to  the  shortage  of 
knowledge  or  computational  facilities.  In  this  sense,  only  ‘approximate’  rationality 
might  be  employed  in  their  decision  processes.  In  addition,  the  structure  of  the 
environment also plays an important role in determining appropriate simplifications to 
different  choices.  Gigerenzer  and  Todd  (1999)  argue  that  the  success  of  models  of 
bounded rationality depends on their ability to exploit the information structure in the 
ecological
1 and social environment
2. Consequently, by carefully analysing the structures 
                                                 
1 Ecological environment refers to the natural environment where an event occurs. It should be considered 
in  the  decision  making  process.  A  decision  strategy  (or  a  heuristic)  can  only  be  successful  when 
employed in an appropriate environment. If applied in a wrong ecological environment, heuristics will 
lead to biases or cognitive illusions (Gigerenzer, 2004).  
2 Social environment refers to how fast the environment changes and the need to consider decisions of 
other people in this environment. For example, the do-what-the-majority-do heuristic is likely to be valid   16 
of  environments  in  which  the  choice  mechanisms  are  processed,  individuals  with 
limited  time,  information,  knowledge,  and  other  resources  are  also  able  to  make 
‘satisfying’ (if not ‘optimised’) decisions (Simon, 1956). To illustrate the areas where 
simple  heuristic  models  are  and  are  not  effective,  Hogarth  and  Karelaia  (2005) 
identified ‘regions of rationality’ by comparing the performances of different models on 
factors characterising environments. They found the terrain mapped by their tests is 
complex and no single model is ‘best’.  
Models of unbounded rationality tell people what they should do (a normative 
perspective),  whereas  models  of  bounded  rationality  try  to  describe  what  people 
actually  do  (a  descriptive  perspective)  and  explain  how  they  behave  when  holding 
limited information and are under time pressure (Camerer, 1998; Gigerenzer and Todd, 
1999;  Rabin,  1998).  Some  researchers  refer  to  bounded  rationality  as  ‘optimization 
under  constraints’  (Sargent  1993;  Stigler,  1961).  The  key  characteristic  of  bounded 
rationality  is  limited  search.  The  idea  of  optimization  under  constraints  develops 
optimization models but taking constraints in human minds (such as limited knowledge 
or memory) and environments (such as information costs or social contexts of events) 
into  account.  Whereas  Gigerenzer  and  Selten  (2001)  argued  that  even  optimization 
under  certain  constraints  may  require  a  collection  of  massive  information  and  large 
degrees  of  knowledge.  Therefore,  if  ordinary  people  do  not  actually  have  the 
computational capabilities and statistical skills to deal with such information, the model 
of optimization under constraints cannot be regarded as a form of bounded rationality. 
Some researchers have attributed cognitive illusions (actual behavioural fallacies and 
biases such as overconfidence bias) to humans’ bounded rationality, in the sense of 
irrationality  or  limitations  on  rationality  (Kahneman  et  al.,  1982;  Thaler,  1991). 
Gigerenzer  and  Selten  (2001)  argued  that  bounded  rationality  is  not  simply  a 
discrepancy between human reasoning and a ‘norm’ (e.g., a law of probability, logic, or 
optimization). They suggested that bounded rationality is neither optimization under 
constraints nor irrationality, but a type of theory which rethinks the norms and explore 
the actual behaviour of human minds and organisations.  
                                                                                                                                               
when the observer and demonstrators are under similar, stable, and noisy environments. Fast and frugal 
heuristics (rather than complicated models) are suitable to environments when other people’s behaviour 
makes a rapid change to the environment, when many decisions are required to be made in a successively 
dependent  order  in  an  environment,  or  when  decisions  have  to  be  made  in  coordination  with  other 
individuals (Gigerenzer, 2004).    17 
Bounded rationality has also been regarded as a series of fast and frugal heuristics 
which  are  suitable  to  different  decision  environments.  When  people  are  under  time 
and/or  cost  pressure  and  are  within  the  constraints  of  their  limited  knowledge  and 
cognitive capacities, they often employ simple ‘heuristics’ (or rules of thumb) to deal 
with complex decision tasks (Camerer, 1998; Conlisk, 1996).  
As  suggested  by  Gigerenzer  and  Todd  (1999),  simple  heuristics  can  be  very 
helpful and accurate if used appropriately. This is clearly in line with Simon’s original 
concept that an individual in a well-structured environment “requires only very simple 
perceptual  and  choice  mechanisms”  to  satisfy  his/her  needs  even  over  a  long-term 
(Simon, 1956, p. 137). However, many studies have suggested that these heuristics may 
also result in systematic biases (see, for example, Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The research interest explored in 
this thesis has drawn on one of these heuristics (and its related bias) and these will be 
discussed in later sections.  
 
2.2.3 Heuristics and Biases in Judgement and Decision Making 
 
Decisions made under conditions of uncertainty require estimates of probabilities 
of  possible  outcomes  of  the  decision.  When  under  time  and/or  cost  pressure  of 
searching information and within their constraints of limited knowledge and cognitive 
capacities, people use simple ‘heuristics’ to cope with the complexities of probability 
estimating and value predicting. Generally, these heuristics are useful and efficient in 
finding satisfying answers to decision tasks, but they may  also cause systematically 
biased judgements in certain circumstances.  
The  representative  studies  which  first  systematically  introduced  and  discussed 
heuristics and biases in human judgements and decision making were by Tversky and 
Kahneman  (1973,  1974).  In  their  studies,  Tversky  and  Kahneman  described  three 
heuristics which are employed by people in their everyday life: (i) representativeness, (ii) 
availability and (iii) anchoring and adjustment. Since then, a huge number of studies 
have been carried out to (1) demonstrate and analyse these three heuristics in different 
contexts and (2) to delineate the circumstances and conditions under which specific 
biases would appear or disappear (e.g., Chiodo, Guidolin, Owyang and Shimoji, 2004; 
Goodwin and Wright, 2004; Keren and Teigen, 2004; Koehler, 1996). Some additive   18 
heuristics and associated biases have subsequently been identified (e.g., Evans, 1989; 
Goldstein  and  Gigerenzer,  2002;  Pelham,  Sumarta  and  Myaskovsky,  1994;  Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters and MacGregor, 2002).  
 
2.2.3.1 Representativeness Heuristic 
 
The representativeness heuristic is often used to judge how likely it is that an 
object or a person belongs to a category, or the likelihood that an event originates from 
a process. This is evaluated by estimating the degree to which X is representative of Y, 
or the degree to which X resembles Y (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972, 1973; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). For example, if you see a lady who is wearing nice suits and 
high heel shoes and carrying a laptop, you may think the probability that she is an office 
lady is very high.  
As a general mechanism which can be employed in both singular and repeated 
events, the representativeness heuristic is valid and effective in many circumstances. 
Therefore,  this  heuristic  could  be  an  easy  and  fast  approach  which  requires  little 
cognitive  resources  and  effort  (Keren  and  Teigen,  2004).  However,  the 
representativeness heuristic may also generate a set of judgemental biases or falsifiable 
predictions if applied in an inappropriate environment.  
One of the most common biases associated with the representativeness heuristic is 
ignorance of base-rate frequency (prior probability) of outcomes. In an experiment by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), subjects were given personality descriptions of some 
individuals who were from a group of 100 professionals composed of engineers and 
lawyers and were asked to estimate the probability of each description that belonged to 
an engineer. In one condition, subjects were told that there were 70 engineers and 30 
lawyers  in  the  group  and  in  another  condition,  the  base-rates  were  reversed  (30 
engineers and 70 lawyers). Surprisingly, the probability judgements produced by the 
subjects in the two conditions had no difference. This indicates that subjects in each 
condition  made  their  assessments  based  on  how  likely  the  description  was 
representative of an engineer, but with little or no regard to the base-rate probability of 
engineers  being  in  the  group.  Further  experiments  demonstrated  that  when  no 
description  was  given,  people  were  able  to  use  the  base-rate  frequencies  properly. 
However, when specific descriptions were provided, people tended to ignore the base-  19 
rates and made judgements based on the descriptions, even when they were entirely 
uninformative.  Another  example  of  ignoring  base-rates  using  the  representativeness 
heuristic  is  the  so-called  conjunction  fallacy.  This  judgement  bias  occurs  when  the 
conjunction (or co-occurrence) of two events is overestimated due to the representative 
description of each event. A typical example might be: Which is most likely, (1) Linda 
is a bank teller, or (b) Linda is a bank teller who is active in the feminist movement, if 
Linda is described as a 31 year old single woman who is bright, outspoken, majored in 
philosophy, was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and 
also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations as a student? Although it is more likely 
that  the  single  event  rather  than  the  conjunctive  event  happens,  almost  90%  of  the 
subjects thought it was more probable that Linda was a bank teller who was active in 
the  feminist  movement  (Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1982).  Clearly,  subjects  in  this 
experiment ignored the base-rates of Linda being a bank teller and of Linda being a 
bank teller and active in the feminist movement, and make assessments based on how 
representative the description was to the question.  
Other  biases  associated  with  the  representativeness  heuristic  are  the  gamblers’ 
fallacy, the misconceptions of regression, and ignorance of sample size (Goodwin and 
Wright, 2004; Keren and Teigen, 2004; Montier, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 
1982). The gambler’s fallacy refers to an over-estimation of the occurrence of certain 
outcome when a series of opposite outcomes have continuously occurred, although the 
occurrence probability of each outcome is identical and independent. For example, after 
observing a long sequence of heads in a fair coin toss, many people will believe it’s 
more probable to get a tail in the next throw. This is because in a random process, heads 
and tails would be expected to occur equally in a long run, whereas people tend to 
regard a short and random sequence of events as the representative of what the random 
process  should  be  (Montier,  2002;  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974).  Another 
consequence of the representativeness heuristic is that people ignore the regression to 
the mean and expect an extreme value to be followed by another extreme value rather 
than by a value towards the mean (Montier, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For 
example,  given  no  fundamental  changes  in  the  market  conditions  or  salesman’s 
marketing strategies, a month of extremely high sales is more likely to be followed by a 
month of poor sales and vice versa. However, people often ignore the regression to the 
mean of sequential events and expect similar extremes in the following events (Montier,   20 
2002). Finally, people are found to neglect the influence of sample size and expect the 
probability of an event to occur in a small sample to be the same as that in a large 
sample (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This is because individuals regard both small 
and large samples as the representatives of the entire population and suppose the two 
sample sets are independent and share the same characteristics. However, small samples 
are  actually  more  likely  to  be  a  departure  from  the  average  value  according  to  the 
sample set theory (Goodwin and Wright, 2004).  
The representativeness heuristic has been applied in many areas. For example, in 
financial markets investors tend to over-react to a sequence of good earnings and expect 
the  probability  of  the  firm’s  earnings  in  the  next  period  to  be  continuously  high 
(ignorance of the regression to the mean) (Montier, 2002). In addition, professionals 
(financial  analysts)  are  also  found  to  employ  this  heuristic  when  predicting  future 
earnings. If their previous forecasts are extremely high, they are more likely to over-
react  to  these  excessively  extreme  forecasts  and  consequently  persist  with  a  high 
prediction for the next period (Amir and Ganzach, 1998).   
 
2.2.3.2 Availability Heuristic  
 
People use the availability heuristic to estimate the frequency of an instance from 
a category or the probability of the occurrence of an event by how easily these instances 
or events can be brought to mind (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974). In particular, 
they  believe  that  the  more  easily  that  a  number  of  instances  are  recalled,  the  more 
frequent the event would be and the more likely that it will happen again in the future 
(Keren and Teigen, 2004). For example, if one is asked to estimate the probability of a 
train going off the track and there happened to be a train accident a few days ago, it will 
be more possible for the person to easily recall this event. Consequently, they would be 
likely to assess the chance of a similar accident in the future to be high.  
Availability is a useful heuristic for assessing frequency of instances, especially 
for instances in large frequency classes which are recalled more easily and quickly than 
instances in low frequency class. However, it has been argued that the recall of a target 
event  is  not  only  a  simple  generalization  from  the  size/frequency  of  the  sample  of 
recalled instances to the entire population, but is also affected by other factors such as 
public exposure, vividness, primacy and recency of events (Keren and Teigen, 2004). In   21 
addition, the availability principle may also involve a process of mental productions of 
feelings:  ‘ease  of  recall’  is  regarded  as  more  important  than  ‘number  of  instances’ 
recalled  (Schwarz,  Bless,  Strack,  Klumpp,  Rittenauer-Schatka  and  Simons,  1991). 
Consequently, the application of availability may lead to a series of systematic biases 
which are illustrated below (Taylor, 1982; Tverskay and Kahneman, 1974).  
The  first  set  of  biases  caused  by  the  availability  heuristic  is  related  to  the 
retrievability  of  instances.  As  illustrated  by  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974),  the 
retrievability of instances is affected by many factors such as the familiarity, salience 
(colourful, dynamic, or vivid information), and recency of recalled events to the whole 
population of events. One example of the implication of familiarity in availability is the 
recall of celebrities’ names. After hearing a list of well-known personalities of both men 
and women, subjects were asked to estimate whether the list contained more names of 
males than of females. Results showed that subjects judged the proportions of men and 
women on the list according to their familiarities of the names that they heard: if they 
recognised more male names than female names, they reported more men than women 
on the list and vice versa. A simple example concerning salience of retrievability is that, 
for example, seeing a bank robbery on the street will actually have greater impact on the 
estimated probability of the occurrence of such an accident than the impact of reading it 
in  a  newspaper.  Another  example  of  salient  information  in  availability  is  that  the 
probability that people need earthquake insurance will be significantly overestimated 
after a large earthquake (Chlodo et al., 2004). Rothbart, Fulero, Jenson, Howard and 
Biffell  (1978)  pointed  out  that  salient  and  negative  information  in  media  coverage 
would  be  retrieved  more  easily  than  modest  and  positive  information.  In  addition, 
people are likely to select stocks from the newspapers or other professional tipsters 
because  the  public  and  salient  information  is  easier  to  recall.  However,  a  study  by 
Gadarowski (2001) found that stocks with very high levels of press coverage actually 
underperformed the market in the subsequent two years. This indicates the recall of 
public information may lead to judgement biases. Finally, the occurrence of a recent 
accident will have  greater impact on the subjective probability  estimate that similar 
event happens again than the impact of an accident which happened a year ago.  
Another example of retrieval biases is the study of egocentric attributions and the 
judgements  of  responsibility  for  joint  products  (Ross  and  Sicoly,  1979).  It  was 
demonstrated that when asked to assign the contribution of each participant of a joint   22 
product, people tended to recall more contributions of their own to the group product 
than the contributions of others, and therefore attributed their own responsibilities to the 
joint product more than other participants do. One possible explanation of this effect 
relies on motivational principles that people tend to attribute more credit to their own 
contribution and enhance their self-image. A so-called exposure bias provides another 
explanation for this effect: when estimating participants’ responsibilities to the group 
project, people bring their own contributions to mind more easily because they observe 
their own contributions more closely than other people do.  
A  second  group  of  availability  biases  is  associated  with  the  effectiveness  of 
searching  and  imagination.  Wood,  Atkins  and  Tabernero  (2000)  examined  the 
relationship  between  self-efficacy  and  performance  on  complex  tasks  by  exploring 
individuals’ perceived capabilities for conducting searches and for processing available 
information.  Results  showed  that  low  search  efficacy  caused  greater  use  of  the 
availability heuristic, and the low processing efficacy, however, was found to lead to 
greater  use  of  the  anchoring  and  adjustment  heuristic  and  the  representativeness 
heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) illustrated that in some circumstances, if the 
instances of which the frequency to be estimated were not stored in people’s memory, 
they intended to construct these instances according to certain rules and estimated the 
frequency of such instances of a class by the ease with which they were constructed. 
The bias caused by the imagination of events under the availability heuristic is that 
events  which  are  easily  imagined  may  not  necessarily  have  a  high  probability  of 
occurrence. For example, civil engineers who are in charge of a construction project 
may overestimate the risk of the project being delayed but underestimate other risks. 
This is because it is easier for a civil engineer to imagine all the circumstances which 
may cause the delay of the project, such as strikes, bad weather, and the interruptions in 
the supply of materials and equipment. However, it might be difficult for the engineer to 
imagine risks associated with a course of action (Keren and Teigen, 2004).  
Finally,  biases  may  come  from  illusory  correlation  (i.e.,  when  conditional 
probabilities have to be estimated, people tend to overestimate the frequency with which 
the two events occur together). One example of the bias of illusory correlation is from 
the experiment conducted by Chapman and Chapman (1969). In their experiment, naïve 
judges were given a diagnosis of a disease and a drawing made by a hypothetical mental 
patient. They were then asked to estimate how frequently certain characteristics of the   23 
diagnosis (such as suspiciousness) were accompanied by some features of the drawing 
(such as peculiar eyes). Results showed that the judges significantly overestimated the 
frequency with which suspiciousness and peculiar eyes were together, due to the bias of 
illusory  correlation.  Further  experiments  suggested  that  even  contradictory  evidence 
was not able to eliminate this judgement bias.  
 
2.2.3.3 Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 
 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic refers to a phenomenon whereby people 
make  estimates  by  starting  from  an  initial  value  (the  anchor  value)  and  adjusting 
upwards  or  downwards  to  reach  the  final  answer  (the  target  value)  (Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1974)
3. For example, if a sales manager is asked to estimate the sales level 
for next month, s/he may rely on the sales level of this month and move upwards or 
downwards to produce the final answer. However, it has been demonstrated that these 
adjustments are often insufficient.  
As suggested by the literature, the anchor value can either be generated by the 
decision makers or suggested by an external source. In either condition, the estimates of 
the target values are highly influenced by the anchor values and the adjustments from 
anchors  to  targets  are  often  insufficient  (e.g.,  Quattrone  et  al.,  1981;  Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1974). It has been demonstrated that even irrelevant anchors (Wilson et al., 
1996) or even ridiculously implausible/extreme anchors (Strack and Mussweiler, 1997) 
can also lead to anchoring. In addition, both novices and experts are subject to the bias 
of anchoring effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
The application of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic also leads to a number 
of decision biases. The first and important bias caused by the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic  is  the  conservative  bias  due  to  insufficient  adjustment.  This  may  raise 
problems in the estimations of costs, payoffs and probability forecasts. A second group 
of biases which come from this heuristic are the over-estimation of conjunctive events 
and  the  under-estimation  of  disjunctive  events.  When  estimating  the  probability  of 
occurrence of a conjunctive/disjunctive event, people are demonstrated to anchor their 
judgements  on  the  probability  of  one  single  event  in  this  task.  Therefore,  the 
                                                 
3 The target value is the quantity that needs to be estimated in a judgemental task. The anchor value refers 
to the number different from the target value but would influence the estimates of decision makers. The 
anchor can be either generated by judges themselves or provided by the external sources.    24 
conjunctive  probability  (a  multiple  of  the  probability  of  each  single  event)  is 
overestimated  and the disjunctive probability  (sum of the probability  of each single 
event) is underestimated. A third type of bias is related to overconfidence. Because 
people tend to be overconfident about their estimates from the anchor values, the ranges 
of their adjustments are often too ‘narrow’ to include the true value (Alpert and Raiffa, 
1982; Goodwin and Wright, 2004; Keren and Teigen, 2004; Quattrone et al., 1981; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
The  current  study  will  be  focusing  on  anchoring  effects,  the  judgemental  bias 
associated  with  the  anchoring  and  adjustment  heuristic,  and  the  application  and 
influential factors of anchoring effects in the real world environment. A more detailed 
review of anchoring effects will be documented in Section 2.3.  
 
2.2.3.4 Other Heuristics   
 
Following the studies of the three main heuristics discussed above, a number of 
new heuristics (e.g. Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Slovic, 2002) have been identified 
and have begun to draw more and more attention of judgement and decision making 
research. Specifically, the recognition heuristic suggests that the alternatives that can be 
recognised by decision makers are more likely to be assigned a bigger or better value 
than  those  which  cannot  be  recognised  (Goldstein  and  Gigerenzer,  2002).  This  is 
different  from  the  availability  heuristic  due  to  the  difference  between  capacity  for 
recognition and capacity for recall. One example, given by Craik and McDowd (1987), 
is that one may recognise a face but cannot recall who he is. The affect heuristic refers 
to the fact that people tend to consider activities positively rather than negatively. This 
seems to indicate that it is broadly believed that positive outcomes appear with higher 
probabilities  while  negative  outcomes  occur  with  lower  probabilities  (Slovic,  et  al., 
2002). The alternative outcomes effect is about the phenomenon that people only choose 
strongest competitors from the whole set of alternatives when comparing the probability 
of  target  outcomes  with  that  of  the  alternatives  (Windschitl  and  Wells,  1998).  The 
positivity heuristic refers to a phenomenon whereby humans tend to seek information 
consistent with their current beliefs and avoid the collection of potentially falsifying 
evidence (Evans, 1989). This heuristic indicates that people like to adopt strategies that   25 
are designed to confirm rather than refute their beliefs or individual perceptions of the 
world (Havard, 2001).  
Furthermore, a large number of other judgemental biases in probability estimation 
have been explored by researchers. For instance, the desirable bias, associated with the 
positivity  heuristic,  refers  to  the  phenomenon  that  people  tend  to  produce  a  higher 
probability for desirable outcomes than for undesirable outcomes. Similarly, the citation 
bias suggests that people pay more attention to the information or events desirable to 
them whilst paying no or less attention to undesirable information/events. In addition, 
the conservatism (or conservative) bias and overconfidence are related to the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic because people tend to make insufficient adjustments from an 
anchor  value  either  when  they  are  too  conservative  or  too  confident  about  their 
judgements  (Goodwin  and  Wright,  2004).  The  recognition  heuristic  will  lead  to  a 
counterintuitive effect, the less-is-more effect, which means that less information could 
conduct more accurate estimates under some circumstances. 
In summary, the heuristics and the decision biases caused by these heuristics are 
discussed in this section. The interest of the current study is the anchoring effect, the 
bias associated with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. A full exploration of the 
anchoring heuristic and corresponding effects is provided below in Section 2.3.  
 
 
2.3 Anchoring Effects 
 
As  introduced  in  Section  2.2.3,  individuals  use  the  anchoring  and  adjustment 
heuristic to estimate the values of decision tasks based on some anchor values which are 
generated by decision makers themselves or provided by external sources. Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that people’s adjustments are usually insufficient to produce 
the right answers. The effects caused by the application of the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic are termed anchoring effects.  
As  the  main  focus  of  this  study,  this  type  of  anchoring  effects  belongs  to  a 
category called assimilation anchoring in psychological judgements. In Section 2.3.1, 
two types of anchoring, the contrast anchoring and assimilation anchoring are defined. 
Under the notion of assimilation anchoring, definitions of two types of anchoring effects 
are introduced in Section 2.3.2; traditional and basic types of anchoring are identified,   26 
followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  strength  and  durability  of  anchoring  effects.  The 
underlying  mechanisms  of  the  anchoring  effects,  according  to  different  judgemental 
theories, are described in Section 2.3.3. In section 2.3.4, the external and individual 
factors which are considered to have impacts on the strength (how strong the anchors 
should  be  to  cause  anchoring)  and  durability  (how  long  the  anchoring  can  last)  of 
anchoring effects are discussed. Section 2.3.5 explores issues which have been covered 
by the literature but not been categorised into previous sections, such as the type of 
settings in which anchoring effects are explored, the impact of incentives on anchoring, 
and the way of debiasing of anchoring bias. A rich picture of the anchoring literature is 
displayed below in Figure 2.3-1.  
 
2.3.1 Types of Anchoring 
 
It should be noted that in different research areas, the concept ‘anchoring’ refers to 
different judgemental phenomena. In psychological judgements, the term ‘anchoring’ 
has  been  used  to  describe  ‘contrast  phenomena’  whereas  according  to  the  study  by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), it refers to ‘assimilation phenomena’. Although both 
phenomena  involve  a  judgemental  process  in  which  individuals’  judgements  are 
influenced by certain anchor stimulus, they are distinguished from each other in terms 
of judgemental processes, characteristics of the judgemental tasks, and resulting effects 
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a).  
 
2.3.1.1 Contrast Anchoring  
 
In the area of psychological judgement, ‘anchoring’ refers to a phenomenon that a 
concrete context consideration is processed to make a categorical judgement based on a 
different target stimulus (Brown, 1953; for an overview, see Chapman and Johnson, 
2002; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a). This is termed the ‘contrast anchoring’ effect and 
is mediated by changing judges’ experiential adaptation of the context stimulus to affect 
their perception of the target stimulus. For example, a target stimulus is regarded as 
being lighter in the context of a heavy stimulus but considered as heavier in the context 
of a light stimulus (Helson, 1964). This can be explained by a ‘judgemental contrast’ 
process, which achieves the response scale of a subjective judgement (target stimulus)   27 
based on a calibration of a given scale (given stimulus) (Parducci, 1968). It is suggested 
that  an  extremely  high/low  stimulus  (anchor)  may  lead  to  a  shift  of  people’s 
judgemental  calibration  towards  the  upper/lower  end  of  the  judgemental  dimension 
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a; Wyer and Srull, 1989).  
 
2.3.1.2 Assimilation Anchoring  
 
‘Assimilation  anchoring’  discovered  by  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974)  is  the 
focus of this study (if not specified, the terms ‘anchoring’ or ‘anchoring effects’ in the 
rest  of  this  study  all  refer  to  the  notion  of  ‘assimilation’  anchoring).  It  involves  a 
numerical  anchor  value  and  an  absolute  judgement  about  the  target  question 
(Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 2000a). In particular, the assimilation anchoring effect 
is caused by two numerical judgements: a comparative judgement between the anchor 
and the target values and, consequently, an absolute judgement about the target value. 
For  example,  in  one  of  Tversky  and  Kahneman’s  (1974)  classic  experiments,  each 
participant  was  provided  with  an  arbitrary  number  (the  anchor  value)  which  was 
randomly generated by spinning a wheel of fortune. They were then asked to compare 
this  number  with  the  percentage  of  African  countries  in  the  UN  (the  comparative 
judgement). Subsequently, they were required to give their own answer about the target 
question  (the  absolute  judgement).  It  has  been  suggested  that  people’s  absolute 
judgements  about  the  target  question  are  highly  assimilated  to  the  anchor  value 
generated by or provided to them. In particular, people who receive a high value as the 
comparison standard give higher estimates about the target value whereas those who 
receive a low anchor give lower estimates about the target (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 
1994;  Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987;  Quattrone  et  al.,  1981;  Tversky  and  Kahneman, 
1974).  
The assimilation anchoring effect has been demonstrated to be remarkably robust 
in terms of certain characteristics. For example, this effect may occur when the anchor 
value is randomly selected and totally uninformative (e.g., Cervone and Peake, 1986; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) or implausibly extreme 
(e.g.,  Chapman  and  Johnson,  1994;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999b;  Strack  and 
Mussweiler,  1997;  Wegener,  Petty,  Detweiler-Bedell  and  Jarvis,  2001)  to  the  target 
question,  or  when  the  anchor  value  is  informative  and  relevant  to  the  target  (e.g.,   28 
Northcraft and Neale, 1987). It appears when the anchor is self-generated (e.g., Davies, 
1997; Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) or externally  provided (e.g.,  Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). This 
effect  applies  not  only  to  novices  but  also  to  the  experts  who  have  professional 
knowledge  about  the  judgemental  tasks  (Englich  and  Mussweiler,  2001;  Joyce  and 
Biddle, 1981; Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Wilson, et al., 1996; Wright and Anderson, 
1989). The involvement of motivations or incentives for judgemental accuracy does not 
diminish the effect of anchoring (Wilson, et al., 1996).  
Moreover, the assimilation anchoring effects have been observed in a large variety 
of  judgemental  areas  besides  laboratory  settings.  For  example,  they  are  detected  in 
general knowledge questions (e.g., Mussweiler, 2001; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; 
Wegener,  et  al.,  2001),  estimates  of  self-efficacy  (Cervone  and  Peake,  1986), 
probability estimates (Plous, 1989), price estimates and auctions (e.g., Dholakia and 
Simonson,  2003;  Dodonova  and  Khoroshilov,  2004;  Mussweiler,  et  al.,  2000), 
evaluations  of  lotteries  and  gambles  (Carlson,  1990;  Chapman  and  Johnson,  1994; 
Englich, 2006; Ganzach, 1996), judicial judgements (Chapman and Bornstein, 1996; 
Englich, 2006; Englich and Mussweiler, 2001), negotiations (e.g., Chertkoff and Conley, 
1967; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Kristensen and Garling, 2000; Ritov, 1996), real 
estate judgements (Northcraft and Neale, 1987), auditing judgements (Joyce and Biddle, 
1981),  and  military  and  political  judgements  (Plous,  1989;  Whyte  and  Levi,  1994). 
Finally, it is argued that the assimilation anchoring effect may be used to explain a 
number of judgemental  phenomena  and biases (Chapman and Johnson,  1999, 2002; 
Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a) such as (i) the confirmation bias – 
people tend to seek information which is consistent with the hypothesis (e.g., Snyder 
and Swann, 1978), (ii) overconfidence – people are too confident with the accuracy of 
their judgements (this bias is less when the anchor is self-generated than externally 
provided,  e.g.,  Block  and  Harper,  2001;  Griffin  and  Tversky,  1992),  and  (iii)  the 
hindsight bias – people tend to believe that they would have predicted the outcome once 
they are aware of it, and the outcome knowledge works as an anchor which influences 
people’s  judgements  about  their  predictability  of  the  outcome  (e.g.,  Chapman  and 
Johnson, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins and Hastie, 1990).  
The research interest of my study is on the effect of assimilation anchoring in a 
real world environment. If not mentioned specifically, the term ‘anchoring effects’ in   29 
the rest of this study refers to the assimilation anchoring effects. More details about the 
characteristics and applications of these effects will be discussed in Section 2.3.4 and 
Section 2.3.5.  
 
2.3.2 Two Types of ‘Assimilation’ Anchoring Effects 
 
Two types of assimilation anchoring effects are defined in this section. The first 
and traditional definition of anchoring effects was suggested by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974).  In  their  study,  anchoring  effects  were  identified  as  a  phenomenon  whereby 
people  make  estimates  by  starting  from  an  initial  value  and  make  insufficient 
adjustments from this starting point to generate the final answer. In this definition, a 
comparison between anchor values and target values is essential. This definition has 
been the building block of subsequent anchoring research and is adopted and cited by 
most of the anchoring studies since then. However, about twenty years later, Wilson et 
al. (1996) demonstrated that anchoring may occur even when the anchor number is 
completely irrelevant to the target question and when no comparison is involved in the 
judgemental process. This concept of anchoring is termed basic anchoring and has been 
demonstrated to be trivial and fragile (Brewer and Chapman, 2002), compared with the 
traditional anchoring. The details of these two types of anchoring effects are presented 
as below.    30 
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2.3.2.1 Traditional Anchoring Effects 
 
Traditional anchoring effects appear when a two-stage procedure is involved in 
people’s judgements: subjects are firstly asked to compare the anchor and target values 
(a comparison procedure), and consequently required to give their own estimates of 
decision  tasks  (a  judgement  procedure).  Although  anchoring  effects  have  been 
demonstrated in a large number of judgemental environments, these various decision 
tasks all involve this two-stage procedure (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 1999; Jacowitz 
and  Kahneman,  1995;  Joyce  and  Biddle,  1981;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999a; 
Quattrone et al., 1981; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Whyte and Sebenius, 1997).  
For example, subjects in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) experiment were asked 
to estimate a number of quantities such as the percentage of African countries in the 
United Nations. For each quantity, a wheel of fortune was spun in front of the subjects 
to  generate  a  number  ranged  between  0  and  100.  The  subjects  were  firstly  asked 
whether the target quantity was higher or lower than the wheel number (the comparison 
procedure) and then were asked to give their own judgements of the target quantity. 
Different groups of people were all found to evaluate the target quantities based on the 
number that they were given: for example, the group who received a lower number of 
10 gave an average estimate of 25% and the group who received a higher number of 60 
gave an average estimate of 45%. Clearly, the random numbers generated by the fortune 
wheel  were  used  as  anchors  in  people’s  judgements.  Although  these  numbers  had 
obviously no relationship with the question subjects were asked, they still anchored 
their estimates on this number and made insufficient movements from it. It is argued 
that it is the comparison procedure that successfully draws people’s attention to this 
piece of information and the underlying mechanism behind the procedure is discussed 
in  Section  2.3.3  (e.g.,  Chapman  and  Johnson,  1999;  Mussweiler,  1997;  Strack  and 
Mussweiler, 1997).  
Another experiment undertaken by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demonstrated 
that  individuals  anchored  their  numerical  estimates  on  the  numbers  extrapolated  or 
adjusted  by  some  incomplete  computation.  In  particular,  two  groups  of  high  school 
students were asked to quickly estimate a numerical expression. According to the way 
the expression was presented, students in different groups gave answers with different   32 
average levels. For the product of an ascending sequence 1×2×3×4×5×6×7×8, students 
gave  answers  averaging  512,  whereas  for  the  product  of  a  descending  sequence 
8×7×6×5×4×3×2×1, the average estimate was 2,250. Although both estimates, typically, 
moved  insufficiently  towards  the  right  answer  (40,320),  the  result  of  the  ascending 
expression was significantly lower than that of the descending expression. This suggests 
that under high time pressure (within 5 seconds) the subjects can only make part of the 
calculation and rely their judgements on the first few steps of the computation (from left 
to right). Therefore, an ascending sequence generates a lower value than a descending 
sequence does. In this case, the anchors were the predictions generated by the subjects 
themselves, but even so, a comparison procedure between the target estimate and the 
computation result generated still existed and highly influenced people’s final estimates.  
Experiments  carried  out  by  many  other  researchers  follow  the  same  two-step 
procedure, although the tasks adopted may belong to various decision contexts such as 
psychology,  negotiation,  real  estate,  and  auditing  (e.g.,  Cervone  and  Peake,  1986; 
Chapman and Johnson, 1994, 1999; Diaz, III, 1997; Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995; 
Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a; Plous, 1989; Quattrone et al., 
1981; Russo and Schoemaker, 1989; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Whyte and Sebenius, 
1997). For  example, people are found to  anchor their estimates of vodka’s freezing 
point on the figure of 32º F since this is the benchmark of the freezing point of anything 
(Epley and Gilovich, 2001). In addition, real estate agents may anchor their estimates of 
property values on the listing price which is believed to be relevant to the market price 
of the property.  
 
2.3.2.2 Basic Anchoring Effects 
 
Demonstration of Basic Anchoring Effects 
In contrast to numerous studies on traditional anchoring effects, little attention has 
been  paid  to  basic  anchoring  effects,  a  phenomenon  whereby  people  anchor  their 
judgements on some particular numbers even when they are not asked to compare this 
number to the target value (for examples, see below). The basic anchoring effect was 
first detected by Wilson et al. (1996) in a series of well-manipulated experiments. The 
results  suggest  that  (1)  basic  anchoring  occurs  if  sufficient  attention  is  paid  to  the 
anchor  value,  even  if  the  anchor  is  completely  irrelevant  to  the  target  question,  (2)   33 
people who are knowledgeable about the target question are subject to a lower level of 
basic anchoring effects, and (3) basic anchoring effects are conducted unintentionally 
and  unconsciously,  and  therefore  are  difficult  to  avoid  even  when  incentives  are 
provided for judgement accuracy and when people are forewarned of the influence of 
anchoring.  It  is  argued  that  if  individuals  anchor  on  arbitrary  anchors  even  without 
being asked to do so, the anchoring effect may be more common in natural decision 
contexts than researchers had thought (Wilson et al., 1996). However, further studies 
show that due to the lack of a comparison process between anchors and targets, basic 
anchoring effects are fragile and can easily disappear, when other anchor numbers are 
used or the order of the anchor numbers is changed (Brewer and Chapman, 2002).  
The five experiments conducted by Wilson et al. (1996) to demonstrate the basic 
anchoring effect are described as below.  In the first experiment, 116 undergraduate 
students were asked to estimate the number of countries in the United Nations (the 
target value) in different conditions. In one condition, participants were given a large 
number on a piece of paper (the anchor value); in the control condition, participants 
were given a piece of blank paper (no anchor). In each of these conditions, participants 
were either asked to compare the number to the target question (as a relevant anchor) or 
to an unrelated question
4 (as an irrelevant anchor)
5. Consequently, all the participants 
were  asked  to  rank  how  knowledgeable  they  were  to  the  target  question  and  how 
confident  they  were  with  their  answers.  A  multiple  regression  with  a  2(control  vs. 
anchor) × 2(relevant vs. irrelevant anchor) × Level of Knowledge analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted. The results demonstrated a significant traditional anchoring 
effect in the condition with the anchor and a comparison between the anchor number 
and the estimate of the target question. Participants who received the anchor number 
but compared this number with an unrelated question were also found to anchor their 
estimates on the received number. This was attributed to a demonstration of the basic 
anchoring  effect
6.  In  addition,  both  traditional  and  basic  anchoring  effects  occurred 
                                                 
4 The target question (or the relevant question) is how many countries there are in the UN. The unrelated 
question  (or  the  irrelevant  question),  compared  to  the  target  question,  is  how  many  physicians  and 
surgeons there are in the local phone book.  
5 Participants in the no anchor condition were also asked these two types of questions and were instructed 
to leave this question blank.  
6 Although this example (to explicitly compare a number with a question which is unrelated with the 
target  question  and  then  provide  the  absolute  estimate  of  the  target  value)  was  regarded  as  an 
demonstration of basic anchoring effects (Wilson et al., 1996), I think it might be more suitable to regard 
it as an effect somewhere between traditional and basic anchoring effects.    34 
among people with low knowledge in the target question, whereas the estimates given 
by knowledgeable people were fairly accurate to the right answer.  
Because  asking  participants  in  the  irrelevant  condition  to  compare  the  anchor 
value with an irrelevant question may still make them compare it to the target question, 
further  studies  are  required  (Wilson  et  al.,  1996).  Experiment  two  constructed  four 
conditions
7 which  required  different  amounts  of  attention  of  people  to  the  anchor 
number (a four-digit ID number). Participants were asked to firstly check the condition 
of their ID numbers and then to answer the target question. No instruction of comparing 
the anchor number with the target value was involved. The results indicate that people 
who  paid  more  attention  to  the  anchor  number  experienced  a  higher  level  of  the 
anchoring  effect.  This  confirms  the  researchers’  hypothesis  that  to  cause  the  basic 
anchoring  effect,  sufficient  attention  is  needed.  Similarly,  the  third  experiment 
demonstrated that people who were asked to copy five pages of large numbers (with 7 
numbers on each page) gave higher estimates of the target question than those who 
copied four pages of words plus one page of numbers and those who copied five pages 
of words (no anchor number). This study confirms with the second experiment that 
basic  anchoring  only  occurs  when  sufficient  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  anchor 
number.  Another  two  conditions  in  which  participants  were  asked  to  make  simple 
computations on the five or one page of numbers showed similar results as the copy 
conditions; simple computations of anchor numbers had no extra influence in causing 
anchoring.  
People in experiments two and three all gave a low rate of being aware of the 
influence of anchor numbers. Furthermore, experiment four repeated experiment two 
but provided monetary incentives to encourage accuracy of estimates and in experiment 
five  participants  were  warned  not  to  be  influenced  by  the  anchor  numbers.  Results 
showed that the monetary incentives did not moderate the effects of anchoring; the pre-
warnings reduced people’s effects of anchoring to some degree but were not sufficient 
to eliminate them.  
Mussweiler and Englich (2005) provided confirmation of the existence of basic 
anchoring effects. For example, in one experiment, participants were asked to think 
about the annual mean temperature in Germany. During the thinking time, people were 
                                                 
7 In particular, the conditions of the ID numbers to be checked are: (1) whether it is written in red or blue 
ink, (2) whether it is a four-digits number, (3) whether it is greater than 100 (the GT-100 condition), and 
(4) whether it is greater than either 1920 or 1940 (the GT-1920-1940 condition).    35 
presented with a string of letters and a high/low (20/5) anchor number in sequence on 
the computer screen 10 times in a total of 60 seconds. The anchor numbers were merely 
presented to the participants without any instructions on the use of the number. The 
results showed a significant basic anchoring effect: participants who were presented 
with a high anchor value gave a higher estimate of the mean temperature whilst people 
who were subliminally primed with a low anchor value suggested a lower estimate. A 
further  study  in  another  context  (asking  the  average  price  of  a  midsize  car)  was 
conducted  and  provided  similar  results.  Consequently,  Mussweiler  and  Englich 
conducted a third experiment to demonstrate that a selective increase in the accessibility 
of target knowledge  was produced by the subliminal anchors. This may  suggest  an 
underlying  mechanism  of  selective  accessibility  model  to  explain  people’s  judging 
processes (see Section 2.3.3 for a further discussion of this mechanism).  
 
Challenge of Basic Anchoring Effects 
The idea of basic anchoring, which may widen the scope of natural contexts in 
which anchoring effects can be detected, is challenged by Brewer and Chapman (2002). 
It is argued that although significant basic anchoring effects are demonstrated, Wilson 
et al.’s experiments encounter some flaws which may lead to biased outcomes. One 
concern is that the anchors used in Wilson et al.’s experiments are all high-magnitude 
anchors  (both  high  and  low  anchor  numbers  are  normally  used  in  other  anchoring 
studies). This makes Wilson et al. only look at the difference between high anchors and 
the target but miss out  the difference between low anchors and the target.  Another 
concern relates to their anchor selection. For example, in the ‘ID number’ experiment, 
Wilson et al. used year-like anchor numbers which are unusual and unique in their 
salience and would therefore attract special attention of people. In the ‘copying’ study, 
the basic anchoring effect was only elicited on a large quantity of numbers (five pages 
of anchor numbers rather than one page of numbers). Therefore, basic anchoring may 
only occur as a result of some special anchors which can attract sufficient attention of 
people.  
Therefore, Brewer and Chapman (2002) re-examined two experiments of Wilson 
et  al.  (1996)  and  extended  them  by  using  different  anchors,  including  low  anchor 
numbers, and changing the order of anchors. In particular, they replicated Wilson et 
al.’s ‘ID number’ experiment with high numbers (5600s), low numbers (600s), the year-  36 
like numbers (1900s) and zip-codes (08900s) as anchor numbers. The results showed 
that the basic anchoring effect occurred only when the year-like numbers were used. 
Both high and low ID numbers were not found to be significantly anchored on; even the 
zip-codes which were supposed to be as salient as the year-like numbers did not cause 
basic anchoring. This seems to indicate that basic anchoring effects merely occur in 
some  very  special  circumstances  such  as  when  the  year-like  numbers  are  used  as 
anchors. To generalise basic anchoring from the specific  year-like numbers to other 
salient  numbers,  such  as  the  zip-code-like  seems  to  be  difficult.  In  addition,  an 
extremely large anchor number (such as 5600s in this study) may not necessarily cause 
anchoring effects, although some studies suggest that higher anchors can result in a 
stronger anchoring bias (Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Chapman and Bornstein, 1996).  
The  second  and  third  experiments  conducted  by  Brewer  and  Chapman  (2002) 
extended Wilson et al.’s ‘copying’ study by including low anchor values and changing 
the order of the anchor numbers. In experiment two, Brewer and Chapman used both 
low and high numbers which were approximately a tenth and ten times the numbers that 
Wilson et al. used as anchors. Four conditions of these anchor numbers (five pages vs. 
one page, copying vs. computation) were manipulated as Wilson et al.’s experiment. In 
the  high  anchor  condition,  Brewer  and  Chapman’s  experiment  failed  to  get  a  basic 
anchoring  effect  as  was  found  in  Wilson  et  al.’s  experiment.  In  the  low  anchor 
condition, only five pages of numbers with simple computations were demonstrated to 
raise  anchoring  and  none  of  the  other  conditions.  This  may  indicate  that  the  basic 
anchoring is sensitive to a large number of anchors and to a computational operation 
which requires deeper cognitive processing.  
The third experiment manipulated by Brewer and Chapman (2002) replicated the 
second experiment but with anchor numbers appearing on all the five pages in a random 
order
8. A 2(Computation) × 2(Anchor Level) × 2(Anchor Order) ANOVA analysis was 
conducted and the results showed that neither computation, anchor level, or order of 
anchors had effects on people’s estimates of the target question.  
In summary, experiments developed by Brewer and Chapman (2002) suggest that 
highly  specific  manipulations  are  required  to  obtain  basic  anchoring  effects.  Such 
effects are fragile, easy to be reduced or eliminated by trivial changes of tasks such as 
                                                 
8 In Wilson et al.’s “copying” experiment, the anchor numbers displayed on each page were presented in 
a carefully scripted order: the first four in a descending sequence and the last three in an ascending 
sequence starting from one number greater than the first number of the seven numbers on this page.    37 
using  different  anchor  numbers  or  changing  the  order  of  anchors,  and  therefore  are 
difficult to generalise but easy to debias.  
 
2.3.2.3 Strength and Durability of Anchoring Effects  
 
Strength of Anchoring Effects  
As  discussed  in  Section  2.2.3,  one  of  the  decision  biases  which  may  lead  to 
anchoring effects is overconfidence: people are too overconfident about their estimates 
so make only a small range of adjustments from the anchor values. These are often not 
sufficient to achieve the correct answers (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982; Goodwin and Wright, 
2004; Keren and Teigen, 2004; Quattrone et al., 1981; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
In judgement and decision making, overconfidence and underconfidence are referred to 
as judgemental miscalibrations (Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Nelson, Bloomfield, Hales 
and Libby, 2001). As suggested by Griffin and Tversky (1992), these miscalibrations 
are elicited because people tend to pay too much attention to information strength
9 and 
too little attention to information weight
10. As a result, overconfidence of judgement 
occurs when information is of high strength but low weight whereas underconfidence 
occurs with low strength but high weight information (Griffin and Tversky, 1992).  
One  example  to  describe  the  impact  of  information  strength  and  weight  on 
judgements is the coin-flipping exercise (Bloomfield, Libby and Nelson, 2000; Griffin 
and Tversky, 1992). There are an equal number of heads-biased coins which have a 
60% chance of coming up heads and a 40% chance of coming up tails and tails-biased 
coins which have a 40% chance of coming up heads and a 60% chance of coming up 
tails.  The  information  strength  in  this  example  is  the  sample  proportion  (i.e.,  (the 
number of heads coming up – the number of coins coming up) / the number of flips), 
and the information weight refers to the sample size (i.e., the number of flips). Each 
coin is thrown a number of times and whether it is heads-biased or tails-biased has to be 
estimated.  It is found that when the sample proportion strongly supports the heads-
biased coins (3/3=100%), whereas the sample size is fairly small (for example, flip 3 
times with the results of 3 heads and no tails, the difference between heads and tails is 
3), people tend to overestimate the possibility of the coin being heads-biased. On the 
                                                 
9 Information strength refers to the proportion of the appearance of a certain event in a sample.  
10 Information weight relates to the size of a sample and the statistical reliability of an inference which 
can be drawn from the sample.    38 
contrary, a sample of 17 flips with 10 heads and 7 tails (the difference between heads 
and  tails  is  3  too),  the  evidence  strength  suggested  by  the  sample  proportion 
(10/17=58.8%) is moderated whereas the sample size of 17 becomes more reliable and 
should be given a more information weight. Therefore, a lower-weight 3-flip sample 
may  cause  overconfidence  and  a  higher-weight  17-flip  sample  may  lead  to 
underconfidence.  
Moreover, Nelson et al. (2001) adopted Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) example of 
coins  and  employed  it  in  an  artificial  financial  market  to  explore  the  impact  of 
information  strength  and  weight  on  investors’  confidence,  trading  volumes,  trading 
prices and wealth. They found that investors tend to make more extreme estimates of 
the value of the security when they have high-strength and low-weight information than 
those  who  have  low-strength  and  high-weight  information.  However,  investors  with 
more extreme estimates of security values are found to trade as aggressively as those 
with less extreme estimates do. In addition, because the market price is biased toward 
high-strength and low-weight information, investors with such type of information tend 
to buy at high prices (when their information is favourable, their estimates tend to be 
too high) and sell at low prices (when their information is unfavourable, their estimates 
tend to be too low). Therefore, their wealth is transferred to investors with low-strength 
and high-weight information.  
It  seems  that  the  concept  of  information  strength  has  a  large  number  of 
implications in the contexts where anchoring effects may occur. For example, in Wilson 
et al.’s (1996) studies, basic anchoring only occurs when people copied five pages of 
numbers but is absent in the condition of four pages of words plus one-page of numbers. 
This suggests that the anchor information should be strong (extreme, salient, or repeated 
a number of times) enough to cause anchoring effects. However, to the researcher’s 
knowledge, no study has systematically examined the impact of the strength of anchors 
on the degree of anchoring effects either in laboratory experiments or in the natural 
environments. This study will be a preliminary research which intends to explore this 
issue in a real world environment.  
 
Durability of Anchoring Effects  
Another  remarkable  characteristic  of  the  phenomenon  of  anchoring  is  its 
durability  (i.e.,  the  effect  may  remain,  uninfluenced,  over  time).  A  number  of   39 
researchers  have  proposed  a  Selective  Accessibility  Model  (for  more  details,  see 
Section  2.3.3)  to  conceptualise  anchoring  as  an  impact  of  people’s  accessible 
knowledge about anchors on their judgements. Under this conceptualisation, anchoring 
is mediated by a selective increase in the accessibility of anchor-consistent knowledge 
(i.e.,  knowledge  which  supports  rather  than  challenges  the  use  of  anchors  in  their 
judgements) about the judgemental target (Mussweiler, 1997; Chapman and Johnson, 
1999; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). In 
particular, decision makers are supposed to compare the target and the anchor value by 
examining  the  assimilability  of  the  anchor  to  the  target.  To  do  so,  they  tend  to 
selectively  retrieve  the  information  and  knowledge  which  is  consistent  with  their 
assumption  about  the  relationship  between  the  anchor  and  the  target  rather  than 
information and knowledge which is against it. Therefore, people’s estimates about the 
target  would  be  heavily  influenced  by  this  anchor-consistent  and  easily  accessible 
knowledge  that  they  retrieve  (Mussweiler,  2001).  Various  studies  on  knowledge 
accessibility effects (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Sedikides and Skowronski, 1991; Srull and 
Wyer, 1979, 1980; Wyer and Srull, 1989) have repeatedly demonstrated the durability 
characteristic  of  these  effects:  the  influence  of  some  trait  priming  to  judgement  is 
remarkably  durable  if  the  trait  concept  is  easily  and  increasingly  accessible.  In 
consequence, the anchoring effect as a special case of knowledge accessibility effects 
may also encounter a similar characteristic: durability.  
The durability of anchoring effects is examined by Mussweiler (2001) in three 
carefully  constructed  experiments.  Study  1  examined  the  durability  of  people’s 
judgemental  anchoring  on  a  fictitious  target  (‘Xiang  Long’).  The  participants  were 
firstly asked to compare the age of ‘Xiang Long’ with either 2000 or 60 years old, and 
then  were  required  to  give  their  own  estimates  of  the  target  object’s  age  either 
immediately after the comparison or one week later. A 2(high vs. low anchor) × 2(no vs. 
one-week  delay)  ANOVA  analysis  was  conducted  and  the  results  found  significant 
anchoring effects in both the no-delay and the one-week delay conditions. Participants 
who received the high anchor (2000 years old) gave fairly high estimates of the age of 
‘Xiang Long’ (about 1000 in average in both no-delay and one-week delay conditions) 
whereas  those  who  received  the  low  anchor  (60  years  old)  made  relatively  low 
estimates  of  this  target  (about  80  in  average  in  both  no-delay  and  one-week  delay 
conditions). The estimated difference between the high and the low anchor conditions is   40 
significant in both no-delay and one-week delay conditions, although participants in the 
delay condition said they did not remember the anchor value which they had received 
one week earlier. These findings suggest that the effects of judgemental anchoring are 
significantly  durable.  It  is  argued  that  judgements  about  a  fictitious  target  (such  as 
‘Xiang Long’) are more likely to encounter anchoring (Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b) 
and the anchoring effects caused by the fictitious target are more likely to be durable 
(Mussweiler,  2001).  This  is  because  judges  are  less  likely  to  retrieve  additional 
information about the fictitious target during the period of delay and hence are more 
likely to stick their judgements to the anchor value over a long time (Mussweiler and 
Strack, 2000b).  
To reduce the influence of fictitious targets on people’s judgements, Mussweiler 
(2001) replaced the fictitious ‘Xiang Long’ question by questions about two actually 
existing targets (the year in which Albert Einstein visited the USA for the first time; the 
maximum  length  that  a  whale  can  reach)  in  the  second  experiment.  The  results 
replicated the findings of study 1 and showed a significant anchoring effect in both no-
delay and one-week delay conditions. The effects of anchoring could even remain till 
one week later once the anchor value was provided. Furthermore, a target question 
which may encounter more interactions from other relevant information about the target 
during the delay period was adopted in study 3. Participants were asked to compare the 
annual mean temperature in Germany with a particular anchor number (20ºC as the 
high  anchor  value  and  5ºC  as  the  low  anchor  value),  and  then  to  give  their  own 
estimates of the temperature either immediately or one week later. In this study, the 
alternative relevant information about the target value (the temperature in Germany) is 
encountered more frequently (on a daily basis) than the previous two studies. But again, 
significant  anchoring  effects  in  the  no-delay  and  one-week  delay  conditions  are 
demonstrated, although none of the participants in the delay condition could recall the 
anchor value that was given to them one week earlier.  
The  social  judgement  research  has  suggested  that  the  degree  of  durability  of 
judgement will be damaged if alternative relevant information about the judgemental 
task is encountered frequently during the judgemental delay (Wyer and Srull, 1989). 
This is not consistent with the case of anchoring effects. In Mussweiler (2001)’s three 
experiments,  the  possibility  that  relevant  information  about  the  target  object  is 
encountered between the judgemental priming and the time when they are required to   41 
give the absolute estimate is increasing. However, increasing the frequency of relevant 
information  does  not  seem  to  diminish  the  durability  of  the  anchoring  effects 
demonstrated in these studies. This might result from the self-generation process of 
knowledge  activation  in  judgemental  anchoring.  In  particular,  self-generated 
information  affects  people’s  judgements  more  deeply  than  externally  provided 
information (Davies, 1997; Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Mussweiler and Strack, 
1999b; Slamecka and Graf, 1978). In terms of anchoring effects, although the anchor 
value is externally provided to the judges, the absolute estimates of the target question 
need  to  generate  by  themselves.  The  information  involved  in  the  delay  interim,  is 
however,  “typically  externally  provided  rather  than  self-generated  and  will 
consequently have a rather shallow effect” (Mussweiler, 2001; p. 439) on judgements. 
Therefore,  the  influence  of  frequent  but  external  information  is  “too  weak  to 
undermine” (Mussweiler, 2001; p. 439) the influence of the self-generated target value 
estimated  one  week  later.  In  summary,  anchoring  effects  may  be  more  robust  and 
durable than other knowledge accessibility effects, i.e. less likely to be affected by new 
alternative information during the delay (Mussweiler, 2001).  
 
2.3.3 Underlying Mechanism of Anchoring Effects  
 
Whilst the robustness of anchoring effects has been demonstrated in a variety of 
judgemental domains (as mentioned above), the underlying mechanisms of these effects 
still remain unclear. Mussweiler and Strack (1999a) discussed four models which intend 
to  explain  anchoring  effects:  insufficient  adjustments,  conversational  inferences, 
numerical priming, and selective accessibility. They argued that the first three models 
are all insufficient to explain the anchoring effect, and the selective accessibility model 
provides  a  better  understanding  of  it.  In  addition,  Chapman  and  Johnson  (2002) 
proposed two models to explain anchoring effects: anchoring as adjustment (which is 
similar  to  the  insufficient  adjustment  model)  and  anchoring  as  activation  (which  is 
similar to the selective accessibility of information model). Finally, it is suggested that 
“judgemental anchoring is not a single mental trick but a set of tricks” (Epley, 2004; p. 
241).  If one single model cannot fully  explain  the mechanism of  anchoring effects, 
probably a better idea is to combine some of the models together.  
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2.3.3.1 Insufficient Adjustment  
 
In Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) original study, insufficient adjustment is used 
to explain the effect of anchoring. In this mechanism, the anchor serves as a starting 
point and people adjust their estimates upwards or downwards from the anchor value to 
reach the final answer.  Such adjustment is often insufficient, which biases the final 
estimate toward the initial value. One possible explanation for insufficient adjustment is 
judges’ uncertainty about the value that they need to estimate (Chapman and Johnson, 
2002).  For  example,  Quattrone  et  al.  (1981)  pointed  out  that  subjects  will  stop  the 
adjustment shortly after they find a range of plausible values for the target question. 
Jacoowitz and Kahneman (1995) also suggested that judges adjust their estimates in the 
appropriate direction until an acceptable value is reached. Another possible explanation 
for insufficient adjustment is that adjustment is effortful whereas people terminate too 
soon  before  they  get  the  right  answer  due  to  lack  of  cognitive  effort  or  resources 
(Chapman and Johnson, 2002).  
However,  researchers  argue  that  the  model  of  insufficient  adjustment  is  only 
appropriate  for  cases  with  implausible  anchors  (Mussweiler  and  Englich,  2005; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2001b; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). In addition, Epley and 
Gilovich (2001) demonstrated that insufficient adjustment only contributes to anchoring 
effects when the anchors are self-generated and extremely implausible compared to the 
target value.  In their further studies, Epley and Gilovich (2006) suggested that self-
generated anchor values tend to lead to insufficient adjustments because people stop the 
adjustment  once  they  reach  a  plausible  value.  Thus,  it  is  difficult  to  explain  why 
plausible,  acceptable  and  relevant  information  also  causes  anchoring.  For  example, 
Northcraft and Neale (1987) found that even experts anchor their estimates of the cost 
of a house on a series of plausible and acceptable prices of the house, such as the listing 
price. Therefore, insufficient adjustment is not sufficient to explain anchoring effects. In 
fact, insufficient adjustment is more like a description of the anchoring effect rather 
than an explanation of it.  
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2.3.3.2 Conversational Inferences  
 
The  second  model  used  to  explain  the  underlying  mechanism  of  anchoring  is 
conversational inferences. People tend to use the anchor value to infer possible target 
values because an implicit conversation which favours the anchor value is applied in 
their mind (Grice, 1975). In particular, subjects may assume the anchor value provided 
by the experimenter is informative (which may not be the case) to the target question 
and hence make an estimate similar to it. In addition, it is more likely and reasonable 
that people regard the relevant anchor value as a hint to the real value (see for example, 
Northcraft and Neale, 1987).  
Although  the  conversational  inferences  model  explains  the  anchoring  effect 
caused by informative anchors (no matter whether they actually are or not), it cannot 
explain the impact of implausible values on people’s judgements. In addition, it cannot 
explain  the  effects  caused  by  randomly  selected  anchors  (Mussweiler  and  Strack, 
1999a). Obviously, numbers generated by spinning a wheel of fortune (Tversky and 
Kahneman,  1974),  throwing  dice  (Mussweiler  and  Strack,  2000a),  or  drawing  cards 
(Cervone and Peake, 1986) have no relationship with the values to be estimated and 
should not be taken into account as informative hints. However, subjects still anchor 
their estimates on them, even if they are aware that the numbers are generated randomly.  
 
2.3.3.3 Numeric Priming  
 
Due  to  the  limitations  of  insufficient  adjustment  and  conversational  inferences 
discussed  above,  a  numeric  priming  model  is  adopted  as  an  alternative  to  explain 
anchoring  effects.  In  particular,  the  number  priming  suggests  that  the  anchor  value 
draws people’s direct attention and increases its accessibility to people’s knowledge 
when they make estimates about the target. Therefore, the anchor value is easily brought 
to mind and leads to values similar to the anchor value (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a). 
As a consequence, a number of studies have argued that it is the anchor value itself that 
works and anchoring effects are superficial and purely numeric in nature (Jacowitz and 
Kahneman, 1995; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong and Kwong, 2000). For example, Wilson 
et al.’s ‘copying’ study (1996, study 3) demonstrated anchoring effects when subjects 
were merely asked to copy five pages of numbers which had no relationship with the   44 
target value (the number of current students at the university who are expected to have 
cancer in the next 40 years) to be estimated. In addition, Wong and Kwong (2000) 
argued that it is the absolute value of the anchor that draws people’s attention and leads 
to anchoring effects. A simple example is that when asked to compare the length of the 
runway of the Hong Kong Kai Tak Airport with an anchor value, subjects who received 
a high absolute value (7300m) gave greater estimates of an unrelated target value (the 
price of a bus) than those who received a low absolute value (7.3km).  
Although the numeric priming has successfully attributed the numeric nature of 
the  anchor  value  to  all  the  anchoring  phenomena,  it  is  criticised  for  ignoring  the 
semantic content with which the anchor values are associated (Mussweiler and Strack, 
1999a, 2001b; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). First, the change of the dimension of the 
same  target  object  may  affect  the  degree  of  anchoring.  For  example,  Strack  and 
Mussweiler  (1997,  study  1)  first  asked  subjects  to  compare  the  height  of  the 
Brandenburg Gate with a low anchor value (25m), and then asked them to estimate the 
height (no change of dimension) or the width (change of dimension) of the Gate. The 
results  showed  that  when  the  dimension  of  the  target  value  was  changed,  the 
assimilation  of  their  estimates  to  the  anchor  value  was  diminished.  Similarly,  after 
comparing whether the Cathedral of Cologne was taller or shorter than 320m (a high 
anchor  value),  subjects  who  estimated  the  height  (no  change  of  dimension)  of  the 
Cathedral were subject to a greater level of anchoring effect than those who estimated 
the length (change of dimension) of it for the absolute question. Second, the change of 
the target object may also lead to different degrees of anchoring. For example, after 
comparing the number of African countries in the United Nations with a specific anchor 
number, people’s estimates of the target value of the same object (how many African 
countries  are  there  in  the  UN)  are  more  assimilative  to  the  anchor  value  than  the 
estimates of a different object (how many physicians are listed in the local phone book) 
(Wilson et al., 1996, study 3).  
Taken together, the change of the semantic context in which the anchor value is 
presented will significantly affect the influence of the anchor value on people’s absolute 
estimates  of  the  target  value.  Therefore,  a  framework  of  purely  numeric  priming  is 
argued  to  be  insufficient  to  explain  such  phenomena  of  anchoring  (Mussweiler  and 
Strack, 1999a, 2001b; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997).  
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2.3.3.4 Selective Accessibility of Information  
 
Mussweiler  and  Strack  propose  a  selective  accessibility  model  to  explain  the 
underlying mechanism of anchoring effects (Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler and Englich, 
2005; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). Two 
fundamental principles of social cognition are associated with this model: hypothesis-
consistent testing and semantic priming. The hypothesis-consistent testing process is 
related to a selectivity hypothesis. That is, participants selectively relate their retrieved 
knowledge about the target of a decision task to an anchor value and test the possibility 
that the target is consistent with the anchor value. The semantic priming process is 
related  to  an  accessibility  hypothesis.  That  is,  generating  knowledge  from  the 
comparison  between  the  anchor  and  the  target  increases  the  accessibility  of  the 
knowledge,  and  makes  it  more  likely  to  be  relied  on  in  the  subsequent  absolute 
judgement of the target value (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a).  
In  particular,  Mussweiler  and  Strack  (1999a,  1999b,  2000a)  suggest  that  to 
compare  the  judgemental  target  with  the  specific  anchor  value,  people  selectively 
retrieve knowledge, from memory or external resources, which is maximally consistent 
with the anchor value (Mussweiler, 1997; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). Consequently, 
the  accessibility  of  anchor-consistent  knowledge  is  increased.  To  make  the  absolute 
estimate of the target value, subjects simply rely on the easily accessible knowledge 
(Higgins,  1996;  Wyer  and  Srul,  1989)  and  their  estimates  are  found  to  be  heavily 
influenced  by  the  anchoring  information  which  has  previously  been  retrieved.  A 
significant assimilation of the target value to the anchor value is then performed (e.g., 
Mussweiler and Englich, 2005; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). For example, people who 
are  asked  whether  the  Mississippi  River  is  longer  or  shorter  than  3,000  miles  are 
assumed to estimate the possibility that the Mississippi River actually is 3,000 miles 
long.  To  do  so,  they  selectively  retrieve  knowledge  from  an  external  resource  (the 
provided anchor value, 3,000 miles, in this example) which is assumed to be maximally 
consistent with the target value. After increasing the accessibility of anchor-consistent 
knowledge, judges heavily rely on this easily accessible, anchor-consistent information 
and  give  their  final  estimates  highly  assimilative  to  the  anchor  value  (Strack  and 
Mussweiler, 1997). A number of studies (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Slamecka and Graf, 1978)   46 
have suggested that self-generated information is highly accessible and will lead to a 
higher level of anchoring, compared with anchors from external resources.  
In addition, Chapman and Johnson (1999, 2002) review a number of studies (e.g., 
Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995; Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler, 1997; Strack 
and Mussweiler, 1997) exploring the underlying mechanism of anchoring effects and 
propose a notion of the anchoring as activation. In particular, it refers to the notion that 
“anchors influence the availability, construction, or retrieval of features of the objects to 
be judged” (Chapman and Johnson, 1999; p. 120). The target estimate is influenced by 
the anchor information. However, Chapman and Johnson point out that “factors that 
affect retrieval or construction can bias the judgement” (Chapman and Johnson, 1999; p. 
120).  For  example,  if  the  target  and  anchor  share  some  features  in  common,  the 
presence of an anchor will help increase the activation of these features and heavily 
influence the target evaluation. If the target object is different from the anchor, however, 
the features of the target will be difficult to be retrieved or constructed; therefore, the 
influence of anchor value to target value will be reduced.  
 
In summary, the underlying mechanisms of anchoring effects have been of much 
interest  in  many  anchoring  studies  and  a  number  of  models  (namely,  insufficient 
adjustment, conversational inferences, numeric priming, and the selective accessibility 
model)  have  been  proposed  to  explain  the  effect  of  anchoring  (e.g,  Chapman  and 
Johnson,  1999,  2002;  Epley  and  Gilovich,  2001;  Mussweiler  and  Englich,  2005; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 2001b; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). Each of these 
models has its own features and can at least explain some, if not all, of the anchoring 
phenomena. It has been suggested that anchoring effects may be due to several, not one, 
independent  mechanisms  (Epley,  2004).  The  exploration  of  these  underlying 
mechanisms  brings  out  an  increasingly  deep  understanding  of  the  operation  of 
anchoring effects. However, the interests of this study are not focusing on how and why 
anchoring effects occur but on what factors will influence the degree of anchoring. The 
impacts of these influential factors on the degree of anchoring in a broad variety of 
judgemental environments will be discussed in more details in the following section.  
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2.3.4 Factors Which Influence Anchoring Effects 
 
Following the definition, type and underlying mechanisms of anchoring effects, 
the factors which may cause and affect the occurrence and degree of anchoring effects 
are reviewed in this section. In particular, these factors are classified into two general 
categories: (1) external factors which describe the objective aspects of decision tasks in 
which  anchoring  occurs  (judgemental  context,  type  of  anchors,  framing  and  data 
presentation), and (2) the individual factors which represent the subjective aspects of 
decision  makers  who  experience  anchoring  in  judgement  (experience  and  expertise, 
gender and mood, cultural background).  
 
2.3.4.1 External Factors  
 
The external factors which influence anchoring effects relate to the characteristics 
of decision tasks which are used to distinguish one task from another. Three aspects 
concerning the nature of the tasks are particularly considered in this study, namely, the 
judgemental context in which anchoring effects occur, the type of anchors (i.e., whether 
the  anchors  are  self-generated  or  externally  provided,  relevant  or  irrelevant  to  the 
targets), and the framing and data presentation of decision tasks (i.e., how the tasks are 
described and presented to the decision makers). The applications of these factors in 
anchoring are discussed below.   
 
Judgemental Context  
Anchoring research has been conducted in a large variety of judgemental contexts. 
For  example,  anchoring  has  been  investigated  in  the  areas  of  general  knowledge 
questions  (e.g.,  Mussweiler,  2001;  Strack  and  Mussweiler,  1997;  Tversky  and 
Kahneman, 1974; Wegener, et al., 2001; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong and Kwong, 2000), 
estimates of self-efficacy (Cervone and Peake, 1986), probability estimates and gambles 
(e.g., Carlson, 1990; Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Davies, 1997; Englich, Mussweiler 
and  Strack,  2006;  Ganzach,  1996;  Plous,  1989),  price  estimates  and  auctions  (e.g., 
Dholakia and Simonson, 2003; Dodonova and Khoroshilov, 2004; Mussweiler, et al., 
2000), negotiations (e.g., Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; 
Kristensen  and  Garling,  2000;  Ritov,  1996),  judicial  judgements  (Chapman  and   48 
Bornstein, 1996; Englich and Mussweiler, 2001; Englich et al., 2006;  Farina et al., 
2003), real estate judgements (Northcraft and Neale, 1987), auditing judgements (Joyce 
and Biddle, 1981), medical judgements (Brewer, Chapman, Schwartz and Bergus, 2007), 
and military and political judgements (Plous, 1989; Whyte and Levi, 1994).  
Based on these studies, a number of judgemental biases caused by anchoring have 
been identified (Chapman and Johnson, 1999, 2002; Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler and 
Strack,  1999a),  for  example  the  confirmation  bias  (e.g.,  Snyder  and  Swann,  1978), 
overconfidence  (e.g.,  Block  and  Harper,  2001;  Griffin  and  Tversky,  1992),  and  the 
hindsight bias (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins and Hastie, 
1990).   
 
(1) General knowledge questions 
Researchers in psychology often use general knowledge questions to investigate 
anchoring effects. University students are often used as subjects in these experiments. 
For  example, in their original study, Tversky  and Kahneman (1974) used a  general 
knowledge  question,  the  percentage  of  African  countries  in  the  United  Nations,  to 
explore anchoring effects. Similarly, Wilson et al. (1996, Study 1) adapted this question 
in their study, asking subjects whether the number of African countries in the UN is 
higher or lower than a specific anchor value, and consequently asked them to give their 
own estimates of the target value.  
A  number  of  general  knowledge  questions  used  in  laboratory  experiments  are 
designed by Mussweiler and his colleague Strack (e.g., Mussweiler, 2001; Strack and 
Mussweiler, 1997). For example, Strack and Mussweiler (1997, Study 1) asked male 
and female non-psychology students at the university to estimate the height or width of 
the Brandenburg Gate or the length or height of the Cathedral of Cologne, in order to 
examine the influence of changing the dimension of the target question on the degree of 
anchoring.  Moreover,  Mussweiler  (2001)  adapted  the  question  used  by  Wong  and 
Kwong (2000) about the length of the runway of the Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong to 
one  which  German  students  should  have  general  knowledge  (i.e.,  the  length  of  the 
runway of the airport in Nuremberg in Germany) to test the nature of the semantics of 
anchoring.  
Other general questions such as the hottest temperature in Seattle, the age at which 
George  Washington  died  (Wegener,  et  al.,  2001),  the  annual  mean  temperature  in   49 
Germany  (Mussweiler  and  Englich;  2005),  have  also  been  employed  in  anchoring 
studies.  
Since it does not require specific knowledge or experience to answer these types 
of questions, it is argued that answers to general knowledge questions may be more 
likely to reflect subjects’ unconscious reactions to anchor values and target questions. 
Therefore, general knowledge questions are regarded as ideal examples to be used by 
psychological experimenters in anchoring research.  
 
(2) Estimates of self-efficacy 
A  number  of  studies  have  been  conducted  to  examine  self-efficacy,  a  belief 
referring to people’s judgements about their capabilities in executing required actions 
and  solving  problems  or  tasks  (Cervone  and  Peake,  1986;  Wood  et  al.,  2000).  For 
example, Cervone and Peake (1986) explored the impact of the anchoring effect on 
individuals’ self-efficacy judgements about their performance capabilities. The results 
showed that people’s estimates of their capabilities for task performance were strongly 
affected  by  the  effect  of  anchoring.  In  particular,  participants  were  firstly  asked  to 
withdraw a card from a series of cards with a number on each of the cards (actually, 
only two numbers appeared on the cards, one high and one low). Then they were given 
a  set  of  40  problem-solving  tasks  to  finish  within  15  minutes,  after  estimating  the 
number of tasks that they expected themselves to complete. Participants who received a 
high number from the cards gave a higher estimate about their capabilities in finishing 
the forthcoming tasks, whereas those who received a lower anchor value beforehand 
provided a lower self-efficacy estimation about the number of tasks that they could 
finish.  These  results  suggest  that  even  randomly  selected  anchor  values  which  are 
obviously  uninformative  to  the  target  question  can  bias  self-efficacy  judgements.  It 
should be noted that the researchers used half males and half females as subjects in their 
experiments and found no gender differences in the degree of anchoring effects.  
In addition, Wood et al. (2000) examined the relationship between self-efficacy 
and performance on complex tasks by exploring individuals’ perceived capabilities for 
conducting searches and for processing information. They found that individuals who 
are low in search efficacy are more likely to rely on memory rather than external search, 
and hence are more likely to employ the availability heuristic. However, people who are 
low in processing efficacy are more likely to use the anchoring and adjustment heuristic   50 
and  the  representativeness  heuristic  in  order  to  reduce  cognitive  effort  required  in 
making judgements and decisions.  
 
(3) Probability estimates and gambles  
The  judgemental  tasks  associated  with  probability  estimates  and  gambles  have 
been widely explored in a number of studies and strong anchoring effects have been 
detected (Carlson, 1990; Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Englich et al., 2006; Ganzach, 
1996;  Schkade  and  Johnson,  1989).  For  example,  Carlson  (1990)  conducted  three 
experiments to examine the relationship of subjects’ minimum selling prices to three-
outcome gambles. In particular, subjects were asked to assume that they had a ticket to 
play a gamble and that they could either choose to play the gamble or sell the ticket. 
They were then asked to estimate the minimum price at which they would like to sell 
the ticket and give up the gamble. For a gamble, they had a 35% chance to win $5.95, a 
35% chance to win $5.60, and a 30% chance to win $5.25. The results showed that 
subjects’  estimates  of  the  minimum  selling  prices  were  heavily  influenced  by  the 
intermediate  outcome  (the  winning  price  of  $5.60  in  this  example),  rather  than  the 
expected utility, of the gamble. This effect of anchoring on the intermediate outcome of 
the gamble is explained as follows: when none of the outcomes has a chance of more 
than 50%, the intermediate outcome is given more attention in that it is similar to both 
the  small  outcome  and  the  large  outcome.  Therefore,  people  tend  to  anchor  their 
estimates on the intermediate outcome and forget about the rule of expected utility. 
However, when one of the outcomes had a higher probability (greater than 50%) to 
occur, they then anchored their judgements on the high-probability outcome rather than 
the intermediate one.  
Another example of anchoring judgements on the outcome of gambling is given 
by an experiment associated with playing dice and criminal sentences (Englich et al., 
2006). Englich et al. (2006) found that the sentencing decisions of experienced legal 
professionals were significantly influenced by irrelevant sentencing demands, even if 
when they were aware that the demand was determined randomly or when the judges 
themselves  determined  the  demands  by  throwing  dice.  In  addition,  the  participants’ 
expertise and experience in criminal sentencing were found to have no contribution in 
reducing the effect of anchoring.  
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(4) Price estimates and auctions 
The effect of anchoring has been widely demonstrated in many studies in the areas 
of  consumer  choice,  purchase  price  and  quantity  estimates,  online  auctions,  and 
investments (e.g., Birnbaum and Zimmermann, 1998; Dholakia and Simonson, 2003; 
Dodonova and Khoroshilov, 2004; Mussweiler, et al., 2000; Wansink, Kent and Hoch, 
1998).  
It is argued that anchoring is likely to happen in a bargaining setting since the fair 
market  value  of  the  object  is  not  objectively  determinable,  and  the  selling  price  is 
actually achieved by a bidding process in which the seller’s asking or listing price may 
serve  as  an  anchor  (Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987).  For  example,  Dholakia  and 
Simonson’s (2003) field and laboratory experiments suggested that when consumers 
were explicitly encouraged to compare listing prices, they tended to be more cautious 
and  careful  in  their  purchase  and  bidding  behaviour.  In  addition,  Dodonova  and 
Khoroshilov (2004) demonstrated anchoring effects from the bidding prices of online 
auctions.  The  bidding  prices  placed  by  the  bidders  were  found  to  be  significantly 
affected by the seller’s ‘buy now’ prices. The higher the ‘buy now’ price was, the higher 
price  the  bidders  were  willing  to  pay,  and  therefore,  the  higher  winning  bid  price 
resulted. Since the winning bid price could be affected by some other factors such as the 
seller’s reputation, the number of bidders, reserve prices, the researchers chose identical 
products from the same seller with the same product descriptions to avoid interactions 
caused by these other factors.  
Besides the price, the purchase quantity has also been shown to be subject to 
anchoring effects. Wansink et al. (1998) conducted two field studies and two laboratory 
experiments to explore the relationship between purchase promotions (which served as 
anchors)  and  consumers’  purchase  quantities.  They  found  that  a  multi-unit  price 
promotion (such as “On sale – 6 cans for $3”) would lead to a larger purchase quantity 
than  a  single-unit  price  promotion  (such  as  “On  sale  –  50  cents  each”).  A  further 
experiment constructed a 2(anchor vs. no anchor) × 3(no discount vs. 20% discount vs. 
40%  discount)  factorial  design  using  6  well-known  products.  The  promotion 
descriptions without quantity implications (such as “Snickers bars – buy them for your 
freezer”) provide a no-anchor condition, and the descriptions with quantity suggestions 
(such as “Snickers bars – buy 18 for your freezer”) serve as the anchors. The results 
showed that the potential purchase quantity increased according to the degree of the   52 
discount, and the promotion with external anchors even increased the purchase quality 
when  there  was  no  discount  on  the  price  (i.e.,  encouraged  people  to  buy  a  certain 
quantity of products even without a change of price). This seems to support the notion 
of  basic  anchoring  effects:  there  was  no  change  in  the  price  of  the  product,  hence 
subjects in the experiment would not have a comparison between the original price and 
the discount price, but they were still affected by the promotions and intended to buy 
more than without promotions.  
 
(5) Negotiations 
The use of anchoring and adjustment heurist has been explored in the context of 
negotiations  and  bargaining  in  a  number  of  studies  (e.g.,  Black  and  Diaz,  1996; 
Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Kristensen and Garling, 
1997, 2000; Poucke and Buelens, 2002; Ritov, 1996; Whyte and Sebenius, 1997). All 
the studies demonstrated strong evidence of anchoring on the opening offer (an initial 
price elicited by the buyer or the seller at the beginning of the bargaining process) of the 
negotiation. In particular, Black and Diaz (1996) found that in a simulated bargaining 
experiment, the final agreement between the buyer and the seller was strongly similar to 
the  initial  offer.  Therefore,  they  argued  that  eliciting  an  extreme  opening  offer  (no 
matter from the buy-side or the sell-side) was a better strategy than eliciting a moderate 
opening offer. By testing the interactions between opening offers and the frequency of 
concessions, they found that an extreme opening offer with an infrequent movement 
rate  of  concessions  did  better  than  with  a  moderate  movement  rate  of  concessions. 
However,  no  significant  difference  was  detected  in  participants’  performances  in 
conditions of frequent and infrequent movement rates when using the moderate initial 
offer.  Consequently,  Chertkoff  and  Conley  (1967)  suggested  that  starting  with  an 
extreme initial offer together with infrequent concessions might be a superior strategy in 
negotiations. Similarly, Black and Diaz (1996) examined the use of the seller’s asking 
price in the context of real property negotiation and found that the buyer’s opening offer 
for the property was strongly influenced by the asking price, even when the latter was 
obviously incongruous. No significant difference between graduate students and mid- to 
upper-level real estate executives was detected in their estimates. They attributed this 
bias to the limited processing capacity of the human mind (Newell and Simon, 1972; 
Simon, 1978).    53 
Besides  the  influence  of  an  opening  offer  on  the  final  settlement  price  in 
negotiations  (Black  and  Diaz,  1996;  Chertkoff  and  Conley,  1967;  Galinsky  and 
Mussweiler, 2001), a number of studies have extended the examination to other internal 
prices generated by buyers and sellers in negotiation processing, such as the reservation 
prices
11 and the aspiration prices
12 (e.g., Kristensen and Garling, 1997, 2000; Poucke 
and Buelens, 2002; Ritov, 1996). For example, Kristensen and Garling (1997) indicated 
that the first counteroffer
13 of the buyer in a negotiation was jointly affected by the 
seller’s initial offer and the buyer’s reservation price. In a further study, Kristensen and 
Garling (2000) demonstrated that the size of counteroffers in a price negotiation was 
affected by the proposed selling price and reservation price. In addition, Poucke and 
Buelens (2002) investigated the difference between the aspiration price and the initial 
offer, which they called the ‘offer zone’, for both buyers and sellers. They identified a 
significant and consistent influence of offer zone on the final negotiated result. However, 
Galinsky  and  Mussweiler  (2001)  suggested  that  the  influence  of  the  opening  price 
offered  by  one  side  (no  matter  which  side,  buyer  or  seller)  of  the  negotiation  was 
negated if the other side of the negotiation focused on other information, such as the 
reservation price, aspiration price, or other alternative prices made by the latter. This 
finding  can  be  used  to  debias  the  influence  of  first  offer:  the  more  alternative 
information involved in the judgemental procedure, the less impact the anchor value has 
on negotiators’ judgements (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001).  
Apart from the influence of internal prices (e.g., opening offer, reservation price) 
on a negotiation’s final settlement price, the impact of externally provided prices (e.g., 
fair market price) on the final price is also significant (Poucke and Buelens, 2002). 
Whyte  and  Sebenius  (1997)  found  that  even  irrelevant  information,  such  as  an 
unreliable anchor introduced just before the negotiation started, is sufficient to cause 
significant anchoring effects in the context of negotiation for both individual and group 
judgement. Moreover, group estimates are not made by using the anchoring heuristic 
but by adopting the majority view at the beginning of group discussion or by averaging 
                                                 
11 A reservation price, also called the bottom line, is an indifference point where the negotiator should 
theoretically be indifferent between accepting the offer and terminating the negotiation. It is the lowest 
outcome that a negotiator is willing to accept.  
12 An aspiration price refers to the best outcome at which a negotiator would expect to obtain in a price 
negotiation (Blount, Thomas-Hunt and Neale, 1996).  
13 The counteroffer is the price generated by the negotiator in a negotiation processing, according to the 
initial offer presented.    54 
the  individual  estimates  if  the  majority  does  not  exist.  Therefore,  anchoring  effects 
elicited by individuals cannot be reduced by the group.  
 
(6) Judicial judgements 
A large number of anchoring studies have been focusing on judicial judgements 
and  decisions  (e.g.,  Chapman  and  Bornstein,  1996;  Englich  and  Mussweiler,  2001; 
Englich  et  al.,  2006;  Farina  et  al.,  2003;  Mussweiler  and  Englich,  1998).  Both 
experimental trials and actual judicial decisions have been examined. Judgements and 
decisions  made  by  amateurs  (university  students)  and  experts  with  professional 
knowledge (jurors) are both explored.  
For example, Chapman and Bornstein (1996, Study 1) constructed a mock trial to 
examine the influence of monetary compensation requested by the plaintiff (the anchor 
value) on jurors’ judgements of compensation awarded. Undergraduate students were 
used as mock jurors in this study. They were provided with a one-page description of a 
personal  injury  suit  with  the  complete  case  summary  in  the  Appendix.  All  the 
information provided to each student was the same but with one difference: the amount 
of the compensation ($100, $20,000, $5 million, and $1 billion, respectively) requested 
by the plaintiff. The result suggested a reversal effect for the influence of the extremely 
high compensation anchor ($1 billion) because the value is too extreme to be true. The 
extremely high request caused the jurors to think the plaintiff was greedy and selfish 
and regarded her compensation request as less favourable and reliable. In contrast, an 
extremely  low  compensation  request  ($100)  may  lead  to  a  low  estimate  of  the 
probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury because the value is too low. 
For  the  middle  compensation,  jurors’  compensation  judgements  were  strongly 
influenced  by  the  amount  that  the  plaintiff  requested,  providing  a  significant 
demonstration  of  anchoring  effects.  Therefore,  it  was  suggested  that  the  more  the 
plaintiff requested, the more she would get (unless the request is regarded as ‘greedy’). 
It might be argued that the knowledge and experience of the mock jurors (undergraduate 
students) would affect the judgemental accuracy of this task.  
Another  study  examined  the  relationship  between  judges’  sentencing  decisions 
and the sentence demanded by the prosecutor in criminal trials (Englich and Mussweiler, 
2001). The first experiment used identical cases as decision tasks which controlled all 
the  other  potential  influential  factors  (such  as,  severity  of  the  crime,  defendant’s   55 
criminal record) and only differed in the sentencing demand (a longer demand of 34 
months and a shorter demand of 2 months, requested by the prosecutor). Criminal trial 
judges  were  used  as  decision  makers.  The  results  showed  that  judges’  sentencing 
decisions were strongly affected by the sentence demand from the prosecutor. The final 
sentences for the same case differed by 10 months according to the high and low anchor 
values.  The  second  experiment  was  designed  to  detect  the  influence  of 
uninformative/irrelevant anchors on judges’ sentencing decisions. The materials were 
identical  to  those  in  the  previous  study.  However,  half  of  the  participants  were 
instructed to make sentencing judgement based on a demand suggested by a first-year 
computer student; clearly this student had no relevant expertise or knowledge related to 
the  case.  The  other  half  were  provided  with  the  sentence  demand  by  a  prosecutor; 
obviously the prosecutor was an experienced and knowledgeable expert in the area. The 
results replicated the findings of other studies concerning the influence of irrelevant 
anchors (e.g., Cervone and Peake, 1986; Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler and 
Strack,  1999b,  2000a;  Strack  and  Mussweiler,  1997).  That  is,  participants  in  the 
experiment showed a significant effect of anchoring on the demand suggested by the 
computer  science  student,  even  if  they  knew  that  this  person  had  no  experience  or 
knowledge in the case and that his suggestion should be regarded as entirely irrelevant 
to the decision task. Finally, the third experiment demonstrated that judges’ sentencing 
estimates were independent from their experience. In particular, even trial judges from 
superior  court  with  an  average  of  more  than  15  years  of  experience  in  criminal 
judgements  were  found  to  strongly  assimilate  their  estimates  of  the  sentence  to  an 
obvious irrelevant sentencing demand. This result confirmed the findings of previous 
studies on experts’ anchoring effects (e.g., Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Wilson et al., 
1996).  However,  since  such  anchoring  was  detected  under  a  strictly  controlled 
environment  which  eliminated  interactions  from  other  factors,  whether  anchoring 
effects occur will appear in a pure (i.e., not manufactured) but complicated (i.e., with all 
the influential factors) real world environment remains unclear.  
Based on the laboratory studies in judicial anchoring (for a more detailed review, 
see Englich and Mussweiler, 2001), Farina et al. (2003) explored the bias of anchoring 
effects by reviewing actual judicial decisions. In particular, they analysed the protocols 
of 555 penal judgements from a total of 99 judges/courts in a region in northwest Spain. 
The period of judgements covered 15 years from 1980 to 1995. The results reported a   56 
considerable  impact  of  anchoring  on  63.6%  of  the  judges’  judgements,  driven  by  a 
sentence request from the public prosecutor or, if in the case of an appeal, by the prior 
judicial decision. Although no general solutions have been indicated in debiasing the 
effect of anchoring in decision making, two methods are suggested, at least partially, to 
be useful in reducing the effect (Farina et al., 2003). Specifically, one is to provide 
training to judges and magistrates about sources of bias, so that they can be more aware 
of the potential bias which may occur in their decisions and make efforts to make more 
objective  decisions.  The  other  one  is  to  provide  more  information  during  the 
judgemental  processes,  such  as  generating  and/or  considering  alternative  anchoring 
values. The interactions between the information from a variety of sources may interact 
with  each  other  and  therefore,  the  judges’  specific  attention  on  a  specific  piece  of 
information may be eliminated (Plous, 1993).  
 
(7) Real estate judgements 
The representative study exploring the anchoring effect in the field of real estate 
property was conducted by Northcraft and Neale (1987). They first invited participants 
to visit a house which was located in the place where the participants lived and which 
was currently for sale. Subsequently, they were asked to estimate four different prices 
for  the  house  (namely,  the  appraised  value  of  the  house,  an  appropriate  advertised 
selling price, a reasonable price to pay for the house, and the lowest offer they would 
accept if they were the seller) according to the information provided. The information 
package  provided  to  each  subject  contained  the  same  information  which  real  estate 
agents suggested would be useful in property appraisal, with only one exception – the 
listing price of the house. Four listing prices ($65,900, $71,900, $77,900, $83900) were 
equally distributed around the actual listing price ($74,900), serving as the extremely 
low, low, high, and extremely high anchor values, respectively. The results revealed that 
both  novice  (undergraduate  students)  and  expert  (professional  real  estate  agents) 
participants significantly anchored their estimates of the listing price on the number 
they were provided with. This suggested that the anchoring phenomena detected in the 
context  of  the  artificial  and  manufactured  laboratory  experiments  (Hogarth,  1981; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) is also available in informative-rich and dynamic real 
world settings, such as real estate property. In addition, the results revealed that the 
extremity  of  the  anchor  values  actually  reduced  the  impact  of  listing  prices  on   57 
participants’ estimates (i.e., the mean deviations of the estimates were higher for the 
more distant anchors, either extremely high or low).  
Further investigations (e.g., to check what information participants used in those 
decision processes, what the ‘top three’ considerations were for them in reaching an 
answer, etc.) found that the degree to which the participants’ estimates focused on the 
provided  anchor  values  was  higher  for  the  students  than  for  the  real  estate  agents. 
Moreover,  the  students  were  more  likely  to  admit  the  use  of  listing  price  as  the 
reference in their decision process than the experts. However, whether the denial of the 
experts was due to their lack of awareness of  using the listing price  as anchors, or 
simply due to their unwillingness to admit it, remains unclear (Northcraft and Neale, 
1987).  
Following Northcraft and Neale’s (1987) investigation, a number of studies have 
been conducted to examine anchoring effects in the context of real estate property from 
the  aspect  of  valuation,  appraisal  and  negotiation(e.g.,  Black  and  Diaz,  1996;  Diaz, 
1997). Again, these studies revealed a significant anchoring effect derived from the 
anchor values (usually the opening price in negotiations) to the final settlement price 
agreed on both sides by those negotiating. Diaz (1997), however, found that valuations 
of a property made by expert appraisers were not biased towards anchors if the experts 
were  familiar  with  the  object  to  be  estimated,  such  as  the  location  and  physical 
conditions of the house. This suggests that experts who have professional knowledge or 
experience in the decision task are subject to a lower level or to no anchoring effects, 
compared with novice judges (see Section 2.3.4.2 for more details). It should be noted 
that the means of data presentation, data collection, and analysis techniques of decision 
makers  may  also  contribute  to  the  anchoring  bias  (see  the  section  of  ‘Framing  and 
Presentation’ below for more details).  
 
(8) Auditing judgements 
Judgement  and  decision  making  in  professional  auditing  have  been  broadly 
explored from various perspectives. Studies show that the judgemental performance of 
auditors are affected by a number of internal and external factors, such as the experience 
and knowledge of the auditors, the emotions of the auditors, and the type of information 
and  judgemental  tasks  (Ashton,  1991;  Ashton  and  Ashton,  1988;  Bhattacharjee  and   58 
Moreno, 2002; Bonner, 1990; Hoffman and Patton, 1997; Krull, Reckers and Wong-On-
Wing, 1993; Shelton, 1999; Smith and Kida, 1991).  
Auditors’ previous experience has been demonstrated to have a strong impact on 
their professional judgements about the fairness of their clients’ financial statements 
(Ashton,  1991;  Bhattacharjee  and  Moreno,  2002;  Bonner,  1990;  Krull  et  al.,  1993; 
Shelton, 1999). For example, Bonner (1990) found in exploring the impact of auditors’ 
experience on their judgements, their knowledge of specific tasks played an important 
role. Ashton (1991) further examined auditors’ knowledge about the base rate of, and 
the underlying reason for, the occurrence of an error in an individual financial statement 
account. It was indicated that auditors’ experience was related to specific audit tasks 
and the knowledge corresponding to the task, rather than simply the length of audit 
experience in any or a specific industry, or the number of clients audited.  
In terms of the use of information, a diluting effect of irrelevant information (i.e., 
the involvement of irrelevant information dilutes the impact of relevant information on 
auditors’ judgements) was confirmed among less experienced auditors (audit seniors), 
but was not encountered by more experienced auditors (audit managers and partners) 
(Shelton, 1999). Similarly, Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) explored the impact of 
realistic but irrelevant affective information on auditors’ professional judgements of a 
client’s  inventory  obsolescence  risk.  The  results  indicated  that  judgements  of  less 
experienced auditors were significantly influenced by the negative affective information 
provided to them, whereas auditors with more experienced were not affected by this 
piece of irrelevant information. Smith and Thomas (1991) also confirmed a reduction in 
the degree of bias displayed by  expert auditors (for more details of experience and 
expertise related factors, see Section 2.3.4.2).  
Moreover,  Joyce  and  Biddle  (1981)  demonstrated  that  auditors  encountered  a 
significant  anchoring  effect  in  their  estimates  of  the  probability  of  a  significant 
executive-level  management  fraud,  given  the  information  provided.  In  particular, 
subjects were first asked to compare whether the number of firms which had significant 
executive-level management fraud was higher or lower than an anchor number in every 
1,000 firms. Both high (20 firms out of 1,000 Big Eight clients, i.e., 1%) and low (10 
firms out of 1,000 Big Eight clients, i.e., 2%) anchor values were employed. They were 
then asked to give their own estimates of proportion of the firms which might encounter 
management fraud (target value). The results showed that in both high and low anchor   59 
conditions,  subjects’  absolute  estimates  were  strongly  biased  towards  the  anchor 
number  provided.  However,  although  the  two  starting  points  both  led  to  significant 
anchoring  effects,  the  effect  was  eliminated  when  the  anchor  value  increased  to  an 
extremely high level (3% in this study). This seems to suggest that the magnitude of the 
anchoring effect is not monotone increasing with an increase in the anchor value. This 
finding is confirmed by other literature (Chapman and Johnson, 1994).  
 
(9) Medical judgements 
Anchoring effects have also been detected in the area of medical judgements and 
have been demonstrated to affect doctors’ and patients’ choices (Brewer et al., 2007). In 
their first experiment, Brewer et al. (2007) asked 99 HIV+ patients to  compare the 
chance of infecting their partners with HIV if a condom broke during sex. They were 
provided with an uninformative anchor number (1% as the low anchor and 90% as the 
high anchor). They were then required to give an absolute judgement of the chance of 
infection,  and  asked  to  choose  the  treatments  that  they  would  recommend  for  their 
partners. The results showed that the patients’ judgements were strongly affected by the 
irrelevant anchor value that they received. However, there was no significant relation 
between the patients’ anchor level and the aggressiveness of their choices of treatment 
(i.e., no evidence showed that they chose more aggressive treatment if they estimated a 
higher chance of getting infected).  
In the second experiment they used skilled experts in medical decision making 
(physicians) to replicate the previous findings. Physicians’ estimates of the probability 
that a patient had a pulmonary embolism were significantly influenced by the irrelevant 
anchor values provided to them (1% as the low anchor and 90% as the high anchor). 
Similar to the first experiment, the physicians’ choices of treatment for the patient had 
no or little relation to their level of anchoring. Note that the anchoring effects were not 
moderated by increasing the subjects’ motivation for accuracy.  
Finally, the researchers emphasised that this study may be the first one examining 
how anchor values affect choices through judgements. However, they only examined 
the situations in which judgements were related to the corresponding choices and the 
relationship between anchoring effects and choices which are not related to judgements 
requires further exploration.  
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(10) Military and political judgements 
An  early  study  exploring  anchoring  effects  in  the  domain  of  the  military  was 
conducted by Plous (1989). A strong anchoring effect was demonstrated on subjects’ 
likelihood estimates of a nuclear war. The results also suggested that increasing the ease 
with which participants imagined a nuclear war (by providing an instruction of the most 
likely path to a nuclear war) did not affect the level of their likelihood estimates or the 
level of anchoring.  
More recently, Whyte and Levi (1994) explored the origins and function of the 
reference  point  (a  standard  point  against  which  the  comparisons  and  evaluations  of 
potential outcomes of the choice are made; this can also be regarded as the anchor value 
in an evaluation) in risky group decision making based on a case study of the Cuban 
missile  crisis.  The  researchers  analysed  the  7-day  documentation  of  the  group 
(consisting of American President John F. Kennedy and his advisers) decision making 
process concerning the Cuban missile crisis. A piece of information mentioned in one of 
JFK’s public statements was found to be used as a neutral reference point (the anchor 
value) during that period. They  found that in a group decision making process, the 
privilege  of  placing  the  reference  point  was  under  the  group  leader.  Therefore,  to 
influence  the  judgement  of  other  decision  makers  in  the  group  appears  to  have  no 
impact  on  judgements  of  the  group.  Contributions  of  this  study  to  the  anchoring 
research were that (1) it investigated the impact of a reference point (the anchor value) 
on decisions made by groups of experienced decision makers, rather than individuals, 
and (2) the investigation was conducted using data obtained from real world decisions, 
rather than observed from laboratory or field experiments.  
 
Type of Anchors 
Anchoring  effects  have  been  demonstrated  to  be  caused  by  different  types  of 
anchors which may have different impacts on the degree of anchoring. For example, 
judges may anchor their absolute estimates of the targets on self-generated anchors (e.g., 
Davies, 1997; Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b, Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974), or externally provided anchors (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974). It has been suggested that self-generated anchors may have a deeper impact on 
people’s judgements and therefore lead to a higher level of anchoring than externally 
provided anchors do (Davies, 1997; Epley and Gilovich, 2001, 2005; Mussweiler and   61 
Neumann, 2000). In addition, anchoring effects may occur when the anchor value is 
informative and relevant to the target (e.g., Northcraft and Neale, 1987), or when it is 
randomly  selected  and  totally  uninformative  (e.g.,  Chapman  and  Bornstein,  1996; 
Cervone  and  Peake,  1986;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  2000b;  Tversky  and  Kahneman, 
1974)  or  implausibly  extreme  and  unreasonable  (e.g.,  Chapman  and  Johnson,  1994; 
Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999b;  Strack  and  Mussweiler,  1997;  Wegener,  Petty, 
Detweiler-Bedell and Jarvis, 2001) to the target value.  
 
(1) Self-generated anchors vs. Externally-provided anchors 
Generally, two types of anchors have been explored in the literature. One type is 
self-generated anchors, which are internally generated by decision makers themselves 
during the judgemental processes (e.g., Epley, Keysar, Van Boven and Gilovich, 2004; 
Epley and Gilovich, 2005; Keysar and Barr, 2002; Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler and 
Neumann, 2000; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b; Poucke and Buelens, 2002; Slamecka 
and  Graf,  1978;  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974).  Self-generated  anchors  are  often 
formulated in the comparison stage of developing an estimate, through a calculation or 
prediction process, when no external anchors are provided. For example, in Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1974) original study, two groups of high school students were asked 
to  estimate  in  5  seconds  the  results  of  the  expressions  1×2×3×4×5×6×7×8  and 
8×7×6×5×4×3×2×1. Within strict time limits, subjects could only calculate the first few 
steps of the expression and used it as an anchor to estimate the final answer. Therefore, 
the average estimate for the ascending expression (512) was much lower than that for 
the descending expression (2250).  
Rather than self-generated, anchors may also be external. External anchors are 
explicitly provided by external sources such as the experimenter in an experiment (e.g., 
Brewer et al., 2007; Davies, 1997; Dholakia and Simonson, 2003; Hinsz et al., 1997; 
Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b, 2000a; Poucke and 
Buelens,  2002;  Rutledge,  1993;  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974).  The  majority  of 
anchoring studies are conducted in experiments using externally provided anchors. A 
typical example was the random number spun by a wheel of fortune in front of the 
subjects in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) study. The subjects were asked to compare 
the real answer to a specific question with this externally provided anchor number, and 
then  to  give  their  own  estimates  of  the  target  value.  Similarly,  Hinsz  et  al.  (1997)   62 
examined people’s estimates of self-set goals for their task performance. Participants 
were found to give higher goal estimates and actually performed better in tasks, when 
instructed to set a goal with an unreasonable high anchor value in the instruction rather 
than with a low anchor or no anchor value in the instruction. In Wong and Kwong’s 
(2000) experiments, subjects were asked to compare whether the length of the runway 
of the Hong Kong Kai Tak Airport was higher or lower than an explicitly provided 
anchor value (7300m or 7.3km). Practice physicians were asked to compare the chance 
that  a  person  was  affected  with  HIV+  with  an  anchor  number  provided  by  the 
experimenter (Brewer et al., 2007). A suggestion of the number of hours that a student 
might need to complete an accounting project was provided, in Rutledge’s study (1993), 
to  the  participants  before  they  estimated  the  actual  time  required.  All  these  studies 
demonstrated  a  significant  effect  of  anchoring  on  these  externally  provided  anchor 
numbers, relevant or irrelevant, arbitrary or plausible.  
Although  both  self-generated  and  externally  provided  anchors  have  strong 
impacts on the participants’ final estimates, the influence of self-generated anchors may 
be  greater  (i.e.,  lead  to  an  estimate  more  similar  to  the  anchor  value)  than  that  of 
external anchors (Davies, 1997; Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Poucke and Buelens, 
2002). This suggestion is inferred from a number of studies investigating the impact of 
internal and external sources on judgement. For example, Davies (1997) examined the 
impact of self-generated and provided explanations for event outcomes. They found 
that explanations generated by the subjects themselves had a greater impact on subjects’ 
belief  persistence  after  the  outcomes  were  discredited  compared  with  explanations 
which were provided, even when the provided explanations were shown to be a higher 
quality.  Mussweiler  and  Neumann  (2000)  explained  the  influence  of  mental 
contamination of self-generated and externally provided information on judgement. The 
results of two experiments demonstrated that judges are more likely to be consistent 
with internally generated information because it yields assimilation to their judgements, 
whereas externally provided information is more likely to elicit contrast and leads to 
mental contamination and judgemental correction.  
Overall,  the  results  of  these  studies  suggest  that  anchors  generated  by  judges 
themselves may have a greater impact than externally provided anchors on the judges’ 
final estimates; their estimates may be more similar to self-generated anchors rather 
than to externally provided ones. Therefore, Mussweiler (2001) suggested that self-  63 
generated information may lead to stronger and more durable anchoring effects than 
that associated with information which is provided. This can be explained by the model 
of  selective  accessibility  of  knowledge:  self-generated  information  has  a  greater 
accessibility  to  people  than  explicitly  provided  information  because  the  former  is 
generated by decision makers themselves and it is therefore more easily accepted and 
serve  as  an  anchor  (Mussweiler,  1997;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999a,  2000a; 
Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer, 2000; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997). Further studies 
have  suggested  that  only  anchoring  effects  caused  by  self-generated  anchors  were 
sensitive to incentives and forewarnings (Epley and Gilovich, 2005).  
Note that although the difference in the impacts of anchors from different sources 
can be induced from the literature of cognitive research, it has not been empirically 
demonstrated in anchoring studies. Further research is therefore required to confirm 
these findings.  
 
(2) Relevant anchors vs. Irrelevant anchors  
Anchoring effects are not only caused by anchors which are relevant, informative, 
and  plausible  to  the  target  tasks  (Mussweiler,  2001;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  2000a; 
Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997), but can also be elicited by 
uninformative,  irrelevant,  or  randomly  selected  anchors  (e.g.,  Brewer  et  al.,  2007; 
Cervone  and  Peake,  1986;  Chapman  and  Johnson,  2002;  Joyce  and  Biddle,  1981; 
LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2006; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Thorsteinson, Breier, Atwell, 
Hamilton  and  Privette,  2008;  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974),  or  implausible  and 
extreme anchors (Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b, 2000a, 
2001a; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Thomas and Handley, 2005; Wegener et al., 2001; 
Wilson et al., 1996).  
Several  studies  have  found  that  anchoring  occurs  when  anchors  are  relevant, 
informative, and plausible to the target questions. As discussed before, Northcraft and 
Neale (1987) found that both students and real estate agents anchored their estimates of 
a house’s selling price on a piece of relevant information, the listing price of the house 
provided  by  the  seller.  In  addition,  Mussweiler  (2001,  Study  3)  asked  subjects  to 
estimate  the  average  annual  temperature  in  Germany  after  comparing  the  mean 
temperature with a high or low anchor value. A significant anchoring effect was found 
even  one  week  after  the  comparison  process.  However,  it  is  suggested  that  an   64 
involvement of relevant information (the temperature on a daily basis during the week) 
did not eliminate the impact of the externally provided anchor on the subjects’ estimates 
during the delay period. 
The vast majority of anchoring studies have demonstrated that even irrelevant, 
uninformative, or arbitrary and implausible anchors can elicit strong anchoring effects. 
Tversky  and  Kahneman’s  (1974)  study  suggested  that  people’s  estimates  about  the 
target value were affected by a randomly selected number, a number generated by a 
wheel of fortune in front of the subjects, even if it was obviously irrelevant to the target 
to be estimated. Joyce and Biddle (1981) found that practicing auditors’ judgements 
about the proportion of 1,000 clients of the Big Eight Accounting Firms which had 
encountered significant executive-level management fraud was significantly influenced 
by an arbitrary number provided to them. Similar results were found by Brewer et al. 
(2007) when examining the anchoring effect of practicing physicians on irrelevant and 
arbitrary anchors externally provided by the experimenters.  
The difference in the degree to which relevant and irrelevant anchors influence 
judges’ final judgements has also been examined. It is suggested that although both 
types of anchors (relevant or irrelevant, plausible or extremely implausible) can lead to 
significant anchoring effects, relevant or plausible anchors are more likely to lead to a 
higher  level  of  anchoring  (i.e.,  more  similar  to  the  anchor  value)  than  irrelevant  or 
extreme anchors do (Chapman and Johnson, 1994; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Quattrone et 
al., 1981). Wegener et al. (2001) also demonstrated that “extreme anchors can have less 
influence on judgements than more moderate anchors” (p. 62). These results indicate 
that the irrelevant and extreme anchors may actually reduce the impact of these anchors 
on  people’s  judgements  and  therefore  judges  would  adjust  further  away  from  these 
numbers (see also, Wilson et al., 1996). 
 
Framing and Data Presentation  
Framing refers to the way that a problem is identified. It provides the context 
within which certain events or phenomena are given meaning and are explained in a 
particular way (Beach and Connolly, 2005). It has been suggested that different frames 
raise  the  focus  on  different  kinds  of  information  and  the  way  that  information  is 
presented may have different impacts on people’s judgement and decision making (e.g., 
Ashton  and  Ashton,  1988;  Chatterjee,  Heath,  Milberg.  and  France,  2000;  Fox  and   65 
Rottenstreich,  2003;  Harries,  C.  and  Harvey,  2000;  Igou  and  Bless,  2007;  Juslin, 
Wennerholm and Olsson, 1999; Krull et al., 1993). The way information is handled and 
processed plays an extremely important role in judgement and decision making in many 
complex situations (Havard, 2001).  
In  particular,  a  number  of  studies  have  demonstrated  that  framing  and  data 
presentation can lead to different levels of anchoring effects (Havard, 2001; Krull et al., 
1993; Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf and Brewer, 2008; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Wong 
and  Kwong,  2000).  Wong  and  Kwong  (2000)  suggested  that  how  the  anchor  is 
presented  affects  the  degree  of  anchoring.  For  instance,  although  two  anchors  were 
semantically equivalent, the one with the higher absolute value (7300m) caused a higher 
estimate  of  the  target  whereas  the  anchor  with  the  lower  absolute  value  (7.3km) 
generated lower estimates for the target question. It has consequently been argued that it 
is the absolute value rather than the semantics of the anchors that make the impact on 
people’s absolute numerical judgements (Wong and Kwong, 2000).  
Havard (2001) examined the impact of the mode of data presentation of anchors in 
a  context  of  real  estate  valuation.  In  the  first  experiment  the  subjects,  who  were 
sequentially provided with a series of recent transaction prices of the property (which 
served as anchors), significantly anchored their estimates of market price of the property 
on these previous prices. However, those who had no such information did not show the 
same bias. In the second experiment, the anchor values were presented in a tabulated 
form and no apparent bias was detected. Therefore, the hypothesis that the property 
valuation can be influenced by the way that data is presented is confirmed. Similarly, 
the impact of data presentation on probability judgements in auditing has also been 
demonstrated (Ashton and Ashton, 1988; Krull et al., 1993). It has been suggested that 
even  when  information  is  irrelevant  to  the  target  question,  the  order  in  which  the 
information is received/presented has a different impact on the auditors’ judgements. 
When subjects received a short series of complex mixed evidence, sequentially, the 
information received later in the sequence exhibited a greater impact on the outcome of 
a task, compared with the information received earlier. This is also referred to as the 
‘recency (or order) effect’, whereby individual’s judgements tend to hinge more on the 
most recent evidence in a sequence of evolving information (e.g., Ashton and Kennedy, 
2002; Krull et al., 1993).  
   66 
2.3.4.2 Individual Factors 
 
The individual (or internal) factors of anchoring effects refer to the characteristics 
of decision makers which may affect anchoring. For the same judgemental task, people 
with different varieties of experience or knowledge may be subject to different levels of 
anchoring effects (e.g, Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Wilson, et al., 1996). Decision 
maker’s  gender  and  mood  are  also  found  to  have  different  impacts  on  people’s 
judgements (e.g., Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Croson and Gneezy, 2004; Greene 
and Noice, 1988). Finally, it has been demonstrated that the cultural background of 
decision makers may also contribute to the discrepancies in their decisions (e.g., Hsee 
and  Weber,  1999).  The  impact  of  these  subjective  factors  of  anchoring  effects  is 
discussed in detail below.  
 
Experience and Expertise 
The impact of anchoring effects on the novices as well as on the experts has been 
investigated  in  many  studies  in  a  variety  of  judgemental  contexts  (Birnbaum  and 
Zimmermann, 1998; Black and Diaz, 1996; Brewer et al., 2007; Caverni and Peris, 
1990; Englich and Mussweiler, 2001; Ho and Keller, 1994; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Mussweiler et al. 2000; Northcraft and Neale, 1987; 
Poucke and Buelens, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996; Wright 
and Anderson, 1989).  
Many studies have demonstrated that anchoring effects apply not only to novices 
but also to experts who have much experience and professional knowledge in the target 
tasks (Englich and Mussweiler, 2001; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler et al. 2000; 
Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987;  Wright  and  Anderson,  1989).  Tversky  and  Kahneman 
(1974) argued that both naïve and experts were subject to overly narrow confidence 
intervals about the probability distributions of which a security price or market index 
may  be  located  in  financial  markets.  This  phenomenon  of  overconfidence  in  the 
certainty  about  one’s  assessment  in  the  market  can  be  explained  by  an  effect  of 
anchoring to his/her judgements. Joyce and Biddle (1981) found that even professional 
experts (practising auditors) were significantly influenced by irrelevant anchors in the 
context  of  auditing  judgement.  Wright  and  Anderson  (1989)  demonstrated  that 
increasing situational familiarity did not reduce anchoring effects.    67 
However, some other studies provide a conflicting picture. On the one hand, a few 
studies have detected a lower level of anchoring effects among expert judges. This is 
because experts have more knowledge and experience than novices in dealing with the 
tasks which help them to incorporate the anchor information more appropriately (e.g., 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Wilson, et al., 1996). Wilson et al. (1996) demonstrated 
that  people  who  had  more  knowledge  about  tasks  than  others  were  less  likely  to 
experience anchoring and less likely to be influenced by irrelevant anchors. Northcraft 
and Neale (1987) demonstrated strong anchoring effects on both students and real estate 
agents  whereas  the  subjects  who  lacked  real  estate  knowledge  (students)  reported  a 
higher  possibility  of  using  the  anchor  value  to  make  estimates.  Furthermore, 
Bhattacharjee  and  Moreno  (2002)  found  that  less  experienced  auditors  were 
significantly  influenced  by  negative  but  irrelevant  information  when  assessing  the 
inventory obsolescence risk, whereas more experienced auditors were not affected by 
such information. On the other hand, Ho and Keller (1994) found that both experts 
(professional  auditors)  and  non-experts  (MBA  students)  were  more  likely  to  be 
influenced by anchor values when they were familiar with the diagnostic probability 
judgement tasks. When they had no professional knowledge of the tasks, their estimates 
of  the  subsequent  diagnostic  conjunction  probability  would  not  be  affected  by  their 
previous  predictions  of  the  conjunction  probability.  In  this  case,  decision  makers’ 
expertise provides a negative impact on their judgements: people with more knowledge 
and  experience  may  be  misled  by  their  expertise  and  therefore  make  less  effort  in 
making accurate judgements on tasks than those with less expertise. The reasons for this 
discrepancy might be (1) the judgemental context of the tasks: in some circumstances 
expertise has a positive impact in reducing anchoring whereas in other circumstances it 
has negative impact and leads to a higher level of anchoring, and (2) the complexity of 
the tasks: the more complex the task is, the more useful decision makers’ expertise in 
reducing judgemental bias. Note that although it is important to explore the underlying 
reasons why expertise leads to different degrees of anchoring, it is not the interest of 
this study.      
 
Gender and Mood  
As an important factor in distinguishing the differences in judgement and decision 
making  (e.g.,  Croson  and  Gneezy,  2004),  the  gender  of  subjects  has  not  received   68 
sufficient  attention  from  researchers  in  anchoring  studies.  A  number  of  studies 
exploring anchoring effects used both male and female subjects in their experiments 
(Cervone and Peake, 1986; Mussweiler, 2001; Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Strack and 
Mussweiler,  1997;  Wilson  et  al.  1996;  Rutledge,  1993).  However,  none  of  them 
analysed the differences in judgements between male and female participants.  
Another factor which is considered important to people’s judgement and decision 
making is their mood. For example, the target is usually evaluated more favourably if 
the judge is in a positive rather than a negative mood (e.g., Schwarz, 2002). It has been 
suggested that a positive affect has a strong impact on performance in many cognitive 
tasks such as creative problem solving, strategy changing in decision making (e.g., Isen 
and Geva, 1987), and facilitating memories of neutral and positive material (e.g., Isen, 
Shalker, Clark and Karp, 1978). Moreno, Kida and Smith (2002) found that accounting 
managers  were  generally  risk  avoiding/taking  for  gains/losses  when  no  affective 
information  was  available,  whereas  the  reverse  was  true  when  positive  affective 
information was provided.  
In  terms  of  anchoring,  Estrada,  Isen  and  Young  (1997)  demonstrated  that 
physicians with positive affect considered the diagnosis of a disease significantly earlier 
and showed less anchoring than those that had no positive affect. Bhattacharjee and 
Moreno (2002) found less experienced auditors were strongly influenced by irrelevant 
but  negative  affective  information  on  a  client  and  gave  a  significantly  higher  risk 
assessment  than  when  they  were  not  provided  such  information.  The  influence  of 
affective information was not found on more experienced auditors. This may indicate 
the  importance  of  professional  experience  in  reducing  the  influence  of  affective 
information on people’s judgement and decision making.  
Note that although the issues of the gender and mood of decision makers have 
been broadly explored in cognitive research, they have not received sufficient attention 
in the study of anchoring. Further research on these types of issues on the degree of 
anchoring is therefore needed.  
 
Cultural Background 
A number of cross-national studies on a variety of issues have been conducted 
(e.g.,  Hsee  and  Weber,  1999).  For  example,  Hsee  and  Weber  (1999)  demonstrated 
systematic  cross-national  differences  in  risk  preferences  between  Americans  and   69 
Chinese. Chinese were found to be significantly more risk seeking than the Americans, 
but only in the investment domain rather than in other domains such as in medical or 
academic decisions. Although different aspects of anchoring effects have been explored, 
as discussed above, little is known, however, about whether people in different regions 
and nations encounter different levels of anchoring. Therefore, studies involving cross-
national observations and comparisons on different aspects of anchoring effects will be 
useful to better understand the effect.  
 
2.3.4.3 Other Issues Concerned Anchoring Effects 
 
A number of issues which have been discussed in the literature and demonstrated 
to have a strong influence on the degree of anchoring, but difficult to be categorised into 
previous sections, are discussed here.  
 
Research settings   
Over the past forty years, anchoring effects have been broadly investigated by a 
huge  number  of  studies.  Most  of  these  studies  are  undertaken  in  psychological 
experiments in laboratories (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 1999, 2002; Havard, 2001; 
Mussweiler,  1997;  Mussweiler  and  Englich,  2005;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999a, 
1999b; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Wilson et al., 1996). The anchoring research has 
been  extended  to  a  variety  of  real  world  settings,  such  as  auditing  judgements 
(Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Joyce and Biddle, 1981), negotiations (Black and 
Diaz,  1996;  Kristensen  and  Garling,  2000),  judicial  judgements  (Englich  and 
Mussweiler, 2001; Farina et al., 2003), and estimations of real estate property (Diaz, 
1997).  
However, most of the ‘real world anchoring studies’ are actually studies using 
designed  experiments  to  explore  anchoring  effects,  but  in  a  real  world  setting  with 
information in a specific profession and with subjects who have specific knowledge in 
this  field.  Although  the  studies  are  experimental,  they  have  extended  the  anchoring 
research to more realistic conditions, compared with conditions in laboratories.  
The only study which used real world decision making data (collected outside a 
laboratory) was conducted by Whyte and Levi (1994) in detecting the reference point 
and anchoring effects in the case of the Cuban missile crisis. All the materials and   70 
information analysed in this study were from the records of previous meetings, minutes, 
records,  and  other  resources,  without  any  manipulation.  A  strong  anchor  point  was 
detected in this complicated and dynamic decision making environment. It is therefore 
suggested that more attention should be paid to develop similar real world studies (i.e. a 
dynamic and real decision making environment which involves feedbacks and instant 
judgements).  
 
Incentives and Forewarnings 
Whether incentives for accuracy and forewarnings of the occurrence of anchoring 
effects  have  any  impact  on  the  degree  of  anchoring  has  been  investigated  in  many 
studies.  
Some  studies  suggest  that  incentives  do  not  reduce  anchoring  (Chapman  and 
Johnson, 2002). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) indicated that payoffs for accuracy did 
not reduce the effect of anchoring on experts. Wilson et al. (1996) suggested that basic 
anchoring processes were unintentional and unconscious, and therefore difficult to be 
avoided even when incentives for judgemental accuracy or forewarnings of the notion 
of  anchoring  were  involved.  Moreover,  anchoring  effects  were  not  moderated  by 
increasing the subjects’ motivation for accuracy (Brewer et al., 2007, Study 2).  
However, Wright and Aboul-Ezz (1988) found no significant anchoring effects on 
frequency  distribution  assessments  under  conditions  involving  extrinsic  incentives 
(financial rewards and public recognition). Wright and Anderson (1989) demonstrated 
that  although  increasing  situational  familiarity  did  not  reduce  anchoring  effects,  the 
involvement  of  monetary  and  performance-contingent  incentives  significantly 
diminished the anchoring effect. The contradictions between different studies regarding 
the effects of incentives may be due to the level of incentives. Individuals with more 
incentives  will  make  more  effort  in  performing  more  accurate  judgements  whereas 
individuals offered small amounts of incentives may not take the tasks seriously.  
Furthermore, Simmons, Leboeuf and Nelson (2008) suggested that the impact of 
motivation on people’s final estimates depended on the characteristic of the tasks. In 
particular, when people were  certain about the direction of judgemental adjustment, 
increasing motivation  for accuracy  could reduce the degree of anchoring  and hence 
increased  the  gap  between  anchor  values  and  final  estimates.  However,  when 
participants  were  not  certain  about  the  adjustment  direction  of  the  decision  tasks,   71 
increasing motivation did not help increase the difference between anchor values and 
target values.  
 
Debiasing  
Due to the robustness of anchoring effects in laboratory experiments as well as in 
a variety of ‘real world experimental decision settings’, it is necessary to investigate the 
ways  of  reducing  the  effect.  Besides  incentives  for  judgemental  accuracy  and 
forewarnings  of  anchoring  occurrence,  a  number  of  studies  have  suggested  other 
methods or strategies in anchoring debiasing (Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Black 
and Diaz, 1996; Farina et al., 2003; Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler et al., 
2000; Whyte and Sebenius, 1997).  
Black and Diaz (1996) suggested an educational intervention to negotiators about 
the influence of sellers’ asking prices on buyers’ opening offers and settlement prices, 
in order to reduce buyers’ estimate biases affected by the asking prices in negotiations. 
Similarly, Farina et al. (2003) suggested that judges and magistrates should be provided 
with  relevant  training  about  the  occurrence  of  potential  anchoring,  since  anchoring 
effects can be reduced if judges are more aware of the influence of anchor values. The 
usage  of  a  proper  training  to  subjects  in  reducing  judgemental  bias  has  also  been 
confirmed by Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002).  
A ‘consider-the-opposite’ strategy can be employed to reduce anchoring effects 
(Lord, Lepper and Preston, 1984). This strategy often involves an active consideration 
of alternative anchors, anchor-inconsistent information, or different ways of problem 
framing (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler et al., 2000). For example, the 
anchoring effect in a negotiation can be reduced by including alternative prices which 
are inconsistent with the opening offer or the asking price of the target object. In a 
judicial judgement context, Farina et al. (2003) also suggested that a protection factor 
against  anchoring,  establishing  an  alternative  anchor  value,  or  considering  multiple 
anchor values (Plous, 1993) could be used to reduce the anchoring. Anchoring effects 
occur  when  individuals  have  more  access  to  knowledge  about  the  anchor  value 
(Mussweiler  et  al.,  2000).  Consequently,  a  consider-the-opposite  strategy  enables 
judges to increase their access of non-anchor knowledge and hence decrease their focus 
on anchor values (i.e., their attention to anchor values are reduced or eliminated by 
more attention paid to non-anchor information). Consequently, effects of anchoring on   72 
particular  information  were  reduced  by  providing  non-anchor  information  (anchor-
inconsistent knowledge) or alternative anchors to judges (Mussweiler et al., 2000).  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the background of rationality and bounded rationality theories is 
used as a basis to explore one of the  commonly used heuristics, the  anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic, and the judgemental bias, anchoring effects. In particular, different 
types of anchoring effects are introduced, a number of theories which are developed to 
explain the underlying mechanisms of anchoring effects are reviewed, and a number of 
factors  which  affect  the  degree  of  anchoring  effects  are  discussed.  The  extensive 
demonstration of anchoring effects in a variety of judgemental contexts indicates that 
the anchoring effect has been a widely-observed phenomenon which may occur in many 
environments, including both laboratory and real world field experiments.  
However, the investigation of previous studies also reveals that anchoring effects 
are  complicated.  For  example,  some  studies  have  demonstrated  that  there  was  no 
difference between expert and non-expert decision makers in terms of the degree of 
anchoring on a particular task (Englich and Mussweiler, 2001; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; 
Mussweiler  et  al.  2000;  Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987;  Wright  and  Anderson,  1989), 
whilst other studies suggested that individuals with more knowledge or expertise about 
the decision tasks were subject to a lower level of anchoring effects (e.g., Mussweiler 
and Strack, 2000b; Wilson, et al., 1996). The impacts of incentives and forewarnings to 
decision  makers  on  the  degree  of  anchoring  also  remain  conflicting.  Some  studies 
demonstrated  no  use  of  incentives  and  forewarnings  in  reducing  anchoring  effects 
(Brewer  et  al.,  2007;  Chapman  and  Johnson,  2002;  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974; 
Wilson et al., 1996) whereas others revealed they did help in the debiasing of this effect 
(e.g., Wright and Anderson, 1989).  
In  addition,  the  anchoring  studies  reviewed  in  this  chapter  are  limited  in  the 
following aspects. First, the majority of the studies are undertaken in laboratories or 
field  experiments.  Due  to  the  weaknesses  of  experimental  studies  (e.g.,  lack  of 
similarity of the real world environment, subjects are not familiar with decision tasks 
and are aware of their involvement in experiments), whether anchoring effects are a   73 
generalised phenomenon in the real world decision making environment (i.e., in which 
decisions  are  made  without  being  manufactured  or  controlled  by  experimenters) 
remains unclear. Second, the sample size of observations is limited in  experimental 
studies. Generally, at most hundreds of subjects are involved in experiments whereas in 
the real world setting similar decisions may be repeated thousands of times. Whether 
subjects used in experiments can represent real world decision makers is questioned. 
Finally,  many  real  world  environments  which  involve  dynamic  and  instant  decision 
making processes, such as the horserace betting market, have not been explored in terms 
of effects of anchoring on participants’ judgements.  
Consequently, a new study is required to explore anchoring effects in a real world 
environment  with  a  large  data  sample.  This  study  aims  to  fill  the  gap  left  by 
experimental  studies  by  employing  a  new  method  to  detect  anchoring  effects  in  a 
dynamic  real  world  environment  which  contains  rich  information.  The  research 
questions derived from previous literature, research paradigm, strategy and methods are 
discussed in the next chapter, in order to identify the most appropriate methodology to 
achieve the purpose of this study. The research data and modelling procedures are also 
described in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Previous  literature  suggests  that  when  faced  with  uncertainty,  decision  makers 
tend to anchor their estimates of the value of a decision task on a reference point (the 
anchor) and make insufficient adjustments from the anchor value to reach the target 
value  (e.g.,  Cervone  and  Peake,  1986;  Epley  and  Giovich,  2001;  Kahneman  and 
Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). However, although strong anchoring 
effects have been demonstrated in a number of laboratory-based studies (see Chapter 2), 
a  limited  amount  of  research  has  focused  on  anchoring  effects  in  real  world 
environments.  Therefore,  the  following  chapters  will  fill  this  gap  by  exploring 
anchoring effects associated with judgements and decisions in a real world environment 
involving risk under uncertainty: the horserace betting markets. In particular, the aim of 
this chapter is to develop a methodology to detect whether these effects exist in the real 
world environment, how strong the anchors are to cause these effects, and whether they 
are  affected  by  the  degree  of  decision  makers’  expertise  and  differences  between 
markets.   
In order to explore the existence of anchoring effects in the real world and the 
degree to which that decision makers anchor their judgements on particular information 
in a real world environment, an appropriate research design is required. In particular, an 
appropriate research paradigm, research strategy, and research method are required to 
answer these research questions.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 specifies the 
research  questions  which  have  been  developed  from  previous  literature.  Section  3.3 
introduces research paradigms and explains why the positivism paradigm is the most 
appropriate paradigm applied to the current research. This is followed by a discussion of 
a suitable research strategy for the study. Anchoring effects have mainly been detected   75 
in  laboratory  experiments  and  have  largely  remained  unexplored  in  the  real  world 
environment, other than in small scale studies. Consequently, the present study seeks to 
extend  the  existing  literature  by  applying  statistical  models  to  explore  potential 
anchoring  effects  in  a  large  scale  study  associated  with  horserace  betting  markets. 
Consequently, a series of research hypotheses are developed in Section 3.4 to explore 
the  existence  and  the  degree  of  anchoring  effects  in  this  real  world  decision 
environment.  The  data  employed  to  conduct  the  hypothesis  testing  are  described  in 
Section  3.5  and  the  specific  research  method  adopted  in  this  study  to  test  these 
hypotheses is identified in Section 3.6. A summary and some conclusions are developed 
in Section 3.7.  
 
 
3.2 Research Questions 
 
Existing literature suggests that anchoring effects are a very common phenomenon 
in human decision making processes. These effects can be caused by different types of 
anchors. For example, in some experiments participants are provided with an externally 
generated irrelevant number (e.g., a number generated by a wheel of fortune): they are 
asked whether the answer to a question is higher or lower than that value. In these 
experiments, participants are found to anchor their estimates of the answer on that given 
number, which is obviously irrelevant to the right answer (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 
2002;  Ritov,  1996;  Shelton,  1999;  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974).  In  terms  of  the 
source  of  anchors,  the  literature  has  demonstrated  that  anchoring  and  insufficient 
judgements can also occur when participants personally generate the anchors without 
being provided with a reference number (e.g., Epley and Gilovich, 2001). It is also 
found that how the anchor is represented (e.g., Wong and Kwong, 2000; Havard, 2001; 
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) and the degree of the decision makers’ knowledge about 
the target object (e.g., Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000; Northcraft 
and Neale, 1987) can affect the degree of anchoring effects.  
In contrast to these laboratory studies, a few studies also explore anchoring effects 
in the field by asking people to answer specifically designed surveys or questionnaires 
according to their daily decision tasks (e.g., Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Shelton, 1999). 
These field studies also detect a strong anchoring effect in circumstances associated   76 
with real world decision tasks (e.g., auction, auditing, and accounting). However, these 
tasks are undertaken when participants are aware of their involvement in a survey or an 
experiment and their judgements being studied. Therefore, they may pay more attention 
to their judgements in the survey to increase their judgement accuracy. In other words, 
their behaviour might be different  from when they  do not know their  decisions are 
examined.  
Consequently,  one  of  the  motivations  for  this  study  was  to  explore  whether 
anchoring effects exist and what factors would affect the degree of anchoring effects in 
a real world decision making environment when decision makers are unaware that they 
are being observed. This will provide a clearer picture of the impact of anchoring in real 
world environments. To achieve this aim, three research questions are proposed:  
 
Question one:  
Do anchoring effects caused by relevant or less relevant information exist in real 
world  environments  and  how  strong  should  the  anchors  be  to  lead  to  anchoring 
effects?  
 
Literature has shown that anchoring effects can be caused by different types of 
information,  such  as  relevant  or  irrelevant  anchors  and  externally  given  or  self-
generated anchors. In this study, only anchors relevant and less relevant to decision 
tasks  are  considered.  In  addition,  although  significant  anchoring  effects  have  been 
demonstrated  in  many  experiments,  some  studies  suggest  that  anchoring  effects  are 
weak and fragile in certain circumstances (e.g., Brewer and Chapman, 2002; Wilson et 
al., 1996). Therefore, it will be interesting to explore how strong the information should 
be to cause significant effects of anchoring in real world environments.  
 
Question two:  
Is the degree of anchoring affected by the degree of expertise of decision makers?  
 
Question three:  
To what extent the degree of anchoring is affected by the environment or market in 
which decisions are made?    77 
These two questions focus on whether the influence of relevant anchors is affected 
by the expertise of decision makers or by the market in which decision procedures are 
conducted.  
 
 
3.3 Research Paradigm  
 
Research can be classified from different perspectives. Generally, four aspects are 
considered to describe a piece of research: the purpose, the logic, the process, and the 
outcome of the research (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  
Based on these four aspects, this study which explores anchoring effects in a real 
world environment (the horserace betting market) can be described as a (1) descriptive 
and predictive, (2) deductive, (3) quantitative, and (4) applied research. In particular, the 
study is descriptive because it aims to describe the characteristics of anchoring effects 
(i.e.,  the  existence  and  the  degree  of  anchoring)  in  a  real  world  decision  making 
environment.  This  study  is  also  predictive  because  it  aims  to  search  for  certain 
circumstances in which anchoring effects would occur and the influence of anchoring 
effects on outcomes of later races is therefore predictive. Based on a large number of 
studies, this study is conducted to try to confirm results derived from laboratories rather 
than to seek patterns or hypotheses. In addition, this study is not to analyse or explain 
how and why anchoring exists. Therefore, it is not exploratory research. Second, the 
aims of this study are to search for anchoring effects in horserace betting markets based 
on results derived from previous literature and to estimate the influence of anchoring 
effects on outcomes of races. To achieve these aims, a number of research questions are 
proposed  to  deduct  whether  theories  and  findings  provided  in  the  literature  can  be 
generalised in a new real world environment, the horserace betting market. In other 
words, it is not to induct a new theory from the observations but to explore whether an 
existing theory or phenomenon can be demonstrated to exist in other settings. Therefore, 
it is deductive rather than inductive research. Third, to conduct deductive research, a 
large  quantity  of  market  data  associated  with  different  types  of  publicly  available 
information  (e.g.,  horses’,  jockeys’  and  trainers’  past  performances)  is  used  to 
demonstrate  the  existence  of  anchoring  effects  in  this  market.  In  order  to  examine 
bettors’  actual  judgements  of  horses  winning  probabilities  from  the  market’s   78 
perspective rather than from each individual bettor’s perspective, a quantitative rather 
than  a  qualitative  method  is  appropriate  to  this  study.  Finally,  this  study  looks  for 
evidence to answer questions such as whether anchoring effects exist in a specific real 
world  environment,  the  horserace  betting  market,  rather  than  to  provide  a  basic 
description or explanation of anchoring in the general area of cognitive psychology. 
Therefore, this is applied research rather than basic research.    
To better clarify and identify the nature of and the process for conducting the 
current research, a study of research paradigms is required. Paradigm, as interpreted by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979), is  
“a  term  which  is  intended  to  emphasise  the  commonality  of 
perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in 
such a way that they can be usefully regarded as approaching social 
theory within the bounds of the same problematic” (p.23).  
Collis and Hussey (2003) argue that paradigm is about people’s opinion of how 
research should be conducted (i.e., the progress of scientific practice based on people’s 
philosophies  and  assumptions  about  the  world  and  the  nature  of  knowledge).  Kuhn 
(1962) regards paradigms as scientific achievements which provide model problems and 
solutions to a group of practitioners.  
In  particular,  Saunders,  Lewis  and  Thornhill  (2003)  describe  the  process  of 
conducting social research as that of peeling an onion: the core of the onion cannot be 
seen until the layers are peeled away. These layers are research philosophy, research 
approaches, research strategy, time horizons, and data collection methods, from outside 
to the centre, respectively. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that a research paradigm is 
a framework which (1) at the philosophical level, reflects one’s basic beliefs of the 
social world; (2) at the social level, provides researchers with guidelines for conducting 
social research; these are also called the research approach or research strategy in other 
literature (e.g., Saunders et al., 2003; Collis and Hussey, 2003); and (3) at the technical 
level, refers to specific methods and techniques which are employed to collect data and 
conduct analysis (i.e., the research method). These three levels of research paradigm are 
described  in  the  following  sections  to  help  further  identify  an  appropriate  research 
paradigm under which the research questions can be properly answered.  
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3.3.1 Research Philosophy 
 
As the first layer of the research ‘onion’, research philosophy represents the way 
that a researcher thinks about the development of knowledge (Saunders et al., 2003). 
The understanding of research philosophy can benefit the research design by clarifying 
research designs, selecting appropriate research designs and identifying or even creating 
and adapting new designs (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002).  
According  to  Burrell  and  Morgan  (1979),  research  is  comprised  of  two 
independent dimensions. One dimension is about how researchers view the nature of 
social  science:  from  an  objective  perspective  or  a  subjective  perspective.  The 
objectivists view the social world and the reality as empirical entities no matter what 
labels they are nominated. The subjectivists, however, believe the social world is “made 
up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to structure reality 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; p. 4)”. The second dimension focuses on how researchers 
view  the  nature  of  social  society  within  which  the  research  problem  exists:  from  a 
regulation point of view or a radical change point of view. The sociology of regulation 
regards society as balanced, consensual, socially ordered and cohesive when providing 
explanations  of  society.  In  contrast,  the  sociology  of  radical  change  focuses  on 
explanations for radical change, deep-seated conflict and structural contradiction which 
are believed to characterise modern society. Along with these two dimensions, four 
basic paradigms are formulated to reflect different views of social reality and social 
theory:  functionalist,  interpretive,  radical  humanist  and  radical  structuralist.  In  this 
framework, each paradigm shares common characteristics with its neighbours in one 
dimension but is distinguished from them in the other dimension. Similarly, Saunders et 
al.  (2003)  summarised  three  different  philosophies  which  are  generally  adopted  in 
social research: positivism, interpretivism, and realism. The relationships between these 
paradigms along the two dimensions are illustrated below in Figure 3.3-1 and each of 
the paradigms will be discussed in more detail.  
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Figure 3.3-1 Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory 
 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
 
   
 SUBJECTIVE                                                                                OBJECTIVE 
 
 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
(Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979; p. 22) 
 
3.3.1.1 Functionalist vs. Interpretive 
 
As  the  dominant  framework  in  research  of  social  science,  the  functionalist 
paradigm constructs research based on the sociology of regulation and approaches its 
research subject from an objective point of view (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It is also 
labeled as the positivism paradigm by many researchers (e.g., Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Fisher, 2004; Saunders et al., 2003). Theories within this paradigm are constructed to 
observe an independent and pre-existing reality; researchers using this paradigm should 
remain independent and value-free and provide objective views to report the ‘what is 
reality’ question (Collis and Hussey, 2003). The positivism paradigm intends to develop 
general laws and knowledge that can be used to predict human behaviour and control 
the social world (Fisher, 2004). In approach, positivism is often problem-orientated and 
aims to provide essentially rational explanations and practical solutions to social issues 
and problems. It applies the models and methods of the natural sciences to the study of 
social affairs and human behaviour (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Remenyi et al., 1998). 
The  data  should  be  collected  in  an  apparently  value-free  manner,  using  a  highly 
structured methodology to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 1997).  
The  interpretive  paradigm  is  often  regarded  as  the  same  as  interpretivism, 
phenomenology or constructionism (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Fisher, 2004; Saunders et 
al., 2003). It also explains the social world based upon the sociology of regulation, but 
from a subjective point of view. Specifically, theories within this paradigm intend to 
describe the social world as it is and to understand the nature of the social reality and 
Radical humanist 
(Realism) 
Radical structuralist 
(Realism) 
Interpretive 
(Interpretivism) 
Functionalist 
(Positivism)   81 
human  behaviour  from  the  observers’  own  viewpoint  and  individual  experience.  In 
other words, interpretivism reflects the sociology of regulation implicitly rather than 
explicitly. The interpretive sociologists believe that reality is socially constructed and 
dependent on individuals’ perspectives. Consequently, they may describe and explain 
the  social  world  in  different  interpretations  and  capture  the  complexity  of  social 
situations from their own point of view. These different interpretations are therefore 
likely to affect their actions and the nature of their interaction with other people in 
return (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Collis and Hussey, 2003; Saunders et al., 2003). To 
obtain a personal understanding of the meanings of social reality, qualitative strategies 
such as interviews or observations are often applied within this paradigm.  
As the two main paradigms of the social science study, the positivism and the 
interpretivism paradigms are contrasted in different ways. Robson (1993) argues that 
the  positivistic  approach  is  usually  regarded  as  starting  with  theory.  Positivistic 
researchers generalise what they are looking for from theory and previous research; they 
have specific hypotheses to test in order to confirm or reject their assumptions of the 
research subject. The interpretive approach, however, involves the collection of data 
before  inducing  theories  and  concepts.  It  is  ‘hypothesis  generating’  rather  than 
‘hypothesis  testing’  (Robson,  1993).  More  specifically,  Collis  and  Hussey  (2003) 
summarise the main differences between the paradigms as illustrated in Table 3.3-2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   82 
Table 3.3-1 Features of the two main paradigms 
 
Positivistic paradigm  
(Functionalist  paradigm  in  Burrell  and 
Morgan, 1979) 
Phenomenological paradigm  
(Interpretive  paradigm  in  Burrell  and 
Morgan, 1979 ) 
Tends to produce quantitative data 
Uses large samples 
Concerned with hypothesis testing  
Data is highly specific and precise 
The location is artificial 
Reliability is high 
Validity is low 
Generalises from sample to population 
Tends to produce qualitative data 
Uses small samples 
Concerned with generating theories 
Data is rich and subjective 
The location is natural  
Reliability is low 
Validity is high 
Generalises from one setting to another 
(Source: Adapted from Collis and Hussey, 2003; p. 55) 
 
3.3.1.2 Radical Humanist vs. Radical Structuralist  
 
Both  of  the  radical  humanist  and  radical  structuralist  paradigms  advocate  a 
sociology of radical change. The radical humanist paradigm develops its concern from 
a  subjective  perspective  which  focuses  on  researchers’  human  consciousness  and 
personal  experience  of  the  social  world  (Burrell  and  Morgan,  1979).  The  theorists 
within this paradigm believe the reality is socially constructed and can be interpreted in 
different  ways  by  different  people.  Consequently,  its  view  of  subjectivity  to  social 
science is in common with that of the interpretive paradigm. The difference between the 
sociology of radical change and that of regulation is that the former aims to not only 
simply interpret or understand the social world but also further change and improve it.  
In contrast, the radical structuralist paradigm approaches a sociology of radical 
change based upon an objective standpoint regarding the social reality. The approach of 
this  paradigm  to  social  science  study  shares  similar  features  with  that  of  the 
functionalist  paradigm;  it  aims  to  provide  objective,  independent  and  value-free 
knowledge and theory of the society. It concentrates on ‘structural relationships’ and 
‘basic interrelationships’ rather than ideological contradictions within a realist social 
world. In other words, the radical structuralists emphasise the radical change of society   83 
based upon the nature and structure of contemporary society rather than upon human 
consciousness or individual experience (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
According to Saunders et al. (2003), realism involves both radical humanist and 
radical structuralist paradigms as discussed above. More specifically, theorists in the 
context of the realism paradigm believe that a social reality exists which is external to 
individuals within the society and is independent of human beliefs and perspectives. 
This perspective shares some common philosophical aspects with positivism such as 
“related to the external, objective nature of some macro aspects of society” (Saunders et 
al.,  2003;  p.  85).  However,  the  realism  also  recognises  that  people  in  societies  are 
influenced  by  social  forces  and  processes,  although  they  may  not  be  aware  of  the 
existence of such influences on their interpretations and behaviours. In other words, 
realism involves both objective reality and subjective perception within its social study 
context: (1) the reality is objective; (2) this reality strongly influences people’s views 
and behaviours; but (3) these people may not recognise such influences when seeking to 
understand this reality.  
 
3.3.1.3 The Paradigm Adopted in This Study 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the four paradigms are regarded as mutually 
exclusive. They offer alternative views of social society. These views are based upon 
different sets of assumptions with regard to the nature of social science and of social 
society.  Therefore,  by  being  clear  about  which  paradigm  to  adopt  in  their  research, 
social researchers are able to identify where they are, where they have been and where 
to go in the future. The understanding of the paradigms also helps researchers to clarify 
specific assumptions for their research, within a particular paradigm. The researchers 
are, therefore, able to select appropriate approaches to examine these assumptions and, 
sequentially, answer the research questions. However, it should be noted that there is no 
‘better’ paradigm than the other. They are ‘better’ at doing different types of research. 
To select which paradigm to use depends upon the research question(s) to be answered 
and the research assumption(s) to be tested in the research (Saunders et al., 2003).  
According  to  the  discussion  above,  a  functionalist  paradigm  is  adopted  in  the 
present study to explore anchoring effects in the horserace betting markets. The reason 
for this can be explained by considering the underlying assumptions about the nature of   84 
social science within this paradigm. Respectively, four sets of assumptions, related to 
ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology, are discussed below.  
 
Ontology 
Ontology  concerns  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  the  phenomena  under 
investigation. In a context of functionalist paradigm, social scientists accept that the 
‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual. It is not a product of individual 
consciousness or of one’s mind; it exists independently and objectively in the world 
(Burrell  and  Morgan,  1979).    Specifically,  the  horserace  betting  market,  in  which 
anchoring effects are investigated, is a reality which is composed of different market 
participants:  the  betting  public,  the  betting  operators  (the  Tote)  and/or  the  market 
makers (the bookmakers). These participants may have different impacts on the market 
but the market is not constructed by any single participant. For example, the racetrack 
constructed by the racetrack management may favour certain types of horses in relation 
to  the  surface  or  drainage  system  of  the  track.  Tipsters  in  the  market  provide 
professional  predictions  of  horses’  winning  chances  before  a  race  starts.  This  may 
highly influence the decisions of the betting public who rely on the tipsters’ assessments. 
The odds of a horse in the pari-mutuel betting system are determined by the amount of 
money placed on that horse compared to the total amount of money bet for that race. 
Odds of horses in a bookmaker betting market are initially determined by bookmakers 
according to their subjective assessments but are highly affected by the flow of stakes 
and the interactions of other bookmarkers in that market. In addition, gambling tax and 
regulations from the  government and racing  authorities are applied to  the horserace 
betting  market.  All  of  these  suggest  that  the  betting  market  is  objective  to  its 
participants but is affected by the participants’ behaviours, perceptions and interactions. 
Consequently,  assumptions  associated  with  ontology  of  functionalist  paradigm  are 
appropriate for the present research.  
 
Epistemology 
Assumptions associated with an epistemological nature are about the essence of 
‘knowledge’.  These  assumptions  include  how  people  understand  social  reality,  how 
they communicate this knowledge with other people (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and 
what attitudes people hold to view what they are studying (Hussey and Hussey, 1997).   85 
In  the  functionalist  paradigm,  researchers  obtain  the  knowledge  of  a  phenomenon 
through a series of empirical tests based upon a large data sample in order to answer 
‘true’ or ‘false’ questions. Although market prices of horses are eventually determined 
by  different  market  participants,  none  of  them  has  overwhelming  influence  on  the 
behaviour of the market. Anchoring effects, if they exist, arise from the decisions of the 
betting public. Consequently, they should be investigated in the whole market which is 
impacted by all the market participants. In this sense, the horserace betting market to be 
investigated according to anchoring effects is regarded as a ‘reality’ external to both the 
researcher and to any single individual in the market. In addition, a series hypotheses 
formulated  and  tested  in  previous  literature  suggest  that  it  is  appropriate  to  test 
anchoring effects in horserace betting markets using hypotheses derived from laboratory 
studies. To answer these typical ‘true’ or ‘false’ questions (e.g., anchoring exists in 
horserace betting markets, anchoring in these markets is affected by bettors’ expertise), 
the epistemological nature of the present study indicates that a functionalist paradigm is 
needed.  Furthermore,  although  most  of  the  studies  in  the  anchoring  literature  are 
undertaken in laboratories associated with small data samples, the study of anchoring 
effects in horserace betting markets enables the researcher to investigate a large amount 
of information from these markets. This advantage over the laboratory studies is based 
on a belief that bettors’ behavioural bias is indicated by their decisions and is thus 
reflected in horses’ market prices, as discussed in the ‘ontology’ section. Therefore, an 
empirical  study  which  follows  the  approach  applied  by  horserace  betting  literature 
(large  sample  statistical  analysis)  rather  than  the  psychological  anchoring  literature 
(small sample experiments) is regarded as appropriate in this study.   
 
Human Nature 
Human  nature  relates  to  a  third  set  of  assumptions  which  describe  the 
relationships  between  human  beings  and  the  environment  where  they  live.  In  a 
functionalist  paradigm,  human  beings  and  their  behaviours  are  both  regarded  as 
products  of  the  environment:  they  are  conditioned  by  the  circumstances  which  are 
external to them. In a horserace betting environment, behaviour of the betting public 
and other market participants (e.g., the tote, bookmakers and the racetrack management) 
relies on the maximisation of profits (or utility) from their own perspective. However, 
the  performance  of  each  market  participant  is  dependent  upon  the  situation  of  the   86 
participant in the market. For example, people betting with bookmakers in betting shops 
have no access to the paddock at the racecourse. Therefore, these people may not be 
able to assess the physical conditions of horses, whereas people at the racecourse can do 
this when before the race starts. Moreover, the conditions of the racetrack (such as the 
surface and the going of the racetrack) and the stall positions of horses, manufactured 
by  the  racing  authorities,  may  affect  the  racing  outcome.  Consequently,  bettors’ 
assessments  of  horses’  winning  probabilities  (implied  by  odds)  will  be  affected  by 
consideration  of  these  factors.  Meanwhile,  the  application  of  track-take  and 
bookmakers’ over-round make it impossible for the majority of the betting public to 
make  long-term  profits  from  horserace  betting.  Taken  together,  the  behaviour  of 
different  participants  in  the  horserace  betting  market  and  decisions  made  by  these 
participants are highly influenced by the market environment. This clearly fits closely 
with the ‘human nature’ assumptions with the functionalist paradigm.  
 
Methodology  
The methodological nature of social science is determined by the nature of the 
three sets of assumptions outlined above. Each set of these assumptions has a significant 
impact on the way in which one investigates and on the appropriate approach that one 
uses  to  obtain  the  knowledge  of  a  social  phenomenon.  Consequently,  “Different 
ontologies,  epistemologies  and  models  of  human  nature  are  likely  to  incline  social 
scientists towards different methodologies (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; p. 2).” Within 
the context of a functionalist paradigm, a methodology for the natural science to explore 
associations  or  causality  is  generally  adopted.  This  is  often  achieved  by  launching 
statistical models and involving a large amount of data. In terms of this horseracing 
study, under the functionalist paradigm, it is appropriate to conduct a series of statistical 
techniques to explain or predict anchoring effects in this market. This is conducted by 
analysing the accuracy of bettors’ assessments of horses’ winning probabilities in a race, 
and whether they anchor their subjective judgements of horses winning on particular 
pieces  of  information.  The  purpose  of  this  methodology  is  to  describe  associations 
and/or to explain causality of objective facts (odds assessments and anchoring effects in 
this study).  
In summary, the discussion of the nature of the four sets of assumptions within the 
context of a research framework indicates that a functionalist paradigm is appropriate   87 
for this study. The horserace betting market is a social environment which involves 
different market participants. Within this environment, these participants behave in a 
different way according to the situation. The purpose of such market behaviours is to 
maximize their own utility based upon the information which people obtain and upon 
their ability to make accurate judgements. The aggregate market is therefore constructed 
of such different behaviours and the interactions between these behaviours. On the other 
hand,  people  make  their  decisions  subject  to  the  restrictions  of  this  decision 
environment and market regulations. Therefore, a research framework which is often 
employed for the natural science study is appropriate for the present study in order to 
understand economic behaviour within this environment.  
 
3.3.2 Research Approach 
 
In  a  research  design,  the  research  approach  belongs  to  the  social  level  of  the 
research paradigm, which involves the use, construction, and verification of theories. 
The inductive and deductive approaches are the two approaches which are generally 
adopted  in  social  research.  Researchers  who  explain  a  social  reality  from  personal 
observations and subjective views are employing the inductive approach. People who 
start  their  research  from  a  generalised  theory  and  clear  research  questions  are 
conducting a deductive approach (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 
2005). 
 
3.3.2.1 Inductive Approach  
 
In an inductive approach, researchers collect data from empirical observations. 
The  purpose  of  observing  and  analysing  cases  is  to  obtain  a  deep  and  vivid 
understanding of the nature of the social phenomenon that is being studied. The result of 
this analysis is the formulation of a theory or some generalised conclusions. In this type 
of research, the research process starts with data, goes from observations to findings and 
ends up at theory building. In addition, personal views and subjective judgements of 
researchers are incorporated into the theory generating process (Bryman and Bell, 2003; 
Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Saunders et al., 2003).    88 
According to Creswell’s (1994) criteria, the inductive approach is often employed 
with new research topics, when much debate is involved and when little literature exists. 
This is often associated with an interpretive philosophy which is to answer the ‘why’ or 
‘how’ type of questions. A collection of qualitative data often involves in an inductive 
research (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Saunders et al., 2003).  
As a large amount of literature is readily available on both anchoring effects and 
on  behaviour  in  horserace  betting  markets,  a  series  of  theories  have  already  been 
developed  which  can  be  used  to  generate  specific  hypotheses.  The  testing  of  these 
hypotheses helps to fill the gap between the literature and helps to answer the research 
questions. Therefore, a deductive rather than an inductive approach is appropriate for 
the present study.  
 
3.3.2.2 Deductive Approach 
 
In  a  deductive  research,  conclusions  are  drawn  through  logical  reasoning.  In 
particular,  theories  or  hypotheses  are  firstly  generated  from  the  existing  knowledge 
(literature).  An  empirical  scrutiny  process  (testing)  is  then  developed  to  test  these 
theories or hypotheses. The results of the tests may accept or reject these theories or 
hypotheses. Consequently, this acceptance and rejection can help researchers to explain 
or predict social phenomena so as to provide new evidence for the theory (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005; Saunders et al., 2003).  
Robson (1993) suggests a five-step progress for conducting deductive research. 
The first step is to deduce a testable hypothesis based on theory. This hypothesis is 
supposed  to  identify  the  relationship  between  two  or  more  events  or  concepts.  The 
concepts adopted in this deductive research should be highly relevant to the research 
topic under study. Secondly, the hypothesis is expressed in operational terms (called 
‘operationalisation’).  These  terms  or  indicators  are  transferred  from  the  concepts 
clarified in the previous step. The purpose of this transformation is to explain how the 
variables  are  to  be  measured  and  to  describe  the  relationship  between  two  specific 
variables. Thirdly, the operational hypothesis is tested by experiments or other types of 
empirical inquiries. The fourth stage of deduction involves examination of the specific 
outcome  of  the  inquiry.  The  findings  may  confirm  or  reject  the  hypothesis  and  the 
underlying theory. It should be noted that in most cases, the theory proved from the   89 
empirical analysis is only based upon the validity of a limited sample. This suggests that 
a modification of hypothesis or theory may also be needed. If so, the fifth step will then 
be undertaken to modify the hypothesis or theory. After revising the theory, researchers 
will need to repeat the cycle so as to verify the updated theory.  
It is argued that the deductive approach is appropriate when a large body of well-
established  literature  on  the  research  topic  is  available.  Researchers  adopting  the 
deductive approach seek research opportunities or gaps by carefully examining existing 
knowledge in the literature. In this case, they are usually very clear about the problems 
or questions that they are to investigate. Therefore, a type of ‘true’ or ‘false’ questions is 
often deduced from the exploration of research questions and related theories (Creswell, 
1994; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). As the dominant research approach employed in 
natural  sciences,  deduction  is  often  employed  in  the  context  of  the  functionalist 
paradigm. Quantitative data are often associated with this type of research.  
A deductive approach is employed in this study for the following four reasons. 
First,  there  is  a  large  amount  of  existing  literature  covering  both  anchoring  and 
behaviour in horserace betting markets. The concepts of the anchoring-and-adjustment 
heuristic  and  anchoring  effects  were  first  systematically  proposed  by  Tversky  and 
Kahneman  in  the  early  1970s.  A  number  of  subsequent  studies  have  developed  the 
theory  of  anchoring  from  different  aspects,  such  as  the  underlying  mechanisms  of 
anchoring, the various environments in which anchoring may occur, the durability of 
anchoring, and the measurement of anchoring. The findings of these studies provide a 
rich source of knowledge of anchoring which occurs in both laboratories and the real 
world.  
Clearly,  the  examination  of  hypotheses  of  anchoring  in  a  real  world  decision 
environment  which  has  not  yet  been  investigated  can  add  new  knowledge  about 
anchoring or may lead to a new theory. The horserace betting market is an appropriate 
real world environment chosen to explore anchoring effects in this study.  
Horserace betting markets have been explored in a considerable number of studies. 
Most  of  these  studies  focus  on  information  efficiency  in  different  racing  markets. 
Hypotheses  are  developed  through  the  concept  of  the  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis 
(EMH) in financial markets, and are extended to horserace betting and other gambling 
markets  (e.g.,  lottery,  blackjack,  football,  basketball,  and  greyhound).  Therefore, 
previous research exploring the accuracy of price in relation to the information available   90 
in these markets can provide well-developed knowledge to inform the current study. 
The  investigation  of  anchoring  effects  in  horserace  betting  markets  in  this  study  is, 
therefore, regarded as a combination of anchoring and betting market studies.  
Second, the current study seeks to explain causal relationships between variables 
such as biased judgements on horses’ winning probabilities and the factor on which 
bettors may anchor. In horserace betting, bettors’ subjective judgements are influenced 
by  different  publicly  available  information  and  the  impact  of  that  information  on 
different people varies. The aim of this study is to detect to what extent certain pieces of 
information (anchoring factors) affect bettors’ subjective estimates of horses’ winning 
probabilities (implied by odds of horses).  
Third, the deductive approach requires sufficient numerical data and assumes that 
researchers are independent from what is being observed. In the current study, a large 
dataset from each of the two horserace betting markets (i.e., information concerning all 
races run in the HK and UK markets over the last ten years) is used by the researcher. 
The availability of a large quantitative database (the odds and other information) and a 
highly structured methodology (statistical methods to control and test hypotheses) are 
able to facilitate replication and generalisation of the study. In addition, the market data 
employed  to  conduct  standard  empirical  tests  are  collected  independently  by  the 
researcher. It should be noted that if the results of these tests are not consistent with the 
hypotheses,  the  hypotheses  may  be  modified.  Explanations  from  the  researchers’ 
subjective perspective may also help explain the inconsistencies. This will not damage 
the application of deduction in this study.  
Finally,  there  will  be  an  operationalisation  process  undertaken  in  deductive 
research  to  transfer  concepts  into  measurable  variables  in  a  quantitative  way.  In 
horserace betting markets, the aggregate effect of all types of public information on 
bettors’  subjective  judgements  is  assumed  to  be  contained  in  final  odds.  The  odds 
information, however, cannot be directly used in the statistical models employed in this 
study. Therefore, an appropriate method is needed to transfer the odds information into 
horses’  winning  probabilities.  Similarly,  factors  which  may  have  an  impact  on  the 
generation of final odds are transferred into dummy variables to meet the requirements 
of statistical analysis (for more details, see Section 3.6.3).  
In summary, the present study applies a deductive approach, through the following 
stages:  literature  study,  hypothesis  construction,  hypothesis  testing,  and  outcome   91 
analysis. The literature of anchoring effects and horserace betting are reviewed in order 
to find the research gap and to develop research questions. Consequently, a series of 
hypotheses  are  constructed  to  answer  these  questions  in  depth,  such  as  whether 
anchoring effects exist in real world environments. In order to test these hypotheses, an 
operationalisation process is undertaken to transfer public information into a range of 
measurable indicators such as horses’ winning probabilities, post-positions of horses, 
and past performances of horses, jockeys and trainers. Therefore, an empirical model is 
employed to test whether bettors anchor their subjective judgements on certain pieces of 
information based upon these operationalised indicators, using large datasets of races 
run in the HK and UK markets.  
 
3.3.3 Research Strategy 
 
Like research approaches, research strategies are also based on the social level of 
research paradigm and located in the middle layer of the research ‘onion’. Research 
strategies  aim  to  take  a  further  step  to  identify  the  overall  plan  to  help  answer  the 
research  questions.  To  do  this,  a  research  strategy  should  clarify  what  data  to  use, 
specify when, where and how to collect these data and consider the constraints that one 
may face when collecting data (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Collis and Hussey, 2003; 
Saunders et al., 2003). The research paradigm and the research approach that one adopts 
have a significant impact on the strategy.  
 
3.3.3.1 Interpretive Strategy  
 
Interpretive strategies refer to the strategies associated with the inductive approach 
within  the  context  of  an  interpretive  paradigm.  Under  the  interpretive  paradigm, 
research strategies are often conducted using qualitative data. Representative strategies 
adopted  in  interpretive  research  include  action  research,  case  studies,  and  grounded 
theory. Because the paradigm adopted in the present study is the functionalistic (not 
interpretive) paradigm, no interpretive strategies are appropriate in this study.  
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3.3.3.2 Positivistic Strategy 
 
In contrast to interpretive strategies, positivistic strategies are often employed in a 
deductive  process  under  a  functionalist  (positivism)  paradigm.  Quantitative  data  are 
mainly used for these strategies. These highly specific and precise data are generally 
numerical and objective, and are usually collected from surveys, experiments or public 
information. A positivistic strategy aims to keep researchers away from the subjects 
being studied, to make sure that the data collected are not affected by the researchers’ 
judgements.  Within  the  context  of  functionalist  paradigm,  an  explanatory  cross-
sectional strategy is therefore adopted in this thesis to conduct a naturalistic study in the 
real world environment.  
 
Exploratory, Descriptive Study and Explanatory Study 
In terms of the purpose of enquires, research projects can be classified into one of 
three  categories:  exploratory,  descriptive  or  explanatory  studies.  Exploratory  study 
intends to ask questions to find out what is happening and seek new insights. As an 
extension of an exploratory study, descriptive research seeks to develop a clear and 
accurate  picture  of  the  phenomena,  people,  or  situations  being  studied.  Explanatory 
studies are meant to establish causal relationships between different variables by using 
statistical tests (Robson, 2002; Saunders et al., 2003). Clearly, an explanatory study 
should be adopted here since the purpose of this study is to find out whether anchoring 
effects  exist  in  horserace  betting  markets  and  to  what  extent  each  anchoring  factor 
impacts  the  betting  public’s  assessments  of  horses’  probabilities  of  winning.  If  the 
anchoring effect does exist in horserace betting markets, bettors’ subjective judgements 
will be affected by this decision bias and depart from the real probability of a horse 
winning  a  race.  Therefore,  there  is  a  causal  relationship  between  the  impact  of 
anchoring  factors  and  the  accuracy  of  betting  judgements.  If  bettors  are  found  to 
significantly anchor their judgements on certain pieces of information, the accuracy of 
their decisions will be damaged.  
 
Cross-sectional Study vs. Longitudinal Study 
Cross-sectional  studies  are  conducted  when  researchers  intend  to  “obtain 
information on variables in different contexts, but at the same time” (Collis and Hussey,   93 
2003; p. 61). The aim is to investigate the characteristics of a large number of people or 
organisations (different races in different markets in this study), to seek relationships 
between different variables and to compare them in different organisations. Using this 
type of strategy, researchers are able to collect a large amount of data from different 
organisations  in  a  short  time  so  as  to  avoid  missing  data  caused  by  chronological 
changes  in  one  organisation  (Collis  and  Hussey,  2003;  Saunders  et  al.,  2003).  The 
cross-sectional strategy is appropriate for the current study for the following reasons: 
first, the variety of different horserace betting markets provides a good opportunity for 
conducting a cross-sectional study among these markets. For example, the number of 
racetracks (e.g., only two in HK but nearly forty in the UK), the size of races (i.e., the 
number of horses in a race) and different betting systems (e.g., with pari-mutuel or 
bookmakers) may all vary in different countries and areas. This may suggest anchoring 
effects at  a different level or on different factors in different areas,  given the same 
variables and hypothesis testing processes in these places. Second, the accessibility of 
similar data in the HK and UK horserace betting markets makes it possible to employ a 
cross-sectional study in these markets.  
Longitudinal studies are usually used to investigate the change and development 
of people or social phenomena over a period of time. Data on the same variables are 
collected  but  at  different  time  periods  in  order  to  establish  valuable  insights  of  the 
development of subjects being studied. Because the aim of the present research is to 
explore anchoring effects in horserace betting markets but not to describe the change or 
trend of anchoring effects in these markets, the longitudinal strategy is not employed in 
this study.  
 
Experimental Study vs. Real World Study 
(1) Experimental studies 
As a type of explanatory study, experimental study is a classic positivistic strategy 
which is used by most of the studies exploring anchoring effects. These experiments are 
conducted either in a psychological laboratory or in a natural setting associated with real 
world decision tasks. By manipulating an independent variable (for example, the bid 
price offered in an auction), researchers are able to observe its impact on the dependent 
variable  (for  example,  the  deal  price  of  the  auction)  so  as  to  explore  the  casual 
relationship between these two variables.    94 
Anchoring  effects  were  first  systematically  demonstrated  in  laboratory 
experiments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and then were confirmed or challenged by 
further studies conducting laboratory experiments and field experiments (e.g., Chapman 
and Bornstein, 1996; Chapman and Johnson, 1996; Carlson, 1990; Joyce and Biddle, 
1981; Mussweiler and Strack; 2000; Northcraft and Neale, 1987). The main advantage 
of laboratory experiments over field experiments is that the former permits easy control 
of the interaction between variables on the experimental results. However, laboratory 
experiments have been criticised for using students as subjects and for not reflecting the 
nature of real world environment. In contrast, field experiments increase the reality of 
the study by conducting experiments in a real world situation, but at the cost of losing 
much of the control on certain factors. Some of these factors may obscure the effect of 
an independent variable. Some of them may have an impact on the dependent variable 
but are not considered the independent variables themselves (Collis and Hussey, 2002).  
 
(2) Comparisons between experimental studies and real world studies 
As discussed above, both laboratory and field-based experiments have their own 
advantages and drawbacks over each other. In the anchoring literature, the majority of 
studies are undertaken in laboratories under controlled experimental conditions; field 
experiments  are  conducted  to  further  explore  the  effects  detected  in  laboratories. 
However,  they  both  lack  some  vital  features  contained  in  real  world  environments 
(Bruce and Johnson, 1997). Therefore, the distinctions between experimental and real 
world studies (also called naturalistic studies) and the benefits of exploring anchoring 
effects in a real world environment (in particular, the horserace betting markets in this 
study) are discussed below.  
The key distinctions between experimental environments and real world decision 
settings refer to the nature of (1) decision tasks and (2) decision makers. In the aspect of 
decision tasks, three vital features are identified.  
First, as discussed above, experiments are carefully determined and standardised 
and  conducted  under  a  set  of  manufactured  and  controlled  conditions.  Under  these 
conditions, certain variables are eliminated or kept constant in order to investigate the 
influence and interaction of other discrete factors. Control groups are often employed to 
provide  comparative  results  (Collis  and  Hussey,  2003;  Robin,  1993).  Therefore,  it 
becomes  possible,  in  experimental  environments,  to  isolate  particular  factors  for   95 
separate analysis and comparison. Even so, it is argued that experimental settings can 
not completely reflect or simulate the real world environment (Collis and Hussey, 2003) 
and “often omit vital elements which are present in a real-world decision environment” 
(Bruce and Johnson, 1997; p. 287). Hence to what extent the results and conclusions 
deduced  through  laboratory  or  field  experiments  can  be  applied  in  a  real  world 
environment remains unclear. However, real world settings also have their drawbacks. 
For example, the researchers may not be able to separate the interaction between two 
independent variables, and often cannot avoid the impact of variables other than the 
independent  variable  on  the  dependent  variable.  It  will  be  difficult  to  separate  the 
impact of individual factors because they all interact in real world environments.  
A second distinction between experiments and real world decision tasks focuses 
on the nature of tasks undertaken. Experiments are often associated with low-risk tasks 
in stress free settings whilst real world decision makers are generally involved in high-
stakes, stressful environments (Yates, 1992).  It  has been suggested that because the 
risks  contained  in  experiments  are  different  from  those  taken  in  the  real  world, 
individuals  may  behave  differently  within  different  contexts  (Anderson  and  Brown, 
1984).  
A third distinction focuses on measurement of performance in experimental and 
real world settings. Evaluations that are used in experiments to measure the impact or 
performance of decision tasks are often subjective: for example, the degree of perceived 
risk  or  degree  of  confidence  in  making  a  correct  decision.  However,  in  naturalistic 
environments, people often use objective measures to evaluate decision quality and this 
is regarded as more reliable than subjective measures.  
Another  key  difference  between  experimental  conditions  and  real  world 
environments centres on the decision makers. First, participants in laboratory and field-
based experiments are often aware that they are involved in an experiment or study. 
Therefore,  they  may  alter  their  behaviour.  In  addition,  laboratory  studies  often  use 
undergraduate students as experiment subjects but these students may not be familiar 
with constructed decision tasks or lack the experience for solving these problems (Bruce 
and Johnson, 1997). It is believed that decision makers in the real world often deal with 
similar tasks repeatedly so that they can gain experience from the decision that they 
make. Therefore, judgements made by ‘experts’ (people who have more knowledge or 
experience  in  the  area)  are  often  found  to  be  more  accurate  than  those  made  by   96 
‘novices’ (people who  do not have much knowledge or experience about the topic) 
(Christensen-Szalanski et al., 1983). For example, when exploring the characteristics of 
auditors’  decision  making  processes,  researchers  found  more  precise  and  accurate 
results  from  auditors  in  accounting  firms  than  from  students  who  were  undertaking 
accounting and financial courses at universities (e.g., Bonner, 1990; Krull, et. al., 1993; 
Shelton, 1999).   
Taken  together,  studies  undertaken  in  experimental  environments  and  in  real 
world settings are different in many perspectives and both offer particular advantages 
and disadvantages.  
A  large  body  of  anchoring  literature  is  based  on  laboratory  experiments. 
Consequently, it is useful to explore whether and to what extent the anchoring effects 
demonstrated in laboratories are really experienced in real world decision environments. 
In this study, a dynamic naturalistic decision environment, horserace betting markets, is 
selected to test this.  
Horserace betting markets represent the ideal real world environment for a number 
of reasons.  
Firstly, the features of horserace betting markets are consistent with all the criteria 
for a dynamic and naturalistic decision making environment (Orasanu and Connolly, 
1993). It is a naturalistic environment and each element of a decision making event in 
this  market,  such  as  participants  (horses  and  jockeys),  location  (racetracks)  and 
conditions  (surface  and  going  of  the  racetrack),  is  unique.  Hence  participants’ 
performance is of high uncertainty. This market is also dynamic because the odds of 
each horse in a race are continuously changing before the race starts and bettors must 
make their decisions in a limited period of time, based on limited information. Even so, 
it has been argued that this time period (usually 30 minutes for each race at a meeting) 
is sufficient for bettors to make rational and reasonable judgements on horses’ winning 
probabilities (Johnson and Bruce, 2001).  
Secondly,  horserace  betting  markets  involve  an  action-feedback  loop,  which 
represents the characteristic of a dynamic decision setting. In particular, bettors make 
explicit or implicit subjective assessments of horses’ winning probabilities based upon a 
variety of publicly available information (e.g., the past performance of a horse, jockey 
or trainer, the stall position of a horse in a race). Once the race finishes and the result is   97 
released, bettors are then able to use the feedback (updated information on the race 
result and performance) to update and adjust their new decisions.  
In summary, this study will employ a cross-sectional strategy in a dynamic real 
world decision setting, the horserace betting market, to explain the relationship between 
certain factors on which bettors may anchor their judgements and the accuracy of their 
judgements when estimating the winning probability of a particular horse. The research 
hypotheses  derived  from  previous  literature  and  research  questions  are  described  in 
Section 3.4 respectively, followed by a description of the research data and variables in 
Section 3.5. The research method which is used to test these hypotheses is explained in 
Section 3.6.  
 
 
3.4 Research Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses are constructed from previous literature. “A hypothesis is an idea or 
proposition which you test using statistical analysis (Collis and Hussey, 2003; p. 56).” 
The purpose of hypothesis testing is to determine whether the real world examined is in 
accord with the researcher’s perspective of that world and hence to answer the research 
questions.  
As discussed in Section 3.2, three broad questions are derived in this study. The 
first  question  asks  whether  anchoring  effects  (caused  by  relevant  and  less  relevant 
information) exist in the real world and how strong these anchors should be to lead to 
anchoring. The second and third questions focus on to what extent decision makers’ 
expertise or market differences affect the degree of anchoring effects caused by certain 
pieces of information.  
 
To answer the first research question, two specific hypotheses are developed as 
below:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (The anchoring factor hypothesis):  
Bettors  in  the  horserace  betting  markets  anchor  their  judgements  of  a  horse’s 
winning probability on the information associated with (i) the past performance of the   98 
horse, (ii) the past performance of the horse’s jockey or trainer, (iii) the post-position 
of the horse, and (iv) the past performance of the favourite, in the previous race.  
 
This hypothesis relates to the influence of relevant information on the degree of 
anchoring effects. According to the anchoring literature (e.g., Chapman and Johnson, 
2000, 2002; Mussweiler, Strack and Pfeiffer, 2000; Ritov, 1996; Shelton, 1999; Thomas 
and Handley, 2005), both relevant and irrelevant information have strong impacts on 
decision makers’ judgements of decision tasks. In the horserace betting environment, 
relevant information refers to the core factors in determining horses’ winning potential 
which are considered important in most racing publications (e.g., Benter, 1994): horses’, 
jockeys’  and  trainers’  past  performances,  and  horses’  post-positions.  Previous 
favourites’ performances are considered less relevant to the favourites’ performances in 
later races. This is because favourites in different races at a meeting are different and the 
competitiveness of other horses in a race is different from that in other races. Therefore, 
performances of favourites in different races are difficult to compare. If bettors anchor 
their  judgements  on  such  information,  they  may  overestimate  the  real  winning 
probability of a similar horse in another race and therefore over-bet on this horse.  
In particular, three types of information are involved in this hypothesis:  
(i)  Information  associated  with  horses’,  jockeys’  or  trainers’  last  performance. 
Three individual models are constructed to test whether bettors anchor their subjective 
probability judgements of a horse winning a race based on the last performance of (a) 
that horse, (b) the jockey or (c) the trainer of the horse.  
(ii) Information associated with the starting stall of the horse: the post-position. A 
horse’s post-position is randomly determined by the racing authority before the racing 
day and is demonstrated to have a strong impact on the performance of the horse
14 (e.g., 
Beyer, 1983; Quirin, 1979). In addition, the influence of previous winner’s post-position 
on bettors’ judgements of the winning probability of the horse from the same position in 
the next race is also considered. 
(iii)  The  performance  of  previous  ‘favourites’.  In  horserace  betting  markets, 
generally one horse cannot run more than one race at a race meeting. Therefore, the 
favourite horse in a previous race is different from the favourite in the next race. The 
                                                 
14 The horse with inside post-position may take advantage of running less than those which start from the 
outside of the racetrack. This effect is robust in short distance races at certain racetracks (e.g., Beyer, 
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winning probability of a favourite horse in one race is likely to have little relationship 
with the winning probability of a favourite in a subsequent race. Therefore, the fact that 
the favourite won the last race does not necessarily increase the actual chance of a 
favourite winning the current race. If bettors make their judgements based on this less 
relevant  information,  they  are  likely  to  overestimate  the  real  chance  of  a  favourite 
winning a subsequent race.  
Note that for the information of previous winner’s post-position and of previous 
favourite’s performance, only races at the same race meeting are considered. For other 
information, previous races can be either at the same meeting or different meetings. 
This is because previous winner’s post-position and the favourite’s performance are 
vivid but less relevant information which is less likely to be reviewed or remembered by 
bettors when making judgements at later meetings. Whilst other information, such as 
horses’, jockeys’ and trainers’ past performance, is more straightforward and relevant to 
the  horses’  performance  and  can  be  easily  obtained  and  studied  from  betting 
publications. Therefore, even records of races at previous meetings are also included. In 
addition, for all the factors tested in this hypothesis, only the results of the previous race 
are considered. The impact of the previous two or three races on bettors’ subjective 
judgements is examined in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (The anchoring strength hypothesis):  
Anchoring effects in the horserace betting market are fragile and they only occur if 
the anchor is based on consistent results in the previous (i) two races, or (b) three 
races (i.e., anchors based on mote than one previous race).  
 
Previous  literature  has  demonstrated  that  anchoring  may  not  occur  in  certain 
circumstances, especially when decision makers are not explicitly asked to compare the 
anchor value  and the target value (e.g.,  Brewer and Chapman, 2002;  Wilson et  al., 
1996). Moreover, it has been suggested that high-strength but low-weight information is 
more likely to cause overconfidence because people are more likely to be attracted by 
high-strength information and neglect the base-rate information (Nelson et al., 2001). 
According  to  this  finding,  a  repeated  outcome  in  a  short  period  of  time  may  catch 
sufficient attention of bettors and therefore lead them to over-bet on this horse. This can 
be  achieved  by  examining  bettors’  response  to  racing  outcomes  of  more  than  one   100 
previous race. In particular, this hypothesis examines to what extent that bettors take the 
information of the previous two or three races into account when making decisions for 
the current race. If anchoring effects cannot be detected using only the previous race 
information, but can be demonstrated when similar results occur for two or three races, 
it may be argued that anchoring effects are fairly fragile in horserace betting markets. In 
this case it might be concluded that anchoring only occurs when the anchor is strong 
enough to attract bettors’ attention.  
Tests of this hypothesis are similar to the tests employed in the anchoring factor 
hypothesis. The modelling procedures are the same for testing these two hypotheses.  
 
To answer research question two concerning the utilisation of bettors’ expertise in 
betting judgements, the following hypothesis is developed:  
 
Hypothesis 3 (The expertise hypothesis):  
Bettors with greater expertise in the decision tasks are subject to a lower degree of 
anchoring than bettors with less expertise.  
 
It is argued that decision makers with greater expertise or more experience on 
decision tasks can better use available information and make more accurate decisions 
compared to those with less expertise or experience. Consequently, experts, compared 
with non-experts, may be able to decrease the possibility of anchoring on certain pieces 
of information or to reduce the degree of anchoring when making judgements (e.g., 
Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Northcraft and Neale, 1987).  
In horserace betting markets, expert bettors can be distinguished from non-expert 
bettors in different ways. For example, previous literature (e.g., Benter, 1994) suggests 
that expert bettors usually spend a lot of time exploring all types of information and 
focusing on the results of a large number of races. These bettors tend to bet throughout 
all days of the week because they can invest a lot of time on studying previous results 
and many of them do this as their jobs. In contrast, casual bettors are more likely to bet 
on  races  that  run  over  the  weekends  because  they  regard  betting  more  like  an 
entertainment rather than a serious decision task. Generally these casual bettors would 
not spend too much time in advance studying information which may help assess the 
winning probability of horses. Consequently, it might be argued that casual bettors are   101 
more likely to anchor their judgements on specific information which is easy to pick up. 
The bets of more expert bettors are therefore likely to predominate during the weekdays, 
when fewer casual bettors operate.  
In  addition,  previous  literature  suggests  that  bettors  with  more  knowledge  and 
experience in horserace betting will generally bet late in order to avoid their bets being 
followed by the general betting public (which would have the effect of reducing their 
returns  in  a  pari-mutuel  market)  (e.g.,  Benter,  1994).  Consequently,  the  odds 
information at different time periods before the race starts can be used to examine the 
judgements of bettors who have different levels of betting expertise. More specifically, 
the final odds and the odds at 2 and 5 minutes before the race begins are selected to 
explore the degree of anchoring between professional bettors and non-expert bettors. 
The expectation is that bets placed at earlier time from the same start will be made by 
more casual bettors. Similar modelling procedures to those constructed for hypotheses 
one and two are employed to test this hypothesis, but using various odds information.  
 
To  answer  research  question  three  which  relates  to  the  impact  of  decision 
environment and market difference on anchoring effects, the following hypothesis is 
developed:  
 
Hypothesis 4 (The market hypothesis):  
The degree of anchoring effects varies between the HK and UK horserace betting 
markets.  
 
The aim of this hypothesis is to explore the different anchoring effects observed in 
different horserace betting markets. It is suggested that the degree of anchoring effects 
and the factors on which that bettors anchor may vary in different areas due to the 
market diversity.  It is also argued that people in different cultures (e.g., the eastern 
people  and  western  people)  may  contain  different  characteristics  in  risk  taking 
preference  and/or  the  way  of  processing  information  (Hsee  and  Weber,  1999). 
Therefore, a difference in the degree of anchoring on particular information may be 
explained by the characteristics in different markets: the objective features such as the 
features of courses, races and horses, or the subjective features such as bettors’ risk 
preferences caused by the cultural differences, or both.     102 
In  this  study,  the  markets  in  two  regions,  the  HK  and  UK  horserace  betting 
markets, are selected to make this comparison. There are two reasons for choosing these 
two markets: one is the data accessibility, and the other is the diversity between the 
markets. For  example, there are only two racetracks in HK whilst thirty-eight  ‘flat’ 
racetracks are available in the UK database. In HK, the betting volume is very high for 
races running on each track, whilst in the UK the amount of the money that is bet at 
each racetrack is relatively small. There are evening races in the HK market (usually run 
at the Happy Valley racetrack) whilst most races in the UK are running during the 
daytime. Due to these differences, it is possible to assume that the behaviour of bettors 
may differ in these two areas and hence leads to different level or types of anchoring. 
The way of testing this hypothesis is to repeat the tests conducted for the previous three 
hypotheses, using both the HK and the UK data separately to detect differences between 
these markets.  
 
In summary, this study is designed to examine the degree to which, in the real 
world and especially in the horserace betting market, bettors anchor their subjective 
judgements of a horse winning on certain pieces of publicly available information. The 
first two hypotheses are designed to detect bettors’ anchoring on relevant information 
with respect to estimating a horse’s winning probability and how strong these anchors 
should be to cause anchoring. Hypothesis three explores the impact of bettors’ expertise 
and  experience  on  reducing  or  eliminating  the  effect  of  anchoring.  These  are 
implemented by following the same modelling procedures as those for hypotheses one 
and  two,  but  using  modified  anchoring  factors  and  specific  odds  information.  The 
difference  of  anchoring  effects  between  different  markets  is  tested  in  the  fourth 
hypothesis  by  verifying  the  first  three  hypotheses  using  HK  and  the  UK  horserace 
betting data separately.  
The research data and variables are introduced in Section 3.5, followed by the 
description of the modelling procedures in Section 3.6. The results of hypothesis tests 
will be presented, explained and discussed in Chapter 4.  
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3.5 Research Data 
 
The data employed to construct a positivistic research must be quantitative and 
highly specific and precise (Collis and Hussey, 2003). To represent and explore the 
main characteristics of the population considered in the research, a large data sample is 
needed. In this study, two large datasets from the HK and UK horserace betting markets 
are employed. The data are discussed in Section 3.5.1, and the variables constructed for 
this study are described in Section 3.5.2.  
 
3.5.1 Data 
 
The data employed in this study is selected from the HK and the UK horserace 
betting markets (flat races only). There are two reasons for choosing these two markets 
to conduct this study: (1) in each market, a large database containing sufficient racing 
information is readily accessible; and (2) the differences between the market structures 
of HK and the UK make it possible to detect anchoring effects in decision environments 
with  a  wild  cross-section  of  participants.  For  instance,  only  the  pari-mutuel  betting 
system exists in the HK market whilst both the pari-mutuel and the bookmaker betting 
systems are available in the UK and the one which dominates the UK market is the 
latter one. To best reflect the behaviour of the whole market in these two regions, the 
pari-mutuel data for HK and the bookmaker data for the UK are employed in this study. 
In HK, there are only two racetracks running alternatively during the weekdays and 
weekends whilst in the UK, there are 38 racetracks all over the country.  
Although both jump and flat races are available in horserace betting markets, in 
the  UK  only  flat  races  are  used  in  this  study.  Compared  to  jump  races,  flat  races 
generally offer much higher prize money and it would be argued may therefore contain 
less insider trading. In addition, these two types of race attract a different betting public 
and  the  classification  criteria  for  jump  races  are  different  from  those  for  flat  races 
(Ming-Chien Sung, 2006). Therefore, it will be difficult to examine market behaviour if 
both jump and flat races are maintained in one database. Consequently, to reduce the 
complexity of the hypothesis testing and to enable a comparison capability between the 
two markets, the jump races are not included in this study (there are no jump races in 
HK).    104 
The  data  exported  and  formulated  from  the  database  contain  two  types  of 
information: (1) general information concerning the horses and the races; and (2) the 
variable and the performance related information. More specifically, each record of the 
data contains the following information:  
 
Table 3.5-1: Description of the data information for the HK and UK horserace 
betting markets 
 
Type  Description of the information 
I.  General information concerning the horses and the races 
1  The race ID (i.e., a unique identification number for each race), the race date, 
and the race time 
2  The horse ID (i.e., a unique identification number to represent each horse) and 
the horse’s name 
3  The number of runners in each race 
4  The official rating of each horse which represents the ranking of the winning 
potential of the horse estimated by the racing authority 
5  The jockey ID and the jockey’s name for each horse in each race 
6  The trainer ID and the trainer’s name for each horse in each race 
7  The class of the race and the winner’s prize money for each race 
II.  The variable and the performance related information 
8  The  odds  information  (e.g.,  the  final  odds  and  the  odds  2  and  5  minutes 
before the race starts) of each horse in each race 
9  The post-position and the finishing position of each horse in each race 
10  A variable which indicates the winner of a race (the horse which won the race 
gets 1; 0 otherwise) 
11  Variables associated with the horses’ past performances 
12  Variables associated with the favourite horses of different races at a meeting 
13  Variables associated with the post-positions of the past winners at a meeting 
14  Variables associated with the jockeys’ past performances 
15  Variables associated with the trainers’ past performances 
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The detailed information of the data employed for each market is described below 
and the full description of each variable employed in this study is provided in Section 
3.6.  
 
3.5.1.1 The HK Data 
 
The data for the HK horserace betting market are drawn from the pari-mutuel
15 
betting markets operating at Happy Valley (HV) and Sha Tin (ST) racetracks in HK. 
The database consists of 66,244 horses running in 5,133 flat races from 6 September 
1998 to 25 April 2007. Nearly two thirds of these observations (44,620 horses in 3,344 
races) come from ST racetrack and the rest (21,624 horses in 1,789 races) are from HV 
racetrack. In each race, the number of runners varies from 5 to 14. All the races are 
started from starting stalls and each horse is allocated a stall position (i.e. the post-
position) which varies subject to the number of runners in the race. An official rating is 
allocated to each horse before the race to represent the horse’s winning potential; the 
rating varies for different horses from 0 to 145 with a mode of 52. The races running at 
HV  and  ST  are  categorised  in  six  classes:  nearly  half  of  them  are  high  class  races 
(32,231 horses out of 2,523 races in class 1-3) and half of them are low class races 
(34,013 horses out of 2,593 races in class 4-6).  
Three types of odds information are employed in this study: the final odds of each 
horse in a race, the odds of a horse at 2 minutes before the race starts, and the odds at 5 
minutes before the race starts. The winning prize of races ranges from 0.1 to 20 million 
HK$ and the distance of races varies from 1,000 metres to 24,000 metres. Two types of 
surface are used at these two tracks: turf and synthetic. In this database, nearly 90% of 
the races are run on the turf (58,812 horses in 4,560 races).  
 
3.5.1.2 The UK Data 
 
The data employed to conduct empirical tests for the UK horserace betting market 
is provided by Raceform Ltd., the leading supplier of the official British Horse Racing 
Board’s racing results. The original dataset contains 556,115 horses running in 49,993 
                                                 
15 In HK, only the pari-mutuel betting system operates – no bookmaker market exists in this market. 
Grateful thanks to Mr. William Benter for providing data for this study.    106 
flat races over 38 racetracks in the UK from 2 January 1996 to 1 February 2007. Due to 
the requirement of the model used to test the hypotheses (the conditional logit model), 
only one winner is allowed in a race. Therefore, 1,183 observations from 104 races are 
removed from the database due to the lack of the winner (79 horses from 7 races) or 
more  than  one  winner  (1,104  horses  from  97  races  –  i.e.  dead  heats)  in  a  race.  In 
addition,  102  horses  from  19  races  are  removed  from  the  database  since  they  were 
withdrawn  before  the  race  but  their  odds  and  other  information  were  accidentally 
recorded in the database. If their records were maintained in the database, the over-
round probability of the horses which actually run the race will be mis-specified. Finally, 
horses whose finishing positions were missing or which were obviously wrong (e.g., 
with a finishing position of 99) in the database were assumed to finish last; this affected 
2,210 horses. Consequently, the final database which is analysed in this study contains 
554,830 horses running in 49,881 flat races over the period of 11 years.  
In the  final database, the number of runners in a race varies  from 2 to 38. A 
Raceform rating is assigned to the horse once it finishes its race and it varies from 0 to 
136. The races in the UK fall into 7 classes (A-H) from high to low. The final odds of 
each horse have a range from 0 to 1000 with a mean value of 18.73
16. The winning prize 
for the winner(s) of each race varies from 0 to up to 852,600 GBP often depending upon 
the class of the race: the higher the racing class, the more the prize money. The distance 
of the race varies from 1,100 metres to 4,874 metres and 55% of the races (307,413 
observations in 24,948 races) were handicap races and 45% (247,417 observations in 
24,933 races) were non-handicap races.  
 
3.5.2 Variables 
 
To  test  the  hypotheses  constructed  in  Section  3.4,  a  number  of  variables  are 
formulated based on the information collected and generated from the database. If not 
specified, the variables and the modelling procedures for the hypothesis testing are the 
same  for  the  HK  and  the  UK  horserace  betting  markets.  The  dependent  and  the 
independent variables are described below and the modelling procedures are explained 
in Section 3.6. 
                                                 
16 The odds information employed in this study are the starting price recorded by the bookmaker betting 
system. This is because the bookmaker market is the dominant market in the UK (compared to the pari-
mutuel market).    107 
3.5.2.1 Dependent Variable 
 
The  betting  public  considers  a  range  of  publicly  available  information  when 
assessing the probability of a horse winning a race. To estimate a horse’s chance of 
winning a race, it is essential to consider the conditions of other competitors in the race. 
Although the competitiveness of a horse running in a race cannot be observed directly, 
whether it wins the race or not is recorded in  the database. Therefore, a dependent 
variable wij is defined such that: wij = 1 if horse i wins race j, and wij = 0 otherwise. A 
full description of the modelling procedure of this study will be provided in Section 3.6.  
 
3.5.2.2 Independent Variables 
 
There are 19 independent variables employed in this study. They are categorised 
into three groups: (1) odds related variables; (2) performance related variables; and (3) 
post-position related variables. These variables are either available directly from the 
database  (e.g.,  the  post-position  of  each  horse  in  a  race),  computed  from  available 
information (e.g., the odds implied probability of a horse winning a race), or created 
from a combination of relevant information (e.g., whether a horse won its previous race). 
These  variables  are  selected  in  this  study  because:  (1)  they  offer  very  important 
information which can be used to estimate the winning probabilities of horses; and (2) 
these information are easy to obtain from public resources and consequently are likely 
to catch bettors’ attention. Therefore, it is likely that the betting public will anchor their 
subjective  judgements  of  such  information.  The  meanings  and  the  features  of  these 
variables are described in the following sections respectively.  
 
Odds Related Variables 
The  Efficient  Market  Hypothesis  (EMH)  suggests  that  in  a  semi-strong  form 
efficient market, the market price incorporates all the publicly available information 
(references). In horserace betting, the odds of a horse represent its market price, and 
these are believed to incorporate, what many studies indicate, are the most important 
and comprehensive information concerning the chance of the horse winning (e.g., Asch, 
Malkiel and Quandt, 1984; Figlewski, 1979; Johnson and Bruce, 2001). Consequently, 
whether all the public information has been taken into account in odds becomes an   108 
important criterion to judge whether the betting public over (or under) estimate the 
contribution of certain  pieces of information to the horse’s winning probability  (i.e. 
whether they anchor their judgements on certain information).  
The odds employed in this study are the starting price (SP) of horses in the UK 
market and the pari-mutuel odds in the HK market. The reasons for choosing different 
betting systems in these two markets are: (1) the majority of bets placed in the UK 
market are with off-course bookmakers
17 and the majority of these bets are settled at 
SP
18; and (2) the only legal form of horserace betting in HK is the pari-mutuel betting 
form (i.e., the totalisator model of betting), so the pari-mutuel odds are the only data 
which can be used in a study of the HK market.  
Based  on  the  SP  (final  odds  information)  of  horses,  the  odds  related  variable 
employed for the UK market is the natural log of odds implied normalised probabilities. 
The reason for applying this logarithmic transformation is to balance the distribution of 
the data with small values and large values and therefore to produce an approximately 
normal distribution of the data (for more details, see Section 3.6.3). The final odds of 
horses are transformed to the natural log of odds implied probabilities as follows: (i) 
transform the final odds of horse i in a n-runner race j to its odds implied fraction (fi) by 
dividing one by the odds plus one (1/(final odds + 1)); (ii) add up all the fractions of the 
horses in the race (∑
=
n
i
i f
1
) which may or may not equal to one; (iii) normalise the odds 
implied probability by dividing the fraction of each horse in the race by the sum of the 
fractions of all the runners in the race (fi /∑
=
n
i
i f
1
); and (iv) take the natural logarithm of  
(iii) (named ‘LnFinOdds’ in the UK database).  
The odds implied probabilities of horses running in the HK market are developed 
in  a  similar  method,  although  these  odds  are  those  determined  by  the  pari-mutuel 
                                                 
17 In the UK, both bookmakers and the totalisator coexist in the horserace betting market. A bookmaker is 
an organisation or a person that takes bets and may pay winnings depending upon the results and the 
nature of the bets, the odds. On-course bookmakers set odds on the course or racetrack and off-course 
bookmakers operate off the course through telephone, betting shops or the internet. A totalisator (or tote) 
is a computerised system which runs pari-mutuel betting, calculating and displaying payoff odds, and 
producing tickets based on incoming bets. Pari-mutuel is a betting system in which all bets of a particular 
type are placed together in a pool; payoff odds are calculated by sharing the pool among all placed bets.  
18 SP is the price, offered by off-course bookmakers, determined only when the race starts. Off-course 
bookmakers provide bettors with the choice of taking the latest betting odds (fixed-odds) on offer at the 
time they are placing their bets or the SP. If the bettor does not mention the bet is at the latest odds, then it 
is then assumed to be placed at the SP.    109 
betting system. The odds implied probabilities at 2 and 5 minutes before the race starts 
are  also  obtained.  These  variables  are  named  ‘LnFinOdds’,  ‘Ln2MinsOdds’,  and 
‘Ln5MinsOdds’, respectively. This allows hypothesis tests associated with anchoring 
effects of experienced and non-experienced bettors to be conducted.  
 
Performance Related Variables 
(1) Horses’ past performances 
A horse’s past performance is one of the most important pieces of information to 
be analysed when bettors estimate the horse’s potential probability of winning its next 
race.  In  this  study,  three  independent  variables  associated  with  horses’  past 
performances are created to explore whether bettors overestimate the importance of this 
information. For example, if a horse won its last race, would bettors overestimate its 
chance of winning next race? The first variable related to horse’s past performance 
(named ‘H1’
19) is a dummy variable which indicates whether the horse won its last race 
(1  if  it  won  and  0  otherwise).  The  other  two  dummy  variables  (‘H2’  and  ‘H3’ 
respectively) are designed to indicate whether the horse continuously won its previous 
(a) two or (b) three races.   
 
(2) Jockeys’ and trainers’ past performances 
These explanatory variables are related to jockeys’ and trainers’ past performances. 
Take jockey’s performance as an example. Three variables associated  with jockey’s 
past performances are considered in this study. Dummy variable ‘J1’ gives a value of 1 
to  the  horse  whose  jockey  has  won  his/her  previous  race  on  another  horse  and  0 
otherwise. Dummy variables ‘J2’ and ‘J3’ refer to jockeys’ inning records in previous 
two or three races: gives 1 to the horse if its jockey wins previous 2 or 3 races and 0 
otherwise. The continuous winning records of a jockey or trainer may be at the same
20 
or different meetings.  
Similarly, dummy variables (‘T1’, ‘T2’, and ‘T3’) are designed to test whether 
bettors anchor their judgements of a horse winning a race on past performances of the 
horse’s trainer at any meeting (i.e., any previous meeting and the current meeting). The 
horse selected to detect anchoring effects in the current race is different from those who 
                                                 
19 If not specified, the same variables are defined and employed for both the HK and the UK markets.  
20 A jockey can ride more than once on different horses at a meeting. A trainer may have more than one 
horse trained by him/her running in different races at a meeting.    110 
won previous races (up to three previous races are examined in this study) but they are 
trained by the same trainer.  
 
(3) Previous favourites’ performances 
Previous literature suggests that decision makers tend to anchor their judgements 
on the information which is obvious and easy to obtain, even when such information has 
no relationship with the decision task (e.g., Brewer et al., 2007; Cervone and Peake, 
1986; Chapman and Johnson, 2002; Joyce and Biddle, 1981; LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2006; 
Mussweiler  and  Strack,  2000b;  Thorsteinson  et  al.,  2008;  Tversky  and  Kahneman, 
1974).  In  horseracing,  it  is  probable  that  whether  a  previous  race  was  won  by  its 
favourite
21  has little relationship with the winning probability of the favourite in the 
current race. However, bettors may still anchor their judgements of the probability that 
the favourite wins the current race on whether the favourite(s) won previous race(s) at a 
meeting.  
To test this, three dummy variables are designed to represent information related 
to the performances of favourite horses in previous races. The first variable (named ‘F1’) 
gives the favourite horse of the current race a value of 1 if the previous race was won by 
the  favourite  and  0  otherwise.  All  the  non-favourite  horses  of  the  current  race  are 
assigned  a  number  of  0.  Similar  procedures  are  applied  to  create  variables  which 
indicate the winning records of the favourites of the previous two and three races (‘F2’ 
and ‘F3’ respectively).  
Note that whether the favourite won previous race(s) at previous meeting(s) is not 
regarded as an obvious piece of information which would be readily observed by the 
betting public (i.e. not easy to be brought to mind). Therefore, only anchoring effects 
associated  with  favourites  winning  races  at  the  same  meeting  (not  include  previous 
meetings) are explored in this study.  
 
Post-position related variables  
Four post-position related variables are constructed in this study. The first variable 
represents the number of post-position
22 from which a horse starts a race (‘PP’). This is 
                                                 
21 A favourite is the horse which, according to the betting public, has a highest probability of wining the 
race (i.e., the shortest price horse in the race).  
22 Post-position is the position of stall in starting gate from which a horse starts. The position is randomly 
allocated to each horse by the racing authority before the race starts and horses with inner positions may   111 
to test whether bettors over-weight the importance of a horse’s post-position in winning 
a  race  and  therefore  anchor  their  subjective  judgements  on  horses  with  inner  post-
positions,  which  is  an  obvious  advantage  for  horses  at  certain  tracks.  Note  that  the 
number of post-positions at different tracks may be placed in different order. In HK, 
horses’ post-positions are sorted in an ascending order from inside to outside of the 
track (lower position locates inside) whereas in the UK, post-positions are sorted from 
low to high at some tracks and high to low at other tracks (from inside to outside of the 
track). In addition, inside positions are favoured at tracks in HK but this is not always 
the case in the UK market. Due to the surface, going and configuration of the tracks, 
horses from outside positions may be favoured at certain racetracks.  
Another three variables relate a horse’s post-position in the current race to post-
positions of winners in previous races. Specifically, dummy variable ‘WP1’ represents 
whether a horse’s post-position in the current race is the same as (=1) or different from 
(=0) the winner’s post-position in the previous race. Similarly, dummy variables ‘WP2’ 
and  ‘WP3’  are  created  to  indicate  horses  whose  post-positions  are  the  same  as  or 
different from those of the previous two or three winners.  For example, at a meeting, if 
race one and race two are both won by horses from stall 6, then the horse allocated to 
stall 6 in race three will be assigned a value of 1 for the variable ‘WP2’. If race one is 
won by the horse from stall 3 and race two is won by the horse from stall 6, then the 
horse from stall 6 in race three will be given a value of 1 to ‘WP1’ but 0 to ‘WP2’; 
however, the horse from stall 3 in race three will be given 0 to both ‘WP1’ and ‘WP2’. 
Note  that  bettors’  memory  of  horses’  post-positions  is  likely  to  remain  at  a  given 
meeting, so only races at the same meeting are considered in this study.  
 
 
3.6 Research Methods 
 
In  a  positivistic  paradigm,  a  value-free  and  unbiased  attitude  is  required  for 
researchers who explore their research topics based on the sociology of regulation. This 
is often approached by applying a scientific method to explore and analyse cause-effects 
relationships  based  on  a  large  number  of  data  rather  than  reasoning  deductions.  In 
                                                                                                                                               
take an advantage of running inside of the track, i.e. running a shorter length than those running outside 
of the track.    112 
anchoring studies, laboratory experiments and field surveys are the main methods which 
have  been  used  to  detect  and  examine  the  existence  and  durability  of  anchoring  in 
decision making processes. These tests have been associated with different settings such 
as  general  decision  making  (e.g.,  Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1974),  accounting  and 
auditing professions (e.g., Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Joyce and Biddle, 1981), 
the  real  estate  evaluation  (Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987),  political  event  prediction 
(Chapman  and  Johnson,  1996)  and  gambling  (e.g.,  Carlson,  1990;  Chapman  and 
Johnson, 1994; Johnson and Schkade, 1989; Schkade and Johnson, 1989); an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) is often used to conduct statistical analysis in exploring anchoring 
effects.  
In  studies  of  information  efficiency  in  horserace  betting  markets,  different 
statistical  techniques  are  used  to  test  the  significance  of  odds  differences  between 
different betting systems (e.g., Bruce and Johnson, 2001; Peirson and Blackburn, 2003), 
to detect the relationships between different variables (e.g., Dowie, 1976; Cain et al., 
2001),  and  to  explore  which  factors  are  more  valuable  in  predicating  winning 
probabilities  of  horses  (e.g.,  Bolton  and  Chapman,  1986).  It  is  noted  that  although 
different  methods  are  employed  in  these  two  areas,  data  analysis  and  statistical 
techniques are involved in all these studies.  
In this section, the research methods used by existing anchoring and horserace 
betting  literature  are  reviewed  respectively  in  the  first  two  parts.  Consequently,  the 
conditional logit model – the statistical technique employed in the present study to test 
anchoring effects in horserace betting markets – is described in the third part.   
 
3.6.1 Research Methods Used in Anchoring Literature 
 
Research  methods  that  are  applied  in  existing  studies  to  investigate  anchoring 
effects include (1) laboratory experiments, (2) field studies, and (3) statistical analysis. 
These methods are introduced in the following subsections, respectively.  
 
3.6.1.1 Laboratory Experiments 
 
The majority of anchoring studies are undertaken in psychological laboratories 
associated with controlled experiments. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, the laboratory   113 
and real world decision environments are distinguished in two aspects: the nature of 
decision  tasks  and  of  decision  makers.  In  relation  to  decision  tasks,  laboratory 
experiments allow the investigation of discrete factors under controlled conditions, can 
be conducted at low costs and in a stress free setting, and are able to involve certain 
number of particular type of participants (e.g., males vs. females) because they select 
undergraduate students as subjects. However, decision tasks undertaken in laboratory 
experiments may not capture the key features of real world decision tasks. In addition, 
subjects in this low risk and stress free environment may behave differently from those 
in real world environments, and the evaluation methods used in laboratories are often 
subjective  and  are  not  able  to  accurately  measure  task  performance  (Anderson  and 
Brown, 1984; Bruce and Johnson, 1997). 
From a decision makers’ point of view, participants are often aware that they are 
involved in a controlled experiment and this may  affect their behaviour (Bruce  and 
Johnson, 1997). In addition, subjects in laboratory-based studies are often not familiar 
with the constructed decision tasks whereas people in the real world are more likely to 
be  familiar  with  the  decision  tasks  they  face  (Christensen-Szalanski  et  al.,  1983). 
Therefore,  results  generated  by  university  students  in  laboratories  may  bias  on 
understanding of anchoring which might be experienced in the real world.  
Taken together, features of laboratory-based studies are different, in many ways, 
from  features  of  naturalistic  studies.  To  explore  anchoring  effects  in  a  real  world 
environment  and  answer  research  questions  of  the  present  study,  it  is  necessary  to 
examine to what extent that observed anchoring effects in laboratories can be translated 
to real world environments. A proper research method in investigating anchoring effects 
in a real world setting, in horserace betting market in particular, is therefore required 
(see Section 3.6.2 for more details).  
 
3.6.1.2 Field Studies 
 
Based  on  findings  from  laboratory  experiments,  researchers  begin  to  explore 
anchoring effects in a real world environment outside laboratories. A common method 
used in the literature is to use designed experiments related to certain industries, such as 
auditing, auction or negation. Decision makers in these real world environments are 
therefore asked to give their answers to these tasks based on their knowledge and/or   114 
work  experience.  The  extent  to  which  these  people  anchor  their  judgements  on  the 
information provided by or generated from the tasks is explored.  
Compared  with  laboratory  studies  using  undergraduate  students,  field  studies 
solve the subject problem by using experienced decision makers who are very familiar 
with the tasks provided to them. However, some disadvantages of experimental studies 
still remain. First, the tasks employed in these studies are designed experiments which 
are not directly comparable with real tasks in terms of risks, costs, amount of money 
involved  etc.  Thus,  even  experienced  decision  makers  may  not  take  these  tasks 
seriously  due  to  the  nature  of  the  experiment.  Second,  the  participants,  even  the 
professionals, in these studies are aware that they are taking part in experiments so that 
they may behave differently. Consequently, it is still unclear whether decision makers 
exhibit  anchoring  or  not  in  a  ‘pure’  (i.e.,  decisions  are  made  without  experimental 
control)  real  world  decision  making  environment  (refer  to  the  differences  between 
experimental and real world studies discussed in Section 3.3.3). 
 
3.6.1.3 Statistical Analysis 
 
In the experimental studies a variety of statistical techniques are also employed. 
One is descriptive statistical figures such as the mean and standard deviation of subjects 
responding ‘yes’/‘no’ to particular questions (e.g., Joyce and Biddle, 1981). Another 
commonly used statistical technique is the Kruskal-Wallis one-way variance analysis 
(e.g., Chapman and Bornstein, 1996; Joyce and Biddle, 1981). This method is used to 
test the null hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis when sample means are not 
equal. In particular, a parametric one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) is adopted in 
most anchoring studies because the within-sample variances of these experiments are 
usually disparate. In addition, this method is more useful and powerful for multiple 
regression analysis when more than one independent variable is considered. However, 
this method is not appropriate for the analysis of horserace betting data because first, the 
characteristics  of  horserace  betting  data  (e.g.,  the  win/lose  outcome  of  a  horse,  the 
competitiveness among horses in a race) require specific techniques, and second, the 
models developed to test anchoring in horserace betting markets are the two-variable 
regressions rather than multiple regressions.  
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3.6.2 Research Methods Used in Horseracing Literature 
 
Three types of methods that are commonly adopted by horserace betting studies in 
exploring market efficiency: (1) descriptive statistical models, (2) classical regression 
models, and (3) logit models. These methods are reviewed below.  
 
3.6.2.1 Descriptive Statistical Models 
 
In horserace betting literature, descriptive statistical models (e.g., mean, mode, 
and standard deviation) are often used to describe the betting data and apply χ
2 tests and 
t-tests to explore differences in populations (e.g., Metzger, 1985; Bruce and Johnson, 
2001; Blackburn and Peirson, 1995). These statistical techniques are easy to use, the 
results are very straightforward to explain, and therefore no high statistical skills are 
required.  However,  although  these  techniques  are  effective  in  describing  the 
significance  of  differences  between  populations,  they  are  incapable  of  estimating 
horses’ winning probabilities. Therefore, decision making processes in horserace betting 
can not be facilitated using these methods (Ming-chien Sung, 2006).  
 
3.6.2.2 Classical Regression Models  
 
Classical regression models are also commonly used in studies exploring market 
efficiency. However, these regression models are only limited to and associated with 
continuous variables such as pari-mutuel odds and starting prices of horses (e.g., Dowie, 
1976, 2003; Gabriel and Marsden, 1990, 1991). In addition, classical regressions are not 
capable of dealing with non-continuous dependent variables such as win or lose. Greene 
(2000) argues that when the independent variables increase or decrease indefinitely, the 
value generated by the linear regression model will extend over the range of 0 and 1. 
Obviously,  this  is  inappropriate  for  the  estimation  of  horses’  winning  probabilities. 
Since the five hypotheses generated in the present study are to investigate the impact of 
certain pieces of information on bettors’ subjective judgements of horses winning, a 
probability related dependent variable is required in the model. Therefore, models of 
classical regression are not appropriate for the analysis in this study.  
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3.6.2.3 Logit Models 
 
Logit  models  are  employed  by  horserace  betting  literature  to  predict  a  binary 
dependent variable which has two types of mutually exclusive outputs indicating the 
winning or losing of a horse in a race (e.g., Asch et al., 1984, 1986; Bruce and Johnson, 
2000a; Sung and Johnson, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). The output of logit models falls in a 
range of 0 and 1 and can be identified as the probability of a horse wining a race. 
Independent  variables  in  these  models  can  be  either  continuous  (such  as  odds)  or 
discrete (such as a dummy variable). However, it is argued that these logit models do 
not account for the competitive nature of horses within races (Bolton and Chapman, 
1986). This leads to a fact that when predicting the probability of a horse winning a race, 
the logit model may make the estimated probabilities for all horses in that race not equal 
to one.  
This issue is solved by applying a conditional logit model (hereafter CL model) in 
the case of horse racing. The output of the dependent variable in CL model can be two 
or more exhaustive groups which represent the outcome of each horse within a race. For 
example, Figlewski (1979) predicted, using the CL model, the racing results of horses in 
the U.S. pari-mutuel system based on the public information concerning professional 
handicappers.  A  series  of  variables  associated  with  horses,  jockeys  and  racetrack 
conditions are determined, using the CL model, to estimate the winning probabilities of 
horses in many other studies (e.g., Chapman, 1994; Benter, 1994). Since the CL model 
can  represent  the  status  of  competition  among  all  runners  in  a  race,  this  model  is, 
consequently, regarded as the most appropriate model applied in the present study to 
explore anchoring effects in horserace betting markets.  
 
3.6.3 Research Methods Used in This Study 
 
To detect the existence of anchoring effects in the horserace betting market, a 
number of procedures are undertaken. The transformation of the explanatory variable is 
described below, followed by the introduction of the modelling procedure. The model 
fit measurements and expected model evaluations are then explained before details of 
hypotheses tests and results are provided. These procedures are presented as follows.  
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3.6.3.1 Transformation of Dependent Variable  
 
As mentioned above, the odds information selected from the UK market is the 
starting price of horses in the bookmaker betting system. This price is determined by the 
bookmaker who offers bets to the betting public. Odds used for the HK market are, 
however, generated from a pari-mutuel betting system whereby the odds on horse i in 
race j ( ij O ) are determined by the proportion of money bet on horse i in race j, as 
follows:  
 
                                         ij O  = 
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where ij B is the amount of money bet on horse i in race j, d is the pari-mutuel operator’s 
deduction  and  nj  represents  the  number  of  runners  in  race  j.  Consequently, 
∑
=
j n
i
ij B
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indicates the total amount of money bet on all the runners in race j. In a pari-
mutuel market, the final odds of a particular horse are not determined until the race 
starts. It is argued that bettors will continue to put money on a horse in a race until the 
odds accurately reflects the market’s best estimate of the horse’s chance of winning that 
race (Asch et al., 1984; Figlewski, 1979; Johnson and Bruce, 2001; Liu and Johnson, 
2007). The ratio,
s
ij p , regarded as the subjective probability judgement of the betting 
public  concerning  horse  i’s  potentials  of  winning  race  j,  is  therefore  constructed  as 
follows:  
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In  other  words, 
s
ij p  is  a  normalised  indicator  of  final  odds  ( ij O )  implied  winning 
probability of horse i in race j. 
The  aim  of  exploring 
s
ij p  is  to  assess  to  what  extent  that  bettors’  subjective 
estimate  of  horse  i’s  chance  of  winning  race  j,
s
ij p ,  can  reflect  the  horse’s  true  or 
objective probability of success, 
o
ij p , and therefore to detect whether bettors anchor their 
judgements of a horse winning a race on particular pieces of information.  
To develop the modelling procedure, a transformation of the explanatory variable 
is  described  in  this  section.  In  the  horserace  betting  literature  (e.g.,  Benter,  1994; 
Figlewski,  1979;  Bruce  and  Johnson,  2001),  the  independent  variable  employed  is 
generally the logarithmic transformation of
s
ij p , the bettors’ subjective estimate of the 
probability of which horse i winning race j. The reasons for applying the logarithmic 
transformation of the subjective probability of the horse i wining race j [ln(
s
ij p )] are as 
follows:  First,  taking  the  logarithmic  form  of  the  probability  can  normalise  the 
distribution of the odds implied probabilities. For example, in the UK market, the values 
of the subjective probability of horse i wining race j, 
s
ij p , are skewed to the right along 
the horizontal axis and clustered within a small range between 0.05 and 0.20. By taking 
the logarithmic transformation, the small values of probabilities on the left side of the 
axis  are  spread  out.  Consequently,  the  space  between  the  values  which  occur  most 
frequently is enhanced so that the significance of the variance of these values can be 
easily captured. Second, by taking the logarithmic transformation, the probabilities with 
large values on the right side of the distribution (values between 0.4 and 0.9 are only 
2.5% of the whole dataset) are compressed. This can reduce the impact of high values 
on model estimation and increase the model fit. Finally, when the values of observations 
in a dataset are in an extremely wide range, the logarithmic transformation can produce 
a better model fit. In the dataset employed in this study, the largest value of 
s
ij p  in the 
HK market is 0.9090 (0.9852 in the UK market), whilst the smallest value is 0.0014 
(0.0010 in the UK market), 636 (985) times smaller than the former one. Therefore, the 
logarithmic transformation is not only useful but also suitable for this study.  
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3.6.3.2 Conditional Logit Model  
 
Due to the competitive conditions of a horse race, it is more likely that an efficient 
probability  estimate  of  horse  i  winning  race  j  is  obtained  if  the  horse’s  chance  of 
winning  is  assessed,  conditional  on  factors  relating  to  other  runners  in  race  j.  Two 
conditional logit (hereafter CL) models are developed: model one includes only those 
factors which bettors may anchor judgements upon and model two includes the factors 
in model one plus the odds information. To develop model one, a ‘winningness’ index 
ij W is defined to represent the winning chance of horse i in race j: 
 
                                     ij W  =  k α Aik +  ij ε                                                               (3) 
                                    
where Aik represents the value for horse i of the kth factor on which bettors may anchor 
their judgements upon (e.g. a dummy variable indicating whether horse i won its last 
race),  k α measures the contribution of the kth anchoring factor to the estimate of the 
winning chance of the horse, and  ij ε is the disturbance term that represents all the other 
information which is unobservable but has impact on the competitiveness of horse i 
running  in  race  j.  The  real  probability  of  horse  i  winning  race  j,
o
ij p ,  is  therefore 
formulated as:  
 
                     
o
ij p  = Prob ( ij W >  lj W , l = 1, 2, … nj, l ≠ i)                                               (4) 
 
Equally,  
 
                     
o
ij p  = Prob ( k α Aik + ij ε > k α Alk + lj ε , l = 1, 2, … nj, l ≠ i)                        (5) 
 
Although  ij W cannot be observed directly from the dataset, whether horse i wins race j 
can be obtained after the race. As a result, a win/lose variable wij is defined as follows:  
 
                     wij = 1 if  ij W  = Max ( j W1 , j W2 , …  j n j W );  
                     wij = 0 otherwise.                                                                                      (6)   120 
 
The probability of horse i winning race j can, therefore, be formulated such that:  
 
                     
o
ij p  = Prob ( ) j ij ij n i A w ,... 2 , 1 , | 1 = =                                                           (7) 
 
It has been demonstrated that if the error terms  lj ε  are independently and identically 
distributed according to the double exponential distribution, the probability of horse i 
winning race j can be given by a CL function as follows (McFadden, 1974):  
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where the parameter  k α  is estimated by maximising the join probability of observing 
the  results  of  all  N  races  in  the  dataset, 
o
ij p  subjects  to  0  ≤ 
o
ij p  ≤  1  and ∑
=
j n
i
o
ij p
1
=  1. 
Consequently, assuming the results of all N races are independent to each other, the 
value  of  the  log-likelihood  function  of  the  whole  dataset,  likelihood  L( β ),  can  be 
maximised as follows:  
 
                                      L(β ) =∑ ∑ = =
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i
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ij
j p
1 1 = ∑ ∑ = =
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j
n
i ik k
j A
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where N is the number of races in the data sample.  
It is noted that equation (8) only measures the contribution of a single anchoring 
factor, Ak, to the real probability of horse i winning race j. If the coefficient of the kth 
factor,  k α , equals to 0, then 
o
ij p  would have a value of 1 which means the factor Ak has 
the full impact on the success of horse i in race j. If  k α is significantly different from 0, 
this indicates that factor Ak can partly but not fully contribute to the success of horse i in 
race j and should be taken into account when bettors estimate the probability that horse i 
wins race j.  
In the model discussed above, the competitiveness of horse i in race j, represented 
by  the  winning  index  ij W ,  only  comprises  two  parts:  one  explanatory  variable  (Aik)   121 
which is regarded as the potential anchoring factor on which bettors may anchor their 
judgements, and the stochastic term ( ij ε ) which contains unobservable information in 
the market. The aim is to detect the importance of the potential anchoring factor on the 
chance  of  horse  i’s  success  in  race  j.  These  factors  include  different  aspects  of 
information which may impact on horses’ winning potentials, as discussed in Section 
3.5.2.  
Odds represent the bettors’ estimate of the winning probability of a horse based 
upon  the  various  information  they  have  taken  into  account  when  making  their 
judgements. Consequently, to explore anchoring effects, another model including public 
odds  as  a  further  independent  variable  is  also  developed  as  follows,  given  ij W  
representing the ‘winning index’ of horse i in race j:   
 
                     ij W  =  k α Aik +β ln(
s
ij p ) + ij ε                                                             (10) 
 
In a similar manner to that described above, this leads to a CL function as follows:  
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where Ak is the kth factor on which bettors may anchor their judgements, ln(
s
ij p ) is the 
logarithmic form of bettors’ aggregate estimate of the probability that horse i wins race j, 
k α  and  β  measure  the  contribution  of  the  kth  anchoring  factor  and  the  bettors’ 
subjective probability of horse i winning race j to the winning index  ij W , respectively, 
and  ij ε is  the  disturbance  term  representing  all  the  unobservable  information  in  the 
market.  Parameters  k α  and  β  are  measured  by  maximising  the  joint  probability  of 
observing the results of all N races in the data sample, 
o
ij p  satisfies 0 ≤ 
o
ij p  ≤ 1 and 
∑
=
j n
i
o
ij p
1
= 1. Consequently, given the results of all N races are independent to each other, 
the value of the log-likelihood function, likelihood L(β ), can be maximised as follows:  
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where N is the number of races in the data sample.  
This CL model is constructed to estimate the winning probability of each horse in 
its race based on explanatory variables, Ak and ln(
s
ij p ). Using equation (11), if  k α  equals 
0 and β  equals 1, these indicate that bettors’ subjective estimates of horses’ chance of 
winning  perfectly  match  horses’  objective  winning  probabilities  (i.e.
s
ij p  = 
o
ij p ). 
However, if  k α  is significantly different from zero and its sign in equation (11) is the 
reverse  of  its  sign  in  equation  (8),  it  is  demonstrated  that  bettors’  subjective 
probabilities are overly influenced by the kth factor (Ak) when they formulate the odds 
information.  This  suggests  that  bettors  in  the  horserace  betting  market  have  unduly 
anchored on the kth piece of information (Ak) when forming their judgements of horse i 
winning race j.  
It  should  be  noted  that  the  horserace  betting  markets  are  diverse  and  involve 
various types of races (e.g., class, distance) and racetracks. Consequently, similar tests 
are  undertaken  for  each  segment  of  the  whole  database.  This  is  to  explore  whether 
bettors anchoring on different piece of information when betting on different types of 
races. In addition, the time and days that bettors place their bets are also considered. 
Comparisons between models using the odds information gathered at different times 
before  the  race  starts  are  conducted  separately.  Bets  placed  on  races  running  on 
weekdays or over the weekends are also compared. This is to explore the importance of 
bettors’ betting experience in reducing the degree of their anchoring.  
STATA 9.0 is employed to estimate the conditional lofit models developed in this 
study.  
 
3.6.3.3 Model Fit Measurements: Pseudo-R
2 
 
According to Malthouse (1999), a way of judging how well the model can explain 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is to see its model fit. 
There are different forms of model fit measurement: the R
2, the pseudo-R
2, and the 
adjusted-R
2.    123 
The overall model fit is usually measured by R
2. It represents the percent of the 
total sum of square which is explained by the independent variables employed in a 
model and can be defined as follows:  
 
                                   R
2 = 1 - 
) 0 (
) (
=
=
θ
θ θ
L
L
                                                           (13) 
 
where  ) ( θ θ = L measures  the  log-likelihood  value  of  the  model  with  the  parameter 
estimated  and  ) 0 ( = θ L indicates  the  log-likelihood  value  of  a  random  choice  model 
without parameter estimated. If the estimated parameter entirely explains the existence 
of the dependent variable,  ) ( θ θ = L  would be zero, and hence the R
2 would turn out to 
be 1 which indicates a perfect model fit. Consequently, the higher the R
2 is, the better 
the  model  performs.  Usually,  the  greater  number  of  explanatory  variables  and 
observations, the higher the R
2 value, and the better the model fit. However, R
2 may 
increase when the model is less competent due to additional independent variables or 
observations incorporated in the model. In this case, the quality of the model estimation 
may not be adequately represented by the R
2 value.  
The adjusted-R
2 takes the number of independent variables and the number of 
observations into account and therefore is regarded as superior to R
2, especially when 
large  databases  with  many  explanatory  variables  are  emplored.  The  adjusted- R
2  is 
defined as follows:  
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where nj is the number of runners in race j, N is the number or races in the whole data 
sample, and B is the number of parameters estimated in the model. In this chapter, B 
equals to 1 when the kth anchoring factor (Ak) is tested in the model on its own and will 
be 2 when the transformed odds implied probability of horse i winning race j (ln(
s
ij p )) is 
added into the model together with the anchoring factor. According to equation (14), if   124 
by increasing N and/or B the model fit reduces, the adjusted-R
2 will decrease and hence 
reflects a more accurate assessment of the model efficiency. Therefore, the adjusted-R
2 
can be regarded as a more powerful indicator of the goodness-of-fit of the model than 
R
2.  
In this study, a pseudo-R
2 is adopted to measure the model fit. This is analogous to 
R
2.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  number  of  independent  variables  employed  in  the 
models (B) is not large (usually 1 or 2) but the number of observations incorporated in 
the study is huge. Therefore, the adjustment part of equation (14), 
B N n
N n
N
j
j
N
j
j
− −
−
∑
∑
=
=
1
1 , is 
close to 1 and the difference between the results of equation (14) and equation (13) is 
minimal.  Consequently,  for  the  datasets  and  models  employed  here,  there  is  little 
difference between R
2, adjusted-R
2, and pseudo-R
2. For convenience, the pseudo-R
2 
provided by STATA 9.0 is therefore adopted as the measure of model fit.  
 
3.6.3.4 Expected Model Evaluations 
 
The models developed are employed to explore anchoring effects in both the HK 
and the UK horserace betting markets.  
The  definitions  and  expected  signs  for  the  coefficients  of  the  independent 
variables are described in Appendix A.  As shown in the appendix, when there is only 
one explanatory variable (Ak or ln(
s
ij p )) in the model, each of the odds related, horse’s 
performance  related,  and  jockey’s  and  trainer’s  performance  related  variables  is 
expected to obtain a positive sign for its coefficient. Among the post-position related 
variables, ‘PP’ could have a positive or negative sign for the coefficient due to the 
features of specific racetracks: at tracks where low/high draw numbers are favoured, the 
coefficients of this factor would be negative/positive.  
When the odds information is included in the model, the sign for the coefficient of 
a variable on which bettors anchor their judgements should reverse. This implies that 
when the betting public attempts to incorporate this piece of information into odds, they 
exaggerate  its  contribution  to  the  estimate  of  a  horse’s  winning  and  anchor  their   125 
judgements on it. Therefore, to obtain the real probability of the horse winning a race, 
the over-weighted part of the contribution must be eliminated from the odds probability.  
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
In  this  chapter,  an  appropriate  research  paradigm,  approach  and  methods  are 
defined to answer the research questions derived from the literature. In particular, a 
positivistic paradigm has been adopted in this study. Under this paradigm, a deductive 
research  approach  is  selected  and  five  hypotheses  are  therefore  generated  to  detect 
anchoring effects in a specific real world environment, the horserace betting market. 
Data from the HK and the UK horserace betting markets are described respectively and 
variables employed in this study are explained separately. To test these hypotheses, a 
CL  model  is  developed.  The  modelling  procedure  is  explained,  together  with  an 
explanation of model fit measurement and the model evaluation of variables. Results 
and discussions of these hypotheses tests will be described in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION:  
ANCHORING EFFECTS IN HORSERACE BETTING 
MARKETS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Anchoring  effects  in  the  real  world  are  explored  using  HK  and  UK  horserace 
betting  market  data.  Previous  literature  suggests  that  decision  makers  are  likely  to 
anchor their judgements on information which they can easily obtain or generate (e.g., 
Brewer and Chapman, 2002; Brewer et al., 2007; Cervone and Peake, 1986; Epley and 
Giovich,  2001;  Joyce  and  Biddle,  1981;  Mussweiler,  1997,  2001;  Mussweiler  and 
Englich, 2005; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b; Northcraft and 
Neale, 1987; Quattrone et al., 1981; Ritov, 1996; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Tversky 
and  Kahneman,  1974;  Wilson  et  al.,  1996).  In  horseracing,  the  winning  records  of 
horses,  jockeys  and  trainers  are  important  information  which  indicates  horses’ 
performances in the past and their winning potential in the future. Conditions of races at 
different racetracks such as the post-positions of horses also have a significant impact 
on racing outcomes. Consequently, a number of empirical tests are conducted to detect 
anchoring effects based on these factors.  
According to the research questions constructed in Chapter 3, four hypotheses are 
formulated. The first two hypotheses  are related to research question one, detecting 
whether  anchoring  effects  caused  by  both  relevant  information  and  less  relevant 
information in horserace betting markets exist, and if they do, how strong these anchors 
must be to cause anchoring. The relevant information includes the past performance of 
the horse, the jockey, the trainer, and the post-position of the horse or the winners of 
previous races. These types of information are relevant to bettors’ probability estimates 
of horses because they  are widely regarded as  having a direct impact on the future   127 
performance of horses. Less relevant information involves the performance of previous 
favourites at a meeting. This information is less relevant because the performance of 
favourites in previous races has little impact on the performance of the favourite in the 
next race since they are different horses. The second hypothesis is constructed to detect 
how strong the information should be to lead to anchoring in horserace betting markets. 
As suggested in previous literature, anchoring effects in some circumstances can be 
weak and fragile (e.g., Brewer and Chapman, 2002; Wilson et al., 1996). However, if 
the  anchor  is  strong  enough,  it  may  have  a  significant  impact  on  decision  makers’ 
judgements (Bloomfield et al., 2000; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Nelson et al., 2001). It 
is therefore argued that even if the outcome of a previous race is too weak to cause 
anchoring, the same result from two or three consecutive races may be strong enough.  
The  second  research  question,  concerning  the  impact  of  decision  makers’ 
expertise  on  their  judgements,  is  explored  using  hypothesis  three  which  states  that 
bettors  with  greater  expertise  in  horserace  betting  are  subject  to  a  lower  level  of 
anchoring effects than those with less expertise. The anchoring factors considered in 
this hypothesis are the same as those employed in the previous two hypotheses.  
To answer research question three, hypothesis four is constructed to explore the 
difference between anchoring effects in different decision making environments (i.e., 
the HK and UK horserace betting markets). The reasons for choosing these two markets 
to conduct a cross-sectional study are as follows: first, the UK horserace betting market 
has more diversity than the HK market as a whole in terms of the betting turnover per 
track and per race, the number of tracks, number of races, type of races, variety of 
classes and the amount of prize money. In the UK, various types of races (flat races 
which are either handicap or non-handicap) are run at 38 racetracks over the country 
and the racing days cover weekdays and weekends. Whilst in HK, races are only run on 
two racetracks on two or three days in each week during the racing season (usually 
races are run at Happy Valley racetrack on Wednesday evening and at Sha Tin racetrack 
on Saturday or Sunday afternoon). In total, there are approximately 4,500 races run in 
the UK in a season in contrast to only 600 races run in HK. Races in the UK vary from 
class A to class G (from high to low) and the prize money for the winner in different 
races varies from GBP 1,179 to 852,600. In contrast, six classes of races are run in HK 
and the prize money ranges from HK$ 0.1 to 20 million (approximately GBP 7,600 to 
15,384,600).    128 
Second,  racetracks  in  the  UK  retain  a  high  level  of  diversity  in  many  aspects 
compared with the highly standardized racetracks in HK. This implies that different 
conditions of track surface and going may have a different impact on the racing results 
at different racetracks in the UK. Therefore, the physical features of each track and the 
influence of these features on the racing outcomes have to be considered carefully when 
bettors make their judgements on horses’ winning probabilities at different tracks in the 
UK. This contrasts with the HK horserace betting market. In HK, there is not much 
difference in the condition of the racetracks when it comes to the same type of races. 
Although Happy Valley and Sha Tin racetracks in HK are not exactly the same in terms 
of the length, shape, and conditions of the course, they are still highly standardized 
when compared with the diversity of conditions at UK courses. In addition, the number 
of horses in a race in the UK can vary from 2 to up to 38 whilst in HK there are about 7 
to 14 runners in most races. All these differences may suggest that the factors which 
may  affect  the  result  of  a  race  may  be  accounted  for  differently  bettors  in  the  two 
markets.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 outlines the data, 
variables and the modelling procedures which are conducted for hypothesis tests. The 
results of the tests are presented in Section 4.3 together with the model fit measurement 
explanations. The results are discussed in Section 4.4. A summary of the main findings 
is provided in Section 4.5.  
 
 
4.2 Data and Methodology 
 
The  data,  variables  and  the  modelling  procedures  employed  to  test  anchoring 
effects in the HK and UK horserace betting markets are introduced in this section.  
 
4.2.1 Data  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, two sets of horserace betting data (from the HK and 
UK  markets  respectively)  are  employed  to  conduct  anchoring  tests.  The  HK  data 
include records of 5,133 flat races (66,244 horses) run at Happy Valley (HV) and Sha 
Tin (ST) racetracks from September 1998 to April 2007. Specifically, about 33% of the   129 
total races (21,624 horses in 1,789 races) run at HV and 67% (44,620 horses in 3,344 
races) run at ST. In each race, the number of runners varies from 5 to 14, and therefore 
the post-position number for each horse varies from 1 up to 14. The distance of the 
races  varies  from  1,000  metres  to  24,000  metres  and  the  races  range  over  6  class 
categories. In this market, only pari-mutuel betting system is operated. Three types of 
odds information are employed in the study: the final odds of each horse in a race and 
the odds 2 and 5 minutes before the race starts. The finishing position of each horse in a 
race and the previous performances of the jockey and trainer of each horse are recorded.  
The bookmaker odds of horses are employed for the UK horserace betting market 
because the bookmaker rather than the pari-mutuel betting system is dominant in the 
UK  and  the  money  bet  into  the  pari-mutuel  ‘pool’  is  very  limited  compared  to  the 
amount bet with bookmakers. Due to data accessibility, only final odds (called Starting 
Price, SP) of horses are included in this dataset. The finalised UK dataset contains 
details of 554,830 horses running in 49,881 flat races in the UK from January 1996 to 
February 2007. In this database, the number of runners in a race ranges from 2 to 38, the 
distance of the race varies from 1,100 metres to 4,874 metres and all the races are 
defined within 7 class categories.  
To detect the difference of judgements between professional and casual bettors 
and between different markets, the datasets of the HK and UK markets are split into two 
sub-datasets  according  to  the  day  in  which  races  are  running.  Generally,  the  casual 
bettors are more likely to bet on the weekend races and consequently the bets experts 
can be more readily isolated on the weekdays (e.g., Benter, 1994; Kopelman nd Minkin, 
1991; Saunders and Turner, 1987). In addition, the variety of racetrack configurations 
may  also  make  different  post-positions  more  advantageous.  Consequently,  different 
post-position anchoring factors may exist at different tracks. The HK dataset is split into 
two categories: races run at HV and races run at ST. In the UK, the data are separated 
into two sub-datasets: one includes all the races run at racetracks which favour high 
draw (post-position) horses and the other is consist of races at the racetracks favouring 
low draw horses. The number of horses and races of the whole market and of the market 
segments in the HK and UK markets are described in Table 4.2-1.  
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Table 4.2-1 Data description for the HK and UK horserace betting markets  
 
HK Market 
Day of the Week  Racetrack 
 
Whole 
Market  Wnd  Wk  HV  ST 
Races  5,133  2,910  2,223  1,789  3,344 
Horses  66,244  38,658  27,586  21,624  44,620 
UK Market 
Day of the Week  Racetrack 
 
Whole 
Market  Wnd  Wk  High PP  Low PP 
Races  49,881  12,738  37,143  12,138  13,714 
Horses  554,830  141,225  413,605  135,854  151,286 
 
 
4.2.2 Variables 
 
As explained in Section 3.5.2 in Chapter 3, the dependent variable employed in all 
the tests in this study is a binominal variable which equals 1 when the horse wins and 0 
otherwise. The independent variables consist of the following: (1) odds-related variables 
such  as  the  natural  log  of  the  odds  implied  probabilities  of  horses  in  each  race, 
determined from the odds available in the market 5 and 2 minutes before the race starts, 
and  the  final  odds  (‘Ln5MinsOdds’,  ‘Ln2MinsOdds’,  ‘LnFinOdds’);  (2)  dummy 
variables which represent whether a horse has won its previous one, two or three races 
at any meeting (‘H1’, ‘H2’, ‘H3’) and whether the previous one, two or three races at a 
meeting are won by the favourite (‘F1’, ‘F2’, ‘F3’); (3) dummy variables which identify 
whether horses ridden/trained by the same jockeys/trainers who won the previous one, 
two or three races at any race meeting (‘J1/T1’, ‘J2/T2’, ‘J3/T3’); and (4) the post-
position  of  each  horse  in  a  race  (‘PP’)  and  dummy  variables  identifying  the  post-
positions of the winners of the previous one, two or three races at a meeting (‘WP1’, 
‘WP2’, ‘WP3’).  
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4.2.3 Modelling Procedures 
 
It has been argued that a conditional logit (CL) model is appropriate to detect 
anchoring effects in the horserace betting environment (see Section 3.6.3 in Chapter 3). 
For each potential anchoring factor, two CL models are developed:  
 
ij W  =  k α Aik +  ij ε                                                             (15) 
ij W  =  k α Aik + β ln(
s
ij p ) + ij ε                                                   (16) 
 
where  ij W  is the ‘winningness’ index defined to describe the winning chance of horse i 
in race j, Aik represents the value for horse i of the kth factor upon which bettors may 
anchor their judgements (e.g., in the case where  I investigate  anchoring based on a 
horse’s winning performance in its previous race, the anchoring factor for horse i, Aik, 
will be “H1” with a value of 1 if horse i won its last race), ln(
s
ij p ) is the logarithmic 
form of bettors’ aggregate estimate of the probability that horse i wins race j (i.e., a 
transform of the odds implied probability of horse i in race j),  k α  and β  measure the 
contribution of Aik and bettors’ subjective probability of horse i winning race j to the 
winning  index  ij W ,  and  ij ε includes  all  the  noise  information  which  impacts  the 
competitiveness of horse i running in race j but is not measured in the model.  
The first step of the modelling procedure is to develop a single variable CL model 
(model  1)  using  equation  (1).  In  this  model,  only  one  independent  variable,  Aik,  is 
involved. This is used to detect the importance and the contribution of factor Aik in 
estimating the chance of horse i winning race j. If the coefficient of the variable,  k α , is 
significantly different from zero, this suggests that factor Aik has an important impact on 
the horse winning. The second step is to develop model 2 which incorporates the odds 
related  variables  (ln(
s
ij p )).  Odds  information  is  generally  regarded  as  an  aggregate 
indicator of a horse’s winning chance estimated by the betting public. Therefore, the 
coefficient of the odds related variable in this model should be significantly different 
from zero. If the coefficient of the anchoring factor in model 2 associated with the odds 
related variable is also significantly different to zero, this indicates that this factor has 
not been properly accounted for in odds. In some cases the information is undervalued   132 
(i.e., bettors do not take fully account of it), and in other cases the information is over-
weighted (i.e., the betting public pay too much attention to this information, and this 
may indicate that they anchor their judgements on this type of information). Specifically, 
if the coefficient of the anchoring factor ( k α ) is significant in both models and keeps 
the  direction  of  the  sign  (positive  or  negative),  the  importance  of  this  piece  of 
information is underestimated by the betting public. If  k α  is statistically significant in 
both models but changes sign when the odds information is included, this suggests that 
the betting public overestimate the value of this factor.   
This two-step modelling procedure is repeated for each of the potential anchoring 
factors investigated. In each procedure, only a single anchoring factor is explored at a 
time to avoid results bias which may arise from interactions between anchoring factors. 
This approach is adopted for both the whole market dataset and different segments of 
the datasets. The results and discussion of these tests are provided respectively in the 
next section, according to the research questions and relevant hypotheses in the order 
shown in Figure 4.2-1:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   133 
Figure 4.2-1 Research questions, hypothesis and independent variables 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing and Results  
 
The four hypotheses developed for the three research questions are tested using 
the  HK  and  UK  horserace  betting  data.  The  results  and  analysis  for  each  test  are 
reported as follows.  
Research 
Question 1 
Research 
Question 3 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 4 
Independent Variable  
“PP”/“WP1” 
Independent Variable  
“F1” 
Independent Variable  
“H1” 
Independent Variable  
“H2/3” 
Independent Variable  
“J2/3” 
Independent Variable  
“T2/3” 
Independent Variable  
“J1” 
Independent Variable  
“WP2/3” 
Independent Variable  
“F2/3” 
Independent Variable  
“T1” 
Research 
Question 2   134 
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis Tests for Research Question One 
 
Hypothesis  one  (the  anchoring  factor  hypothesis)  tests  whether  bettors  in 
horserace betting markets anchor their judgements of a horse’s winning probability on 
the information associated with the last performance of the horse, the horse’s jockey or 
trainer, the horse’s post-position, or the performance of the favourite in the previous 
race.  Hypothesis  two  (the  strength  hypothesis)  repeats  the  tests  conducted  in  the 
anchoring factor hypothesis but focuses on the influence of racing outcomes of previous 
two or three races (e.g., the impact of the information that a horse has won its previous 
three races).  
Results of these hypothesis tests based on CL models are displayed below in Table 
4.3.1-1 – Table 4.3.1-20 according to different anchoring factors in different markets. A 
summary of the findings associated with the two hypotheses are provided in the last part 
of this section.   
 
4.3.1.1 Horse’s Past Performance 
 
HK Market 
The  extent  to  which  bettors  in  the  HK  horserace  betting  market  anchor  their 
subjective judgements of a horse’s probability of winning on the horse’s performance in 
its previous one, two and three races is described in the following tables: Table 4.3.1-1 
displays  the  results  of  CL  models  associated  with  a  single  independent  variable 
concerning the winning records of horses in their previous one, two and three races (H1, 
H2 and H3, respectively) and tables 4.3.1-2(1-3) report results of CL models which 
incorporate  both  bettors’  subjective  probability  judgements  and  horses’  past 
performances.  
In  Table  4.3.1-1,  the  coefficient  of  H1  derived  for  the  whole  market  data  is 
significant  at  the  1%  level  (coef.  =  0.8224;  Z  =  19.34).  This  suggests  that  the  last 
performance  of  a  horse  has  a  significant  impact  on  its  winning  probability  in  a 
subsequent race. Similarly, the variables H2 and H3 are both significant at the 1% level 
(H2:  coef.  =  1.2089,  Z  =  13.51;  H3:  coef.  =  1.7820,  Z  =  10.65),  indicating  the   135 
importance  of  horses’  winning  records  in  the  past  two  and  three  races  on  their 
subsequent performance.  
When the odds related variable (
s
ij p ln ) is added to the model (see Tables 4.3.1-
2(1-3)),  the  influence  of  horses’  past  performances  is  entirely  absorbed  in  bettors’ 
subjective judgements (based on final odds). Take Table 4.3.1-2(1) as an example. The 
coefficient of H1 drops down to 0.0757 (Z = 1.63) whilst the final odds variable 
s
ij p ln  
obtains an extremely high and significant coefficient (coef. = 0.9899; Z = 54.34). The 
Pseudo-R
2  of  the  model  with  final  odds  (0.1517)  is  higher  than  that  of  the  model 
without  final  odds  (0.0124).  Results  in  Tables  4.3.1-2(2)  and  4.3.1-2(3)  suggest  a 
similar pattern: the final odds implied probability estimates are significant at the 1% 
level but horses’ performance variables (H2 and H3) are not.  
These results suggest that (1) the odds of a horse represent an aggregate indicator 
of bettors’ estimates of the horse’s winning probability; (2) the information containing a 
horse’s performances in its previous one, two and three races has been fully accounted 
by  the  betting  public  in  odds;  and  (3)  the  importance  of  horses’  past  performance 
information has not been over-weighted. Therefore, bettors in the HK horserace betting 
market are not found to anchor their subjective judgements on horses’ performances in 
their previous races.  
Note that the results relating to races run on the weekdays and weekends and the 
results relating to bettors’ subjective judgements 5 or 2 minutes before the race starts 
are also reported in these four tables. These results will be discussed in Section 4.3.2 
when analysing the expertise hypothesis. A similar approach is adopted when reporting 
results for other anchoring factors.  
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Table 4.3.1-1 Results of estimating CL models with horse’s past performance as 
independent Variable in the HK market 
Whole Market  Day of the Week   
Variable    Wnd  Wk 
ij H1 coef. 
a  0.8224**  0.9060**  0.7039** 
Std. Err.  0.0425  0.0550  0.0672 
Z  19.34  16.47  10.48 
LL  -12937.41  -7394.66  -5540.03 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  324.49  233.36  96.59 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0124  0.0155  0.0086 
ij H2 coef. 
b  1.2089**  1.4203**  0.8201** 
Std. Err.  0.0895  0.1089  0.1604 
Z  13.51  13.04  5.11 
LL  -13026.70  -7444.32  -5577.37 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  145.93  134.03  21.91 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0056  0.0089  0.0020 
ij H3 coef. 
c  1.7820**  1.9740**  1.4000** 
Std. Err.  0.1674  0.2037  0.3022 
Z  10.65  9.69  4.63 
LL  -13055.45  -7474.21  -5579.96 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  88.43  74.27  16.73 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0034  0.0049  0.0015 
No. of horses  66,244  38,658  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  2,910  2,223 
a 
ij H1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its last race; equals 0 
otherwise.  
b 
ij H2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous two races; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij H3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous three races; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.    137 
Table 4.3.1-2(1) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the horse’s performance in 
its previous race as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 1 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  0.9899**  0.9736**  0.9835**  0.9955**  0.9794**  0.9887**  0.9817**  0.9649**  0.9758** 
Std. Err.  0.0182  0.0183  0.0187  0.0235  0.0236  0.0241  0.0288  0.0289  0.0295 
Z  54.34  53.20  52.73  42.28  41.41  41.03  34.07  33.33  33.06 
ij H1 coef. 
b  0.0757  0.1034*  0.1203**  0.0679  0.0967  0.1150 
†  0.0860  0.1117  0.1269 
† 
Std. Err.  0.0464  0.0463  0.0463  0.0608  0.0608  0.0607  0.0718  0.0717  0.0716 
Z  1.63  2.23  2.60  1.12  1.59  1.89  1.19  1.56  1.77 
LL  -11112.52  -11224.82  -11254.60  -6280.60  -6348.63  -6368.13  -4831.84  -4876.11  -4886.41 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3974.28  3749.68  3690.13  2461.47  2325.41  2286.43  1512.95  1424.42  1403.81 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1517  0.1431  0.1408  0.1639  0.1548  0.1522  0.1354  0.1274  0.1256 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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Table 4.3.1-2(2) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the horse’s performance in 
its previous two races as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 2 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  0.9957**  0.9821**  0.9935**  0.9968**  0.9835**  0.9943**  0.9928**  0.9787**  0.9909** 
Std. Err.  0.0179  0.0180  0.0184  0.0231  0.0232  0.0237  0.0285  0.0287  0.0292 
Z  55.52  54.46  53.99  43.18  42.37  41.98  34.83  34.15  33.88 
ij H2 coef. 
d  0.0508  0.0522  0.0600  0.1609  0.1650  0.1744  -0.1573  -0.1616  -0.1558 
Std. Err.  0.0973  0.0972  0.0973  0.1198  0.1198  0.1199  0.1694  0.1696  0.1695 
Z  0.52  0.54  0.62  1.34  1.38  1.45  -0.93  -0.95  -0.92 
LL  -11113.70  -11227.13  -11257.73  -6280.34  -6348.95  -6368.86  -4832.10  -4876.84  -4887.52 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3971.91  3745.05  3683.85  2462.01  2324.77  2284.97  1512.43  1422.97  1401.60 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1429  0.1406  0.1639  0.1548  0.1521  0.1353  0.1273  0.1254 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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Table 4.3.1-2(3) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the horse’s performance in 
its previous three races as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 3 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  0.9946**  0.9811**  0.9928**  0.9994**  0.9865**  0.9977**  0.9872**  0.9729**  0.9851** 
Std. Err.  0.0179  0.0179  0.0182  0.0229  0.0230  0.0235  0.0283  0.0284  0.0290 
Z  55.94  54.91  54.45  43.67  42.90  42.52  34.92  34.23  33.97 
ij H3 coef. 
f  0.2426  0.2273  0.2271  0.2331  0.2281  0.2296  0.2547  0.2181  0.2154 
Std. Err.  0.1853  0.1846  0.1849  0.2280  0.2270  0.2273  0.3187  0.3189  0.3192 
Z  1.31  1.23  1.23  1.02  1.00  1.01  0.80  0.68  0.67 
LL  -11113.00  -11226.53  -11257.18  -6280.70  -6349.38  -6369.39  -4832.24  -4877.08  -4887.73 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3973.32  3746.25  3684.96  2461.27  2323.91  2283.90  1512.17  1422.49  1401.18 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1517  0.1430  0.1407  0.1638  0.1547  0.1520  0.1353  0.1273  0.1254 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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a c e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b
ij H1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its last race; equals 0 otherwise. 
d 
ij H2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous two races; equals 0 otherwise.  
f 
ij H3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous three races; equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
† Statistically significant at the 10% level.  
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UK Market 
The results of estimating CL models associated with horses’ past performances 
and bettors’ subjective estimates of horses’ chances of winning in the UK market are 
reported in Table 4.3.1-3 and Tables 4.3.1-4(1-3). Due to the data accessibility, only 
final odds information is available in the UK market. The impact of bettors’ expertise 
on  their  betting  decisions  concerning  horses’  past  performance  information  (results 
associated with the weekday and weekend races) will be analysed in Section 4.3.2 (This 
also applies to the discussion of other anchoring factors in the UK market).  
As  shown  in  Table  4.3.1-3,  taking  the  UK  betting  market  as  a  whole,  the 
performance of a horse in its last race has a significant impact on the horse’s chance of 
winning in its subsequent race (H1: coef. = 0.6507, Z = 41.66). This indicates that if a 
horse won its previous race, it is likely to win its future races. However, when the odds 
information is included in a new CL model (see Table 4.3.1-4(1)), the significance of 
H1 disappeared. The coefficient of bettors’ subjective judgements (
s
ij p ln ) in the whole 
market is significant at the 1% level (coef. = 1.2075; Z = 171.13), implying that the 
odds information has a significant contribution to bettors’ estimation of horses’ winning 
chances
23.  The  coefficient  of  H1,  however,  turns  to  negative  (coef.  =  -0.0164)  and 
insignificant (Z = -0.99). Similarly, horses’ past performances in its previous two and 
three races (H2 and H3) are also detected significant as independent variables in models 
without odds information but insignificant in models with final odds in. The signs of the 
coefficients of H2 and H3 also change from positive to negative when odds information 
is added in the model.  
These results suggest: (1) the odds formulated by the betting public have entirely 
enclosed the impact of a horse’s past performance on its winning probability in the next 
race; and (2) bettors in the UK market manage to fully account for the importance of 
horses’ past performances in their probability judgements. Although the coefficients of 
H1, H2 and H3 change signs when the odds information is included, the Z values show 
that they are insignificant (i.e., the impacts of these factors have not been strong enough 
to  be  overestimated).  In  addition,  the  Pseudo-R
2  values  of  models  with  odds  have 
largely increased compared to those of models without odds. This suggests that the odds 
                                                 
23 If not different from the results reported here, all the results associated with the odds information in the 
subsequent tests will not be discussed. The focus of this study is the impact of anchoring factors on 
bettors’ judgements. .    142 
of a horse have a much greater power in explaining the horse’s winning probability than 
the information of the horse’s past performance on its own.  
 
Table 4.3.1-3 Results of estimating CL models with horse’s past performance as 
independent variable in the UK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week   
Variable    Wnd  Wk 
ij H1 coef. 
a  0.6507**  0.5982**  0.6723** 
Std. Err.  0.0156  0.0291  0.0185 
Z  41.66  20.56  36.32 
LL  -115595.24  -29425.96  -86166.97 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  1580.42  388.81  1196.25 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0068  0.0066  0.0069 
ij H2 coef. 
b  0.8412**  0.8128**  0.8547** 
Std. Err.  0.0339  0.0600  0.0411 
Z  24.82  13.55  20.80 
LL  -116120.67  -29540.85  -86579.65 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  529.56  159.02  370.88 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0023  0.0027  0.0021 
ij H3 coef. 
c  1.0469**  0.8998**  1.1246** 
Std. Err.  0.0637  0.1105  0.0781 
Z  16.43  8.15  14.39 
LL  -116272.78  -29592.26  -86679.12 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  225.35  56.20  171.95 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0010  0.0009  0.0010 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
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a 
ij H1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its last race; equals 0 
otherwise. 
b 
ij H2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous two races; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij H3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous three races; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table  4.3.1-4(1)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability  judgements  and  the  horse’s  performance  in  its  previous  race  as 
independent variables in the UK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week  Model 1 
Variable    Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  1.2075**  1.2058**  1.2080** 
Std. Err.  0.0071  0.0142  0.0081 
Z  171.13  84.76  148.66 
ij H1 coef. 
b  -0.0164  -0.0268  -0.0121 
Std. Err.  0.0165  0.0306  0.0196 
Z  -0.99  -0.87  -0.62 
LL  -96790.10  -24840.52  -71949.48 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39190.70  9559.68  29631.22 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
a  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b
ij H1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its last race; equals 0 
otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-4(2)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the horse’s performance in its previous two races as 
independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 2 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  1.2071**  1.2029**  1.2086** 
Std. Err.  0.0070  0.0141  0.0080 
Z  172.97  85.58  150.31 
ij H2 coef. 
d  -0.0410  0.0201  -0.0693 
Std. Err.  0.0358  0.0631  0.0434 
Z  -1.15  0.32  -1.60 
LL  -96789.98  -24840.85  -71948.38 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39191.03  9559.02  29633.41 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
c  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
d 
ij H2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous two races; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   145 
Table  4.3.1-4(3)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the horse’s performance in its previous three races as 
independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 3 
Variable  
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  1.2066**  1.2047**  1.2072** 
Std. Err.  0.0070  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  173.61  85.99  150.81 
ij H3 coef. 
f  -0.0550  -0.1198  -0.0206 
Std. Err.  0.0681  0.1170  0.0839 
Z  -0.81  -1.02  -0.25 
LL  -96790.27  -24840.37  -71949.64 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39190.36  9559.98  29630.90 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
f 
ij H3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if it won its previous three races; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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4.3.1.2 Jockey’s Past Performance 
 
HK Market 
The  results  of  exploring  the  degree  to  which  jockey’s  past  performance  is 
incorporated into bettors’ subjective judgements of a horse’s winning in the HK market 
are  presented  in  Table  4.3.1-5  and  Tables  4.3.1-6(1-3).  Column  ‘Whole  Market’  in 
Table  4.3.1-5  presents  the  estimates  of  CL  models  associated  with  jockeys’  past 
performances (J1, J2 and J3, respectively), for the HK horserace betting market as a 
whole.  A  positive  and  significant  coefficient  of  variable  J1  suggests  that  the 
performance of a jockey in his/her last race has an important impact on the performance 
of the horse ridden by him/her in the next race (coef. = 0.1692; Z = 3.40). However, 
none of the coefficients of J2 and J3 is significant in these tests. This seems to indicate 
that the fact that a jockey has won his/her previous two or three races has a less impact 
on his/her subsequent performance than when he/she has just won his/her last race. This 
seems to be contrary to the common sense that the more times a jockey won, the more 
chance  he/she  wins  the  next  race  due  to  the  improvement  of  skills  and  experience. 
However, the results of J2 and J3 actually confirm the effect of ‘regression to the mean’ 
in  judgement  and  decision  making  literature:  people’s  performances  are  not  always 
good or always bad but mixed up with good and bad and regress to the mean. Therefore, 
it  is  more  likely  to  observe  one  or  two  good  performances  followed  by  a  bad 
performance  or  a  reversal  sequence  rather  than  a  series  of  three  good  or  three  bad 
performances. The misconceptions of regression and neglect of base-rate will lead to a 
representativeness bias in judgement (Goodwin and Wright, 2004; Keren and Teigen, 
2004; Montier, 2002; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).   
The results of estimating conditional models with bettors’ subjective probability 
judgements and the jockey’s performance in his/her previous race(s) are reported in 
Tables 4.3.1-6(1-3). Similar to previous results, when considering the UK market as a 
whole,  the  final  odds  implied  variables  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level. 
However, the coefficients of J1, J2 and J3 are all insignificant (coef. = -0.0319, Z = -
0.61 in model 1; coef. = -0.1335, Z = -0.81 in model 2; coef. = -0.5210, Z= -0.86 in 
model 3). This indicates that bettors have fully taken the information of jockey’s past 
performances into account in odds when assessing the horse’s winning probability.    147 
Note  that  although  signs  of  anchoring  factors’  coefficients  have  changed  from 
positive to negative but the values remain insignificant. This indicates that the betting 
public in this market have realised whether a horse’s jockey has done well in his/her 
previous race(s) is important in estimating the horse’s chance of winning, but do not 
overestimate its importance. Consequently, results from CL models with and without 
odds  information  suggest  that  bettors  in  the  HK  market  appear  not  to  anchor  their 
judgements on the information concerning whether the jockey of the horse has won 
his/her previous race(s).  
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Table 4.3.1-5 Results of estimating CL models with jockey’s past performance as 
independent variable in the HK market 
Whole Market  Day of the Week   
Variable    Wnd  Wk 
ij J1 coef. 
a  0.1692**  0.1653*  0.1742* 
Std. Err.  0.0498  0.0665  0.0750 
Z  3.40  2.48  2.32 
LL  -13094.12  -7508.38  -5585.74 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  11.08  5.92  5.17 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0004  0.0004  0.0005 
ij J2 coef. 
b  0.1960  0.0996  0.3037 
Std. Err.  0.1587  0.2230  0.2263 
Z  1.24  0.45  1.34 
LL  -13098.94  -7511.24  -5587.49 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  1.45  0.19  1.67 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
ij J3 coef. 
c  -0.1602  0.1590  -0.5965 
Std. Err.  0.5987  0.7430  1.0240 
Z  -0.27  0.21  -0.58 
LL  -13099.62  -7511.32  -5588.12 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  0.08  0.04  0.41 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
No. of horses  66,244  38,658  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  2,910  2,223 
a 
ij J1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her last race; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
b 
ij J2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous 
two races; equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij J3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous 
three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level. * Statistically significant at the 5% level.   149 
Table 4.3.1-6(1) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the jockey’s performance in 
his/her previous race as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 1 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  0.9979**  0.9853**  0.9980**  1.0039**  0.9921**  1.0044**  0.9888**  0.9751**  0.9883** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0178  0.0181  0.0227  0.0228  0.0233  0.0282  0.0284  0.0290 
Z  56.46  55.47  55.02  44.25  43.51  43.15  35.05  34.38  34.12 
ij J1 coef. 
b  -0.0319  -0.0667  -0.0931  -0.0641  -0.0980  -0.1221  0.0090  -0.0268  -0.0561 
Std. Err.  0.0519  0.0518  0.0518  0.0696  0.0696  0.0695  0.0777  0.0776  0.0776 
Z  -0.61  -1.29  -1.80  -0.92  -1.41  -1.76  0.12  -0.35  -0.72 
LL  -11113.65  -11226.44  -11256.27  -6280.79  -6348.87  -6368.31  -4832.54  -4877.24  -4887.69 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3972.02  3746.45  3686.77  2461.10  2324.94  2286.06  1511.56  1422.15  1401.26 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1430  0.1407  0.1638  0.1548  0.1522  0.1352  0.1272  0.1254 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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Table 4.3.1-6(2) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the jockey’s performance in 
his/her previous two races as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 2 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  0.9977**  0.9846**  0.9967**  1.0032**  0.9907**  1.0024**  0.9892**  0.9751**  0.9878** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0227  0.0228  0.0232  0.0282  0.0283  0.0289 
Z  56.49  55.50  55.05  44.27  43.54  43.17  35.08  34.41  34.15 
ij J2 coef. 
d  -0.1335  -0.1901  -0.2362  -0.1958  -0.2594  -0.3069  -0.0657  -0.1146  -0.1590 
Std. Err.  0.1641  0.1639  0.1640  0.2308  0.2307  0.2308  0.2336  0.2330  0.2331 
Z  -0.81  -1.16  -1.44  -0.85  -1.12  -1.33  -0.28  -0.49  -0.68 
LL  -11113.50  -11226.57  -11256.82  -6280.84  -6349.21  -6368.94  -4832.51  -4877.18  -4887.71 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3972.33  3746.17  3685.67  2460.99  2324.26  2284.80  1511.63  1422.28  1401.22 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1430  0.1407  0.1638  0.1547  0.1521  0.1352  0.1273  0.1254 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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Table 4.3.1-6(3) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the jockey’s performance in 
his/her previous three race as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 3 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  0.9975**  0.9841**  0.9959**  1.0028**  0.9900**  1.0014**  0.9892**  0.9749**  0.9873** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0227  0.0227  0.0232  0.0282  0.0283  0.0289 
Z  56.50  55.51  55.05  44.26  43.53  43.15  35.10  34.43  34.17 
ij J3 coef. 
f  -0.5210  -0.6018  -0.6611  -0.1964  -0.2778  -0.3339  -0.9582  -1.0366  -1.0978 
Std. Err.  0.6080  0.6077  0.6082  0.7602  0.7608  0.7624  1.0331  1.0319  1.0320 
Z  -0.86  -0.99  -1.09  -0.26  -0.37  -0.44  -0.93  -1.00  -1.06 
LL  -11113.42  -11226.70  -11257.22  -6281.18  -6349.81  -6369.79  -4831.97  -4876.61  -4887.16 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3972.49  3745.92  3684.89  2460.31  2323.06  2283.10  1512.70  1423.41  1402.31 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1430  0.1406  0.1638  0.1546  0.1520  0.1353  0.1274  0.1255 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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a c e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij J1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her last race; equals 0 otherwise. 
d 
ij J2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous two races; equals 0 otherwise. 
f 
ij J3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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UK Market 
Results  of  estimating  the  impact  of  jockeys’  past  performances  on  bettors’ 
subjective judgements of horses’ winning probabilities in the UK market are displayed 
in the following four tables. Table 4.3.1-7 reports the results of three CL models with 
jockeys’  past  performances  (J1,  J2  and  J3)  as  independent  variables.  Similar  to  the 
results in the HK market, whether a jockey won or lost his/her last race has a significant 
impact on the performance of the next horse ridden by the same jockey (coef. = 0.1998; 
Z = 12.50), for the UK market as a whole. When bettors’ subjective judgements (coef. = 
1.2056; Z = 173.87) are included in the model, the coefficient of J1 remains positive 
(coef. = 0.0317; Z = 1.86), but only significant at the 10% level which cannot provide a 
strong  support  for  over-  or  underestimates  of  this  factor  (see  Table  4.3.1-8(1)). 
Therefore, no anchoring occurs in respect of jockey’s last performance information.  
 Results  associated  with  anchoring  factors  J2  and  J3  do  not  demonstrate  the 
existence of anchoring either. As shown in Table 4.3.1-7, these two variables are both 
positive and significant at the 1% level (J2: coef. = 0.3391, Z = 7.88; J3: coef. = 0.3595, 
Z = 3.37). When the final odds implied variable is added in the model, the coefficients 
of J2 and J3 both turn to insignificant although J2 with a positive sign (coef. = 0.0416, Z 
= 0.91) and J3 with a negative sign (coef. = -0.0669, Z = -0.59). These results indicate 
that the information that a jockey has won his/her previous two or three races has been 
fully accounted for in odds by bettors in the UK market.     154 
Table 4.3.1-7 Results of estimating CL models with jockey’s past performance as 
independent variable in the UK market 
Day of the Week   
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
ij J1 coef. 
a  0.1998**  0.2301**  0.1891** 
Std. Err.  0.0160  0.0311  0.0186 
Z  12.50  7.39  10.15 
LL  -116310.52  -29594.31  -86715.57 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  149.86  52.10  99.03 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0006  0.0009  0.0006 
ij J2 coef. 
b  0.3391**  0.3666**  0.3291** 
Std. Err.  0.0430  0.0827  0.0504 
Z  7.88  4.43  6.53 
LL  -116356.72  -29611.33  -86745.31 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  57.47  18.06  39.56 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0002  0.0003  0.0002 
ij J3 coef. 
c  0.3595**  0.8155**  0.1564 
Std. Err.  0.1068  0.1808  0.1337 
Z  3.37  4.51  1.17 
LL  -116380.23  -29611.67  -86764.43 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  10.44  17.38  1.32 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0003  0.0000 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
a 
ij J1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her last race; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
b 
ij J2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous 
two races; equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij J3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous 
three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.    155 
Table  4.3.1-8(1)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the jockey’s performance in his/her previous race as 
independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 1 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  1.2056**  1.2028**  1.2067** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  173.87  86.11  151.07 
ij J1 coef. 
b  0.0317  0.0395  0.0170 
Std. Err.  0.0170  0.0405  0.0198 
Z  1.86  0.98  0.86 
LL  -96788.87  -24840.43  -71949.30 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39193.16  9559.86  29631.57 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
a  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij J1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her last race; 
equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-8(2)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the jockey’s performance in his/her previous two races 
as independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 2 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  1.2060**  1.2029**  1.2070** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  174.02  86.19  151.18 
ij J2 coef. 
d  0.0416  0.2356  0.0152 
Std. Err.  0.0460  0.1297  0.0540 
Z  0.91  1.82  0.28 
LL  -96790.19  -24839.32  -71949.63 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39190.52  9562.08  29630.92 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
c  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
d 
ij J2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous 
two races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-8(3)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability  judgements  and  the  jockey’s  performance  in  his/her  previous  three 
races as independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 3 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  1.2062**  1.2034**  1.2073** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  174.10  86.22  151.27 
ij J3 coef. 
f  -0.0669  0.0612  -0.2970* 
Std. Err.  0.1138  0.3353  0.1425 
Z  -0.59  0.18  -2.08 
LL  -96790.42  -24840.89  -71947.36 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39190.06  9558.95  29635.45 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
f 
ij J3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its jockey won his/her previous 
three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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4.3.1.3 Trainer’s Past Performance 
 
HK Market 
The  results  of  explaining  the  degree  to  which  trainers’  past  performances  are 
accounted for in bettors’ subjective probability judgements in the HK market is reported 
in Table 4.3.1-9 and Tables 4.3.1-10(1-3). Results of CL models with trainers’ past 
performances in their previous one, two and three races (T1, T2 and T3) as independent 
variables are presented in Table 4.3.1-9. For the whole market, the coefficient of each 
variable (T1: coef. = 0.2023, Z = 4.21; T2: coef. = 0.3080, Z = 2.01; T3: coef. = 0.7768, 
Z  =  1.87)  indicates  that  the  information  of  trainers’  performance  is  important  in 
estimating horses’ winning probabilities. However, the significance level of these three 
variables  decreases  from  the  1%  level  for  T1  to  5%  for  T2  and  10%  for  T3.  This 
reconfirms the effect of ‘regression to the mean’ implicated by the performances of 
jockeys in their past two and three races in the HK market (see Section 4.3.1.2).  
Results of CL models including bettors’ subjective probability judgements and 
trainers’ past performances are reported in Tables 4.3.1-10(1-3). For the HK market as a 
whole, When the HK market is considered as a whole, the anchoring factor T1 (coef. = 
0.0915, Z = 1.83) is only significant at the 10% level. This result cannot provide a 
significant evidence of  misuse of the trainer’s last performance information and the 
positive signs of the coefficients of T1 in models with and without odds information 
suggest that bettors in the HK market do not tend to over-weight this piece information. 
Models 2 and 3 provide similar results. Trainers’ past performances in their previous 
two  and  three  races  have  been  fully  accounted  for  in  odds  and  are  not  over-  or 
underestimated. Therefore, no anchoring effects are found on the information associated 
with trainers’ past performances. However, a decreasing of the significance level from 
T1 to T2 and T3 may indicate that bettors are learning from trainers’ past performances: 
the  more  times  a  trainer  won  his/her  race,  the  more  likely  that  bettors  are  to  pay 
attention to this information and adjust their judgements more properly. In other words, 
judgements based on the results of more races are more accurate than those based on 
only one race.  
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Table 4.3.1-9 Results of estimating CL models with trainer’s past performance as 
independent variable in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week   
Variable    Wnd  Wk 
ij T1 coef. 
a  0.2023**  0.2016**  0.2031** 
Std. Err.  0.0481  0.0641  0.0728 
Z  4.21  3.15  2.79 
LL  -13091.21  -7506.61  -5584.61 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  16.90  9.47  7.44 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0006  0.0006  0.0007 
ij T2 coef. 
b  0.3080*  0.1637  0.4549* 
Std. Err.  0.1528  0.2215  0.2116 
Z  2.01  0.74  2.15 
LL  -13097.78  -7511.08  -5586.25 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  3.76  0.52  4.14 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0001  0.0000  0.0004 
ij T3 coef. 
c  0.7768 
†  1.2600*  0.1085 
Std. Err.  0.4151  0.5170  0.7428 
Z  1.87  2.44  0.15 
LL  -13098.19  -7508.99  -5588.31 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  2.94  4.69  0.02 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0001  0.0003  0.0000 
No. of horses  66,244  38,658  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  2,910  2,223 
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a 
ij T1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her last race; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
b 
ij T2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous 
two races; equals 0 otherwise. 
c 
ij T3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous 
three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
† Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.3.1-10(1) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the trainer’s performance in 
his/her previous race as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 1 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  0.9966**  0.9832**  0.9952**  1.0021**  0.9894**  1.0011**  0.9881**  0.9735**  0.9861** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0227  0.0228  0.0232  0.0282  0.0283  0.0289 
Z  56.42  55.41  54.94  44.22  43.47  43.09  35.04  34.35  34.08 
ij T1 coef. 
b  0.0915  0.0498  0.0207  0.0780  0.0369  0.0097  0.1089  0.0665  0.0350 
Std. Err.  0.0501  0.0500  0.0500  0.0670  0.0668  0.0667  0.0755  0.0753  0.0754 
Z  1.83  1.00  0.41  1.16  0.55  0.15  1.44  0.88  0.46 
LL  -11112.20  -11226.78  -11257.84  -6280.55  -6349.73  -6369.88  -4831.53  -4876.92  -4887.85 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3974.92  3745.75  3683.65  2461.58  2323.22  2282.92  1513.59  1422.80  1400.95 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1517  0.1430  0.1406  0.1639  0.1546  0.1520  0.1354  0.1273  0.1253 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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Table 4.3.1-10(2) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the trainer’s performance in 
his/her previous two races as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 2 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  0.9972**  0.9832**  0.9957**  1.0029**  0.9904**  1.0021**  0.9886**  0.9739**  0.9861** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0178  0.0181  0.0227  0.0226  0.0232  0.0282  0.0283  0.0289 
Z  56.48  55.41  55.02  44.26  43.53  43.16  35.07  34.39  34.12 
ij T2 coef. 
d  0.1203  0.0498  -0.0192  -0.0931  -0.1774  -0.2387  0.3457  0.2646  0.2128 
Std. Err.  0.1589  0.0500  0.1586  0.2298  0.2294  0.2296  0.2201  0.2193  0.2193 
Z  0.76  1.00  -0.12  -0.41  -0.77  -1.04  1.57  1.21  0.97 
LL  -11113.56  -11226.78  -11257.91  -6281.14  -6349.57  -6369.32  -4831.40  -4876.62  -4887.50 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3972.20  3745.75  3683.49  2460.41  2323.54  2284.03  1513.84  1423.41  1401.63 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1430  0.1406  0.1638  0.1547  0.1520  0.1354  0.1274  0.1254 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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Table 4.3.1-10(3) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the trainer’s performance in 
his/her previous three race as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 3 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  0.9972**  0.9837**  0.9954**  1.0023**  0.9894**  1.0008**  0.9891**  0.9746**  0.9869** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0227  0.0227  0.0232  0.0282  0.0283  0.0289 
Z  56.48  55.48  55.03  44.24  43.49  43.12  35.09  34.42  34.15 
ij T3 coef. 
f  0.5185  0.4267  0.3617  0.5987  0.5305  0.4810  0.3675  0.2367  0.1486 
Std. Err.  0.4433  0.4414  0.4413  0.5513  0.5503  0.5512  0.7640  0.7618  0.7617 
Z  1.17  0.97  0.82  1.09  0.96  0.87  0.48  0.31  0.20 
LL  -11113.22  -11226.84  -11257.61  -6280.68  -6349.45  -6369.54  -4832.44  -4877.26  -4887.94 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3972.89  3745.63  3684.11  2461.32  2323.77  2283.61  1511.76  1422.12  1400.77 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1430  0.1406  0.1638  0.1547  0.1520  0.1353  0.1272  0.1253 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  38,658  38,658  38,658  27,586  27,586  27,586 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  2,910  2,910  2,910  2,223  2,223  2,223 
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a c e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij T1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her last race; equals 0 otherwise.  
d 
ij T2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous two races; equals 0 otherwise. 
f 
ij T3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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UK Market 
 The extent to which bettors anchor their subjective judgements on the information 
associated  with  trainers’  past  performances  in  the  UK  markets  is  discussed  in  this 
section.  Table  4.3.1-11  reports  the  results  of  three  CL  models  with  trainers’  past 
performances in their previous one, two and three races as independent variables. For 
the UK market as a whole, all the three factors have a highly significant impact on 
horses’ winning probabilities.  
Results of models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and trainers’ 
past performances as independent variables are reported in Tables 4.3.1-12(1-3). Similar 
to  the  HK  market,  bettors  in  the  UK  market  do  not  fully  account  for  the  last 
performance of a trainer’s horse when estimating the winning chance of the trainer’s 
horse in the current race (T1: coef. = 0.0411, Z = 2.48; significant at the 5% level). 
However, when two or three horses trained by the same trainer win their races, the 
betting  public  begin  to  realise  the  trainer’s  performance  in  determining  the  horse’s 
performance and take full account of it (T2: coef. = 0.0525, Z  = 1.26; T3: coef. = 
0.1322, Z = 1.58). Therefore, no anchoring effects are detected on the information of 
trainers’ past performances.   166 
Table 4.3.1-11 Results of estimating CL models with trainer’s past performance as 
independent variable in the UK market 
Day of the Week 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
ij T1 coef. 
a  0.2792**  0.2548**  0.2877** 
Std. Err.  0.0156  0.0308  0.0180 
Z  17.93  8.26  15.94 
LL  -116233.18  -29587.87  -86644.89 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  304.54  64.99  240.41 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0013  0.0011  0.0014 
ij T2 coef. 
b  0.4731**  0.5098**  0.4594** 
Std. Err.  0.0385  0.0736  0.0452 
Z  12.28  6.92  10.16 
LL  -116317.28  -29598.78  -86718.33 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  136.34  43.16  93.52 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0006  0.0007  0.0005 
ij T3 coef. 
c  0.7877**  0.8013**  0.7820** 
Std. Err.  0.0770  0.1409  0.0919 
Z  10.23  5.69  8.51 
Log likelihood  -116340.28  -29606.41  -86733.86 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  90.35  27.91  62.46 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0004  0.0005  0.0004 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
a 
ij T1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her last race; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
b 
ij T2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous 
two races; equals 0 otherwise. 
c 
ij T3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous 
three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.    167 
Table  4.3.1-12(1)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the trainer’s performance in his/her previous race as 
independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 1 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  1.2051**  1.2033**  1.2057** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  173.63  86.02  150.83 
ij T1 coef. 
b  0.0411*  0.0055  0.0536* 
Std. Err.  0.0166  0.0328  0.0192 
Z  2.48  0.17  2.78 
LL  -96787.55  -24840.89  -71945.83 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  39195.80  9558.94  29638.52 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
a  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij T1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her last race; 
equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table  4.3.1-12(2)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the trainer’s performance in his/her previous two race 
as independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 2 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  1.2057**  1.2025**  1.2068** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  173.88  86.10  151.07 
ij T2 coef. 
d  0.0525  0.1203  0.0274 
Std. Err.  0.0415  0.0792  0.0488 
Z  1.26  1.52  0.56 
LL  -96789.81  -24839.77  -71949.51 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  39191.29  9561.18  29631.16 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
c  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
d 
ij T2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous 
two races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-12(3)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and the trainer’s performance in his/her previous three 
race as independent variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 3 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  1.2058**  1.2028**  1.2068** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0140  0.0080 
Z  173.97  86.16  151.14 
ij T3 coef. 
f  0.1322  0.2875  0.0676 
Std. Err.  0.0837  0.1519  0.1003 
Z  1.58  1.89  0.67 
LL  -96789.37  -24839.19  -71949.44 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  39192.16  9562.35  29631.29 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1614  0.1708 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
f 
ij T3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for a horse if its trainer won his/her previous 
three races; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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4.3.1.4 Post-position of the Horse 
 
In  horseracing,  horses  begin  their  races  from  ‘starting  stalls’.  This  device  is 
employed to ensure that all runners in a race are released simultaneously. The stall from 
which a horse starts a race (i.e., its post-position) is randomly allocated and announced 
on the day before the race. In HK, the number of the stall starts from 1 to 40 (from 
inside to outside of the track) in sequence according to the number of runners in a race. 
Clearly, horses starting from the inside of the track can run less distance than those who 
start from the positions outside of the track. Due to the track configuration (e.g., a short 
oval racetrack with sharp bends at Happy Valley racetrack in HK) or certain racetrack 
topography  (e.g.,  faster  ground  on  the  inside  of  the  track),  horses  at  certain  post-
positions may take advantages in the race. The importance of post-positions of horses 
must be considered carefully when bettors assess the probability of each horse winning 
the race. For example, the two racetracks in HK (HV and ST) are both oval circuits and 
the track configuration suggests that horses with low post-positions will be favoured 
(Schnytzer, Liu, and Johnson, 2008). However, the bends at HV are tighter than those at 
ST with a radius of only 91 meters at the tightest bend at HV compared to a radius of 
158 meters at the tightest bend at ST. Moreover, the circumference of HV (1,454 meters) 
is shorter that of ST (1,933 meters). Consequently, horses with a low post-position at 
HV are likely to have more advantage than those that run at ST.  
In the UK, flat races are run at thirty-eight racetracks across the country. Each 
racetrack  is  different  from  others  in  terms  of  the  configuration  and  topography. 
Therefore, at some racetracks low post-positions are favoured and at other racetracks 
high  post-positions  have  advantages.  The  way  to  distinguish  high  draw  advantage 
racetracks (high post-positions are advantageous to horses) and low draw racetracks 
(horses with low post-positions are favoured) is to examine the significance and sign of 
the factor ‘post-position (PP)’ in a CL model with PP as the only independent variable. 
To achieve this, the data is split by racetracks. Then a CL model with post-position of 
horses as independent variable is employed for races at each track. A significant and 
positive coefficient of PP means the post-position is important in assessing the chance 
of  a  horse  winning  a  race:  the  higher  the  post-position  of  the  horse,  the  higher   171 
probability  of  the  horse  winning.  Such  tracks  are  named  high  draw  racetracks
24. 
Oppositely, if PP obtains a significant but negative coefficient, then a horse with a low 
post-position will be favoured in the race. Consequently, these tracks are assigned to 
low  draw  racetracks
25.  Finally,  two  new  datasets  are  created  with  all  high  draw 
racetracks in one dataset and all low draw racetracks in another. These two datasets are 
then employed to examine the different relationship between horses’ performances and 
their post-positions at different racetracks (see Table 4.2.1-1).  
In this study, two aspects of horses’ post-position will be explored in the HK and 
UK  horserace  betting  markets.  The  first  focuses  on  whether  bettors  anchor  their 
judgements of a horse wining on the information of the horse’s post-position. Note that 
whether horses are favoured by low or high post-positions can be observed from the 
results of previous races and/or from comments and information supplied by racing 
tipsters. Therefore, the post-position of a horse might be a piece of information to which 
bettors pay too much attention to when estimating the horse’s chance of winning.  
The second aspect explores whether bettors anchor their probability judgements of 
a  horse  winning  on  the  post-position  of  the  winner(s)  of  previous  race(s)  at  a  race 
meeting. This assumption derives from a belief that individuals tend to anchor their 
judgements on vivid information which is easy to obtain (Schnytzer, Liu, and Johnson, 
2008). At a race meeting, the most immediate information is the result of a previous 
race(s). For example, if the winner of the previous race starts from stall six, bettors may 
take too much account of this information and anchor their probability judgements on 
the  number  of  this  position.  Consequently,  they  may  overestimate  the  winning 
probability of the horse from the same post-position in the current race. In this study, 
the influence of the post-positions of previous winners on the horse with the same post-
position  in  the  current  race  is  explored  using  the  previous  three  races  at  the  same 
meeting.  Whether  bettors  with  greater  expertise  are  less  prone  to  anchor  their 
judgements on horses’ post-positions will be discussed when exploring hypothesis three 
in Section 4.3.2.  
Four variables associated with horses’ post-positions are employed in this study. 
Variable  ‘PP’  represents  the  post-position  of  a  horse  in  its  race.  Dummy  variables 
                                                 
24 Racetracks with high draw advantage include: Beverley, Folkestone, Goodwood, Hamilton, Lingfield, 
Ripon, Southwell (A.W.), and Windsor.  
25 Racetracks low draw advantage include: Brighton, Catterick, Chester, Doncaster, Lingfield (A.W.), 
Nottingham, Warwick, Yarmouth, and York.    172 
‘WP1’, ‘WP2’ and ‘WP3’ are designed to test bettors’ potential anchoring on the post-
position of the previous one, two and three winners at a meeting. Specifically, ‘WP1’ 
equals 1 when the horse’s post-position in a race is the same as that of the winner in its 
previous race and 0 otherwise. Variables ‘WP2/3’ give 1 to a horse if the winners of the 
previous two/three races at the meeting start running from the same post-position as this 
horse; 0 otherwise. It is argued that if a piece of information is repeated more than once, 
it will be more likely to draw individuals’ attention and hence become an initial point on 
which decision makers may anchor their judgements (Bloomfield et al., 2000; Griffin 
and Tversky, 1992; Nelson et al., 2001). Because the chance that two or three winners 
in a meeting start from the same post-position is not high, once it happens, bettors are 
more likely to be attracted and therefore believe that the horse with the same post-
position in the next race gets more chance to win the race. Consequently, if bettors 
anchor  their  judgements  on  this  information,  they  would  overestimate  the  winning 
probability of the horse with the same post-position.  
Results and analysis for tests in the HK and UK markets are presented below. In 
each  market,  results  of  the  whole  market  and  for  different  racetracks  are  analysed 
separately.  Only  models  with  final  odds  implied  variables  and  post-position  related 
variables are discussed in this section; models involving 2 or 5 minutes odds will be 
discussed in Section 4.3.2 when exploring the expertise hypothesis.  
 
HK Market 
(1) Anchoring on the Information of the Current Race 
The results of examining to what extent a horse’s post-position affects its finishing 
position are displayed in Table 4.3.1-13. It shows that for the HK market as a whole and 
for both HV and ST racetracks, the coefficient of PP is negative and significant at the 
1% level in the model. This suggests that at these racetracks (combined and separated), 
a low post-position (inside of the track) is a big advantage for a horse to win the race. In 
addition, the Pseudo-R
2 of the model at HV (0.0159) is 30 times greater than that at ST 
(0.0005), suggesting that a low post-position may have a larger impact on a horse’s 
performance at HV than at ST.  
The  results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective  probability 
judgements and the horse’s post-position as independent variables are reported in Table 
4.3.1-14(1).  For  the  HK  market  as  a  whole  (i.e.,  HV+ST),  the  coefficient  of  PP  is   173 
statistically insignificant, indicating that the betting public have taken the post-position 
information fully into account when developing their subjective probability judgements. 
In  particular,  bettors  in  the  HK  market  do  not  appear  to  anchor  their  subjective 
judgements on the obvious advantage taken by low PP horses, although this advantage 
can  be  easily  discerned  from  media  comment,  from  observation  of  the  racetrack 
configurations as well as the racetrack authority’s clarification, and from the study of 
previous results. Consequently, it might be easily concluded that anchoring effects on 
post-position advantage do not exist in this market, which is clearly contrast with the 
wide-spread  demonstration  of  anchoring  effects  in  experimental  studies  (e.g., 
Mussweiler and Strack, 2000; Northcraft and Neale, 1987).  
Because the influence of post-position on horses’ winning probabilities and the 
manner  in  which  bettors  handle  post-position  information  at  the  two  racetracks  are 
different, combining data from the two racetracks leads to model mis-specification in 
this study. A likelihood ratio test is conducted to confirm this conclusion, based on the 
maximum  likelihood  values  for  models  incorporating  (i)  post-position  only  and  (ii) 
post-position and odds implied probabilities. For each model, the ratio is calculated 
based on the maximum likelihood values modelled at HV (LHV), at ST (LST), and at the 
combined market for the two racetracks a whole (LHK), by the formula -2[LHK – (LHV + 
LST)]. The results are 68.4754 and 20.3066 for models (i) and (ii) respectively. This 
suggests  that  for  both  models  (either  with  or  without  odds  implied  probability  as 
independent  variable),  the  CL  models  conducted  for  the  two  racetracks  separately, 
compared with models explored for the combined market, can display more information 
concerning the effect of post-position of horses on their winning probabilities and the 
manner in which bettors incorporate such information.  
The difference of the impact of post-position on horse’s winning probability and 
the way bettors handle this information between the two racetracks can also be observed 
from the significance and sign of the coefficient of PP in models with final odds implied 
probabilities and PP as independent variables. In Table 4.3.1-14(1), the coefficient of 
PP in the model for HV racetrack is statistically significant at the 1% level with  a 
negative sign (coef. = -0.0250; Z = -3.36), while this coefficient for ST racetrack is 
positive  and  significant  at  the  5%  level  (coef.  =  0.0116;  Z  =  2.45).  Note  that  the 
coefficients of  ij PP  in Table 4.3.1-13 for HV and ST are both significant and negative. 
These results indicate that bettors at HV/ST under/over use the information of post-  174 
position advantage when assessing horses’ winning probabilities. In other words, they 
anchor  their  judgements  on  post-position  advantage  at  ST  but  do  not  take  enough 
account of it at HV. Therefore, the results for the HK market combined from the two 
racetracks as a whole mask the actual behaviour of which bettors at the two tracks use 
information. To some extent, this can be considered as a compromise of the conflicting 
effects at the two racetracks. However, the coefficients of the natural log of the odds 
implied probability are significant at the 1% level at both tracks, as well as at the market 
as a whole, indicating that bettors’ subjective probability judgements reflected by the 
market odds are a reasonable estimator of a horse’s actual winning probability.  
Taken together, the results discussed above appear, concerning bettors at ST, to 
support  hypothesis  one,  namely,  that  bettors  anchor  their  subjective  probability 
judgements on post-position advantage of horses, whereas the evidence regarding HV 
appears  not  to  accept  this  hypothesis.  In  addition,  it  suggests  that  the  sum  of  the 
information contained in CL models for the two racetracks separately is not necessarily 
equal to the information involved in similar models for the HK market as a whole.  
 
(2) Anchoring on the Information of the Previous Race 
If  the  effect  of  post-position  advantage  is  recognised  by  bettors,  throughout  a 
racing  day,  by  observing  the  outcome  of  the  previous  race(s),  they  may  apply  this 
consciousness into their judgements in the subsequent race(s). One way of examining 
this hypothesis is to observe the results of preceding race(s) and explore the influence of 
previous outcomes on judgements of horses with same post-positions in a subsequent 
race.  
Table 4.3.1-13 reports the results of the post-position advantage associated with 
the winner(s) of previous race(s). For the HK market as a whole, the coefficients of 
dummy variables which represent whether a horse’s post-position in a race is the same 
as that of the winner(s) in the previous one, two and three races (namely, WP1, WP2 
and WP3), are all positive but not statistically significant. The model LR values and 
Pseudo-R
2 are very low, suggesting that the information of the post-position of previous 
winners do not have much impact on the winning chance of the horse from the same 
position in a subsequent race. Models for races at HV and ST racetracks separately 
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When the final odds information is included in the models, the coefficients of the 
factors  associated  with  previous  winners’  post-positions  remain  insignificant  (see 
Tables 4.3.1-14(2-4)). This suggests that, in the HK market (combined or separated), 
bettors  do  not  misuse  the  information  of  previous  winners’  post-position  in  their 
subjective  judgements  of  subsequent  horse’s  winning  probability.  Note  that  when 
coefficients of the factors are statistically insignificant, changes of the sign of these 
coefficients do not support the existence of anchoring effects on these factors. These 
results  are  inconsistent  with  Terrell  and  farmer’s  (1996)  findings  in  US  greyhound 
racing. In particular, Terrell and farmer (1996) demonstrated a 9% profit by betting “the 
greyhound in the starting trap occupied by the previous winner” (Vaughan Williams, 
2005; p. 131). This indicates that the US greyhound racing bettors tend to underestimate 
the winning probability of a greyhound if the previous race was won by the greyhound 
from the same starting position. However, this evidence of ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (an effect 
that when an outcome occurs a few times people underestimate the chance of getting the 
same outcome in the next round) is not supported by the results in the HK horserace 
betting market. As described above, bettors in the HK market seem to fully account for 
the  previous  winners’  post-position  information  when  estimating  the  winning 
probability of the horse in the next race from the same position.  
Taken together, the results of exploring the degree to which bettors, in the HK 
market,  account  for  the  post-position  advantage  according  to  the  outcome  of  the 
previous races(s) do not support the strength hypothesis. It is clear that, for the whole 
market and the two separate racetracks, the post-position of the winners in previous one, 
two  or  three  races  does  not  have  a  significant  impact  on  bettors’  estimates  of  the 
performance of the horse from the same post-position in the subsequent race. Even if 
the three previous races are all won by horses from the same post-position, bettors still 
do  not  anchor  their  judgements  on  the  post-position  information.  They  may  either 
ignore the importance of this piece of information or may have fully accounted for it 
when making judgements for the next race.  
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Table  4.3.1-13  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  horse’s  post-position  as 
independent variable in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Racetrack   
Variable    HV  ST 
ij PP coef. 
a  -0.0339**  -0.0815**  -0.0136** 
Std. Err.  0.0037  0.0069  0.0045 
Z  -9.05  -11.75  -3.04 
LL  -13058.49  -4382.23  -8642.02 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  82.35  141.56  9.26 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0031  0.0159  0.0005 
ij WP1 coef. 
b  0.0656  0.1413  0.0208 
Std. Err.  0.0540  0.0873  0.0688 
Z  1.21  1.62  0.30 
LL  -13098.94  -4451.75  -8646.60 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  1.45  2.52  0.09 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0001  0.0003  0.0000 
ij WP2 coef. 
c  0.0297  0.1917  -0.0987 
Std. Err.  0.2086  0.3041  0.2875 
Z  0.14  0.63  -0.34 
LL  -13099.65  -4452.83  -8646.58 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  0.02  0.38  0.12 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
ij WP3 coef. 
d  0.8058  0.3475  1.1426 
Std. Err.  0.6297  1.061  0.7910 
Z  1.28  0.33  1.44 
LL  -13098.98  -4452.97  -8645.82 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  1.36  0.10  1.64 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
No. of horses  66,244  21,624  44,620 
No. of races  5,133  1,789  3,344   177 
 
a 
ij PP : A variable which represents the number of the post-position of horse i in race j.  
b 
ij WP1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as the winner’s in race j-1; equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij WP2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as those of the winners in race j-1 and j-2 at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise.   
d  ij WP3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as those of the winners in race j-1, j-2 and j-3 at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 4.3.1-14(1) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the horse’s post-position as 
independent variables in the HK market  
 
Whole Market  Racetrack 
        HV      ST   
Model 1 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  0.9984**  0.9836**  0.9950**  0.9223**  0.9034**  0.9141**  1.0234**  1.0099**  1.0213** 
Std. Err.  0.0178  0.0179  0.0183  0.0328  0.0328  0.0335  0.0214  0.0215  0.0219 
Z  55.94  54.93  54.47  28.16  27.52  0.000  47.83  47.05  46.67 
ij PP coef. 
b  0.0015  -0.0005  -0.0009  -0.0250**  -0.0312**  -0.0320**  0.0116*  0.0114*  0.0111* 
Std. Err.  0.0040  0.0040  0.0040  0.0075  0.0074  0.0074  0.0047  0.0047  0.0047 
Z  0.39  -0.13  -0.23  -3.36  -4.20  -4.32  2.45  2.40  2.35 
LL  -11113.76  -11227.27  -11257.89  -3911.23  -3940.71  -3948.61  -7192.38  -7273.24  -7295.69 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3971.79  3744.78  3683.53  1083.56  1024.60  1008.81  2908.54  2746.81  2701.92 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1429  0.1406  0.1217  0.1150  0.1133  0.1682  0.1588  0.1562 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  21,624  21,624  21,624  44,620  44,620  44,620 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  1,789  1,789  1,789  3,344  3,344  3,344 
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Table 4.3.1-14(2) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the previous winner’s post-
position as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Racetrack 
        HV      ST   
Model 2 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  0.9973**  0.9839**  0.9956**  0.9495**  0.9356**  0.9477**  1.0182**  1.0048**  1.0162** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0318  0.0320  0.0327  0.0213  0.0213  0.0217 
Z  56.49  55.49  55.04  29.84  29.22  28.97  47.89  47.11  46.73 
ij WP1 coef. 
d  0.0376  0.0419  0.0401  0.0390  0.0488  0.0475  0.0397  0.0404  0.0384 
Std. Err.  0.0563  0.0561  0.0561  0.0903  0.0901  0.0901  0.0719  0.0717  0.0717 
Z  0.67  0.75  0.72  0.43  0.54  0.53  0.55  0.56  0.53 
LL  -11113.62  -11227.00  -11257.67  -3916.79  -3949.43  -3957.84  -7195.22  -7275.96  -7298.31 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3972.09  3745.32  3683.98  1072.45  1007.17  990.35  2902.85  2741.37  2696.67 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1430  0.1406  0.1204  0.1131  0.1112  0.1679  0.1585  0.1559 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  21,624  21,624  21,624  44,620  44,620  44,620 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  1,789  1,789  1,789  3,344  3,344  3,344 
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Table 4.3.1-14(3) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and previous two winners’ post-
positions as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Racetrack 
        HV      ST   
Model 3 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  0.9974**  0.9839**  0.9956**  0.9498**  0.9359**  0.9481**  1.0181**  1.0047**  1.0161** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0318  0.0320  0.0327  0.0213  0.0213  0.0217 
Z  56.49  55.50  55.04  29.86  29.24  28.99  47.89  47.11  46.73 
ij WP2 coef. 
f  -0.0322  -0.0058  -0.0024  0.0066  0.0627  0.0667  -0.0599  -0.0606  -0.0574 
Std. Err.  0.2168  0.2165  0.2165  0.3133  0.3130  0.3133  0.3001  0.2998  0.2995 
Z  -0.15  -0.03  -0.01  0.02  0.20  0.21  -0.20  -0.20  -0.19 
LL  -11113.83  -11227.28  -11257.92  -3916.88  -3949.55  -3957.96  -7195.35  -7276.10  -7298.43 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3971.66  3744.77  3683.48  1072.26  1006.92  990.12  2902.59  2741.10  2696.42 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1429  0.1406  0.1204  0.1131  0.1112  0.1678  0.1585  0.1559 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  21,624  21,624  21,624  44,620  44,620  44,620 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  1,789  1,789  1,789  3,344  3,344  3,344 
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Table 4.3.1-14(4) Results of estimating CL models with bettors’ subjective probability judgements and previous three winners’ 
post-positions as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Racetrack 
        HV      ST   
Model 4 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
g  0.9973**  0.9838**  0.9955**  0.9499**  0.9361**  0.9482**  1.0179**  1.0045**  1.0160** 
Std. Err.  0.0177  0.0177  0.0181  0.0318  0.0320  0.0327  0.0213  0.0213  0.0217 
Z  56.48  55.49  55.03  29.86  29.24  29.00  47.88  47.10  46.72 
ij WP3 coef. 
h  0.2670  0.3283  0.3692  -0.1740  -0.1150  -0.0455  0.6690  0.7328  0.7376 
Std. Err.  0.6802  0.6780  0.6778  1.0867  1.0836  1.0828  0.9080  0.9046  0.9020 
Z  0.39  0.48  0.54  -0.16  -0.11  -0.04  0.74  0.81  0.82 
LL  -11113.77  -11227.17  -11257.78  -3916.87  -3949.57  -3957.98  -7195.12  -7275.82  -7298.15 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  3971.79  3744.99  3683.75  1072.29  1006.89  990.07  2903.04  2741.65  2696.99 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1516  0.1429  0.1406  0.1204  0.1131  0.1112  0.1679  0.1585  0.1560 
No. of horses  66,244  66,244  66,244  21,624  21,624  21,624  44,620  44,620  44,620 
No. of races  5,133  5,133  5,133  1,789  1,789  1,789  3,344  3,344  3,344 
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a c e g  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij PP : A variable which represents the number of the post-position of horse i in race j.  
d 
ij WP1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the same as the winner’s in race j-1; equals 0 otherwise.  
f 
ij WP2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the same as those of the winners in race j-1 and j-2 at a 
meeting; equals 0 otherwise.   
h  ij WP3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the same as those of the winners in race j-1, j-2 and j-3 
at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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UK Market 
(1) Anchoring on the Information of the Current Race 
The results of models estimating to what extent a horse’s post-position affects its 
finishing position in a race are reported in Table 4.3.1-15. For the UK market as a whole, 
the coefficient of PP is positive but insignificant. This seems to indicate that a horse’s 
post-position has no significant impact on the horse’s running performance. However, a 
different picture appears when the market data is split into two groups: one group is 
consistent of the data from racetracks with high draw advantage and the other group 
combines races from the low draw advantage racetracks. Respectively, the coefficient of 
PP is positive and significant at the 1% at racetracks with high draw advantage (coef. = 
0.0283; Z = 11.00) but negative and significant at the 1% at racetracks with low draw 
advantage (coef. = -0.0216; Z = -8.87). Clearly, these results show that the post-position 
of a horse has a significant impact on the horse’s performance in a race; at some tracks 
horses starting from high position have advantage whereas at other tracks horses with 
low  draw  positions  have  advantages.  Consequently,  the  insignificance  of  the  post-
position in the model for the whole market results from the cancellation of the results 
from high draw and low draw racetracks.  
The  results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective  probability 
judgements  and  the  horse’s  post-position  as  independent  variables  are  reported  in 
Tables 4.3.1-16(1). As shown in the table, the coefficient of the horse’s post-position 
( ij PP ) is insignificant (coef. = 0.0005; Z = 0.40) for the whole market. This may suggest 
that (1) the post-position information has been fully accounted in odds by the betting 
public;  or  (2)  this  piece  of  information  is  not  important  in  estimating  the  horse’s 
probability of winning. However, results of models using separate data (where high and 
low draw advantages tracks are separated) provide another story. The coefficient of 
ij PP is  positive  and  significant  at  the  1%  level  (coef.  =  0.0194;  Z  =  7.12)  at  the 
racetracks which favour high draw horses whilst it is negative but significant at the 1% 
level (coef. = -0.0152; Z = -5.95) at the racetracks with low draw advantage. Note that 
the significance and the sign of PP’s coefficients in models with odds related variables 
are completely in line with those in models without the odds information, for the whole 
market as well as for the two racetrack groups. This consistence indicates that (1) at 
either  high  or  low  draw  advantage  racetrack,  the  post-position  of  the  horse  is  an   184 
important piece of information in estimating the horse’s winning probability; and (2) 
bettors  in  the  UK  market  have  not  paid  sufficient  attention  to  the  post-position 
information  (i.e.  they  underestimate  rather  than  overestimate  the  impact  of  this 
information  when  estimating  the  horse’s  chance  of  winning).  Consequently,  no 
anchoring effects are detected from the results discussed above.  
In  addition,  the  difference  of  the  impact  of  post-position  on  horses’  winning 
probabilities and of the manner in which bettors handle post-position information at 
different racetracks may also confirm that the examination of the whole market data 
may be mis-specified and may lead to misleading conclusion. Similar as in the HK 
markets, a likelihood ratio test is conducted to confirm this suggestion, based on the 
maximum  likelihood  values  for  models  incorporating  (i)  post-position  only  and  (ii) 
post-position and odds implied probabilities. For each model, the ratio is calculated 
based on the maximum likelihood values modelled for the combined market with all the 
racetracks  as  a  whole  (LUK),  at  racetracks  with  high  draw  advantage  (LHigh)  and  at 
racetracks favouring low draw horses (LLow), by the formula -2 [LUK - (LHigh + LLow)]. 
The  results  are  112260.86  and  93893.08  for  models  (i)  and  (ii)  respectively.  This 
suggests that for both models (either without or with odds implied probability as the 
independent  variable),  the  CL  models  conducted  for  the  two  types  of  racetracks 
separately,  compared  with  models  for  the  whole  market,  contain  more  information 
concerning the impact of post-position of horses on their performance and the manner in 
which bettors incorporate such information.  
In  summary,  the  results  associated  with  horses’  post-positions  and  bettors’ 
subjective judgements, shown in Table 4.3.1-15 and Table 4.3.1-16 (1), suggest that 
bettors in the UK horserace betting market do not anchor their subjective judgements on 
the  post-position  advantage  discerned  from  the  configuration  of  the  racetrack.  In 
addition, it also suggests that models conducted for the whole UK horserace betting 
market  may  not  detect  the  real  information  contained  by  different  racetracks.  More 
specifically,  the  effects  of  the  post-position  on  horses’  performance  at  different 
racetracks may be mashed when all the data are combined together.  
 
(2) Anchoring on the Information of the Previous Race 
The manner in which bettors handle the post-position information of the winners 
in the previous one, two or three races in estimating a horse’s winning chance in the   185 
current race is explored in this section. Three dummy variables (WP1, WP2 and WP3) 
are created to explain the relationship between the post-positions of previous winners 
and of the current horse.  
Results of estimating CL models with post-position related variables are reported 
in Table 4.3.1-15. Results of models with bettors’ subjective judgements and different 
post-position variables are reported in Tables 4.3.1-16(2-4), respectively. Table 4.3.1-15 
shows that the coefficient of WP1 is positive and significant at the 1% level (coef. = 
0.0499; Z = 2.79), WP2 is positive but insignificant (coef. = 0.0404; Z = 0.63), whereas 
WP3 is negative but significant at the 5% level (coef. = -0.6529; Z = -2.09), for the UK 
market as a whole. This may suggest that the post-position of the winner in the last race 
has a significant impact on the winning probability of the horse which starts from the 
same position in the current race. When the winners of the previous two races are both 
from the same post-position, there is no impact on the horse with the same position in 
the next race. When the number of races examined increased to three, this appears to 
exert a negative impact on the winning probability of the horse with the same PP in the 
next race. Therefore, it seems that the impact of previous winners’ post-position on the 
performance of the horse in the next race has a negative relationship with the number of 
races which is explored: the more races are monitored, the less positive impact it has.  
When  the  whole  database  is  split  into  two  datasets  according  to  post-position 
advantages  of  racetracks,  no  significance  is  found  for  the  coefficients  of  the  three 
anchoring variables at the racetracks with high draw advantage (see Table 4.3.1-15). 
The racetracks with low draw advantage, however, provide similar results as those for 
the whole market: a negative relationship between the impact of previous winner(s) 
post-position on bettors’ judgements and the number of times that horses win from the 
same position. This seems to indicate that at the racetrack which favours high post-
position, the post-position of previous winners has no impact on the performance of the 
horse  from  the  same  position;  at  the  racetrack  with  low  draw  advantage,  the  more 
previous  races  are  examined,  the  less  positive  impact  the  post-position  of  previous 
winners has on the performance of the horse in the current race.  
When the odds implied probability is added into the model, results for the whole 
market  show  that  bettors  do  not  appear  to  fully  account  for  the  information  of  last 
winners’ post-position (WP1) in their judgements (significant at the 5% level for the 
whole market and 1% level for racetracks with low draw advantage). This is consistent   186 
with  Terrell  and  Farmer’s  (1996)  findings  in  US  greyhound  racing:  bettors 
underestimate  the  winning  probability  of  the  greyhound  which  starts  from  the  trap 
occupied by the previous winner. Even so, no evidence shows that the UK horseracing 
bettors  over-  or  underestimate  the  impact  of  previous  two  or  three  winners’  post-
position (WP2 and WP3) in their judgements. For the separate datasets, racetracks with 
low draw advantage provide similar results to those of the whole market and bettors at 
tracks with high draw advantage even fully account for the impact of anchoring factor 
WP1. This may suggest that the UK bettors are learning from the previous racing results 
and are able to adjust their judgments in later races.  
In summary, although the post-position of previous winner(s) may have different 
impacts on subsequent horses which start from the same position, bettors appear not to 
overestimate the importance of this information. In particular, they may underestimate 
its impact at tracks with low draw advantage but adjust their judgements quickly when 
they  observe  similar  results  from  two  or  three  races.  Therefore,  the  anchoring  and 
strength hypotheses of anchoring on previous winners’ post-position information are not 
accepted.    187 
Table  4.3.1-15  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  horse’s  post-position  as 
independent variable in the UK market 
 
Racetrack   
Variable 
Whole Market 
High draw adv.  Low draw adv. 
ij PP coef. 
a  0.0012  0.0283**  -0.0216** 
Std. Err.  0.0013  0.0026  0.0024 
Z  0.98  11.00  -8.87 
LL  -116384.97  -28413.19  -31841.35 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  0.96  121.58  78.98 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0021  0.0012 
ij WP1 coef. 
b  0.0499**  -0.0123  0.1525** 
Std. Err.  0.0179  0.0376  0.0324 
Z  2.79  -0.33  4.70 
LL  -116381.60  -28473.92  -31870.18 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  7.70  0.11  21.31 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0003 
ij WP2 coef. 
c  0.0404  -0.0233  0.1289 
Std. Err.  0.0643  0.1394  0.1115 
Z  0.63  -0.17  1.16 
LL  -116385.26  -28473.96  -31880.19 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  0.39  0.03  1.29 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
ij WP3 coef. 
d  -0.6529*  -0.2472  -0.1765 
Std. Err.  0.3126  0.6054  0.4334 
Z  -2.09  -0.41  -0.41 
LL  -116382.81  -28473.89  -31880.75 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  5.28  0.18  0.17 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
No. of horses  554,830  135,854  151,286 
No. of races  49,881  12,138  13,714   188 
a 
ij PP : A variable which represents the number of the post-position of horse i in race j.  
b 
ij WP1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as the winner’s in race j-1; equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij WP2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as those of the winners in race j-1 and j-2 at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise.   
d  ij WP3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as those of the winners in race j-1, j-2 and j-3 at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-16(1)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and horses’ post-positions as independent variables in the 
UK market 
 
Racetrack  Model 1 
Variable 
Whole Market 
High draw adv.  Low draw adv. 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  1.2061**  1.2447**  1.2089** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0141  0.0133 
Z  174.11  88.55  90.55 
ij PP coef. 
b  0.0005  0.0194**  -0.0152** 
Std. Err.  0.0013  0.0027  0.0026 
Z  0.40  7.12  -5.95 
LL  -96790.52  -23314.17  -26529.81 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39189.87  10319.64  10702.05 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1812  0.1678 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
a  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij PP : A variable which represents the number of the post-position of horse i in race j.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-16(2)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability  judgements  and  previous  winner’s  post-positions  as  independent 
variables in the UK market 
 
Racetrack  Model 2 
Variable 
Whole Market 
High draw adv.  Low draw adv. 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  1.2061**  1.2483**  1.2109** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0141  0.0134 
Z  174.11  88.82  90.70 
ij WP1 coef. 
d  0.0481*  -0.0128  0.1478** 
Std. Err.  0.0190  0.0402  0.0346 
Z  2.53  -0.32  4.27 
LL  -96787.43  -23339.54  -26538.68 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39196.04  10268.87  10684.31 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1803  0.1676 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
c  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
d 
ij WP1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as the winner’s in race j-1; equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table  4.3.1-16(3)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and previous two winners’ post-positions as independent 
variables in the UK market 
 
Racetrack  Model 3 
Variable 
Whole Market 
High draw adv.  High draw adv. 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  1.2061**  1.2484**  1.2111** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0141  0.0134 
Z  174.11  88.82  90.72 
ij WP2 coef. 
f  0.0551  -0.0467  0.1863 
Std. Err.  0.0688  0.1502  0.1197 
Z  0.80  -0.31  1.56 
LL  -96790.28  -23339.55  -26546.37 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39190.34  10268.86  10668.94 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1803  0.1673 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
f 
ij WP2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as those of the winners in race j-1 and j-2 at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise.   
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-16(4)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability judgements and previous three winners’ post-positions as independent 
variables in the UK market 
 
Racetrack  Model 4 
Variable 
Whole Market 
High draw adv.  Low draw adv. 
s
ij p ln coef. 
g  1.2061**  1.2483**  1.2110** 
Std. Err.  0.0069  0.0141  0.0133 
Z  174.11  88.82  90.72 
ij WP3 coef. 
h  -0.6069
  -0.1417  -0.0300 
Std. Err.  0.3268  0.6282  0.4535 
Z  -1.86  -0.23  -0.07 
LL  -96788.59  -23339.57  -26547.54 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39193.72  10268.82  10666.61 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1803  0.1673 
No. of horses  554,830  141,225  413,605 
No. of races  49,881  12,738  37,143 
 
g  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
h  ij WP3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for horse i in race j if its post-position is the 
same as those of the winners in race j-1, j-2 and j-3 at a meeting; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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4.3.1.5 Performance of Previous Favourite 
 
Factors associated with favourites’ past performances are explored in this section 
to  examine  anchoring  in  the  HK  and  UK  horserace  betting  markets.  Three  dummy 
variables concerning the performance of the favourite in the previous one, two and three 
races  are  employed  to  conduct  these  tests.  In  particular,  variable  F1  gives  1  to  the 
favourite  of  the  current  race  if  the  previous  race  was  won  by  the  favourite,  and  0 
otherwise. Variable F2 gives 1 to the favourite of the current race if the previous two 
races were both won by the favourites, and variable F3 focuses on the outcomes of 
previous three races. Note that under this definition, when the previous race was not 
won by the favourite, the favourite in the current race will obtain a value of 0, which 
makes all the values for horses in this race to be 0. This will cause calculation problems 
in CL model if the number of such races is too high. Therefore, races with 0 for all 
horses in a race are removed from the dataset. As a result, the number of horses and 
races may vary in these tests and will be presented in the results of each test. 
Only races at the same meeting are concerned in this study to detect anchoring 
effects because favourites’ performances in races at previous meetings are difficult to be 
retrieved to bettors’ memory and therefore are not likely to serve as anchors.  
 
HK Market  
Results of exploring anchoring effects on favourites’ past performances using CL 
models associated with the HK market data are displayed in Table 4.3.1-17 and Tables 
4.3.1-18(1-3). As shown in Table 4.3.1-17, for the whole HK market, coefficients of the 
independent variable F1 (coef. = 1.4479; Z = 22.31) and F2 (coef. = 1.3173; Z = 9.47) 
are both positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the information that 
the previous one or two races are won by the favourites has a significant impact on the 
performance of the favourite in a subsequent race. When the number of races won by 
the  favourites  goes  up  to  three,  the  significant  impact  of  this  information  on  the 
performance  of  the  subsequent  favourite,  however,  disappears  (coef.  =  0.6258;  Z  = 
1.64). 
The results of models incorporating bettors’ subjective probability judgements and 
favourites’ past performances as independent variables are reported in Table 4.3.1-18(1-
3). When the HK market is considered as a whole, the variables F1 and F2 turn to be   194 
insignificant  (F1:  coef.  =  0.0742,  Z  =  0.86;  F2:  coef.  =  -0.1270,  Z  =  -0.70).  This 
suggests  that  the  information  that  the  previous  one  or  two  races  are  won  by  the 
favourites has been fully accounted in odds by the betting public.  
However, results in model 3 show that when previous three races are all won by 
the favourites, it has a significant negative impact (coef. = -0.9293; Z = -2.04, at the 5% 
level) on bettors’ subjective judgements of the favourite’s winning probability in the 
next race. Compared with the positive but insignificant coefficient of F3 in the model 
without market odds (see Table 4.3.1-17), a negative but significant coefficient of F3 in 
model 3 indicates that the influence of favourites’ performances in previous races has to 
be reduced from bettors’ estimates of the winning chance of the next favourite horse to 
obtain the real winning probability of the horse. In other words, the betting public pay 
too much attention to this piece of information and therefore anchor their judgements on 
it.  
Taken  together,  the  information  of  favourite’s  last  performance  has  been  fully 
accounted in odds by bettors in the HK market. Therefore, the anchoring hypothesis on 
favourite’s  last  performance  is  not  accepted.  However,  when  the  HK  betting  public 
observe that previous three races at a meeting are all won by the favourites, they tend to 
anchor their judgements on this piece of information and overestimate the real chance 
that the favourite wins the next race. These results are inconsistent with the effect found 
by  previous  literature  in  racetrack  betting.  For  example,  Metzger  (1985)  found  that 
bettors in US horserace betting regard a favourite less favourable if a series of races 
have been won by the favourites and vice versa. This is an evidence of the ‘gambler’s 
fallacy’ which indicates that people tend to underestimate the chance that an outcome 
occurs if the same outcome has been repeated a series of times. Clearly, bettors in the 
HK horserace betting market are not subject to a ‘gambler’s fallacy’ when favourites 
win previous two races but exhibit a ‘hot hand’ effect when the result is repeated three 
times. In other words, they believe that the favourite has a more chance of winning after 
a series of races won by the favourites (i.e., the favourite gets ‘hot’ in the next race). 
This may suggest that the strength hypothesis cannot be accepted unless similar results 
are repeated enough times (three times in the case of the favourite’s past performance 
information).    195 
Table 4.3.1-17 Results of estimating CL models with favourite’s past performance 
as independent variable in the HK market  
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week   
Variable    Wnd  Wk 
ij F1 coef. 
a  1.4479**  1.4959**  1.3739** 
Std. Err.  0.0649  0.0828  0.1044 
Z  22.31  18.06  13.16 
LL  -2939.36  -1794.84  -1144.10 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  383.66  249.73  134.77 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0613  0.0650  0.0556 
No. of horses  15,872  9,873  5,999 
No. of races  1,225  744  481 
ij F2 coef. 
b  1.3173**  1.3059**  1.3375** 
Std. Err.  0.1390  0.1743  0.2307 
Z  9.47  7.49  5.80 
LL  -698.89  -456.01  -242.88 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  69.68  43.55  26.14 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0475  0.0456  0.0511 
No. of horses  3,736  2,459  1,277 
No. of races  286  185  101 
ij F3 coef. 
c  0.6258  0.5909  0.6867 
Std. Err.  0.3806  0.4804  0.6239 
Z  1.64  1.23  1.10 
LL  -150.10  -96.81  -53.28 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  2.32  1.31  1.03 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0077  0.0067  0.0096 
No. of horses  770  497  273 
No. of races  59  38  21 
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a 
ij F1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous race was won 
by the favourite; equals 0 otherwise.  
b 
ij F2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous two races 
were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij F3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous three races 
were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-18(1)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective  probability  judgements  and  the  favourite’s  past 
performance as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 1 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  0.9976**  0.8985**  0.8934**  0.9611**  0.9232**  0.9177**  0.8987**  0.8574**  0.8533** 
Std. Err.  0.0461  0.0452  0.0451  0.0583  0.0573  0.0572  0.0754  0.0739  0.0736 
Z  20.35  19.88  19.80  16.48  16.12  16.04  11.92  11.59  11.59 
ij F1 coef. 
b  0.0742  0.1317  0.1569  0.0327  0.0901  0.1156  0.1377  0.1953  0.2196 
Std. Err.  0.0858  0.0859  0.0856  0.1108  0.1109  0.1106  0.1358  0.1360  0.1352 
Z  0.86  1.53  1.83  0.30  0.81  1.04  1.01  1.44  1.62 
LL  -2678.74  -2700.00  -2704.13  -1621.57  -1635.16  -1638.42  -1056.93  -1064.58  -1065.45 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  904.89  862.38  854.12  596.28  569.10  562.57  309.09  293.81  292.06 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1445  0.1377  0.1364  0.1553  0.1482  0.1465  0.1276  0.1213  0.1205 
No. of horses  15,872  15,872  15,872  9,873  9,873  9,873  5,999  5,999  5,999 
No. of races  1,225  1,225  1,225  744  744  744  481  481  481 
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Table  4.3.1-18(2)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective  probability  judgements  and  the  favourite’s  past 
performance as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 2 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  0.9905**  0.9876**  0.9813**  1.1099**  1.1334**  1.1295**  0.7825**  0.7344**  0.7252** 
Std. Err.  0.0962  0.0952  0.0943  0.1236  0.1229  0.1218  0.1545  0.1521  0.1506 
Z  10.30  10.38  10.41  8.98  9.22  9.28  5.06  4.83  4.81 
ij F2 coef. 
d  -0.1270  -0.1441  -0.1388  -0.3103  -0.3580  -0.3551  0.1975  0.2388  0.2471 
Std. Err.  0.1812  0.1832  0.1835  0.2276  0.2299  0.2303  0.3012  0.3058  0.3061 
Z  -0.70  -0.79  -0.76  -1.36  -1.56  -1.54  0.66  0.78  0.81 
LL  -631.24  -632.21  -632.71  -402.10  -400.53  -400.71  -227.71  -229.57  -229.80 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  204.97  203.05  202.04  151.36  154.50  154.14  56.47  52.76  52.30 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1397  0.1384  0.1377  0.1584  0.1617  0.1613  0.1103  0.1031  0.1022 
No. of horses  3,736  3,736  3,736  2,459  2,459  2,459  1,277  1,277  1,277 
No. of races  286  286  286  185  185  185  101  101  101 
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Table  4.3.1-18(3)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective  probability  judgements  and  the  favourite’s  past 
performance as independent variables in the HK market 
 
Whole Market  Day of the Week 
        Wnd      Wk   
Model 3 
 
Variable  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins  Final  2mins  5mins 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  1.0509**  1.0298**  1.0131**  1.1895**  1.1879**  1.1651**  0.8435**  0.8025**  0.7953** 
Std. Err.  0.2030  0.1985  0.1946  0.2706  0.2668  0.2614  0.3111  0.3028  0.2976 
Z  5.18  5.19  5.21  4.40  4.45  4.46  2.71  2.65  2.67 
ij F3 coef. 
f  -0.9293*  -0.9665*  -0.9702*  -1.1662*  -1.2626*  -1.2630*  -0.5518  -0.5151  -0.5252 
Std. Err.  0.4553  0.4612  0.4628  0.5809  0.5925  0.5948  0.7372  0.7394  0.7416 
Z  -2.04  -2.10  -2.10  -2.01  -2.13  -2.12  -0.75  -0.70  -0.71 
LL  -132.22  -133.00  -133.22  -82.99  -83.25  -83.50  -48.86  -49.25  -49.24 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  38.08  36.52  36.07  28.95  28.43  27.92  9.88  9.10  9.12 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1259  0.1207  0.1192  0.1485  0.1458  0.1433  0.0918  0.0846  0.0847 
No. of horses  770  770  770  497  497  497  273  273  273 
No. of races  59  59  59  38  38  38  21  21  21 
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a c e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij F1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous race was won by the favourite; equals 0 otherwise.  
d 
ij F2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous two races were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise.  
f 
ij F3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous three races were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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UK Market 
Tests of impact of the favourites’ past performances on bettors’ estimates of the 
favourite’s winning probability in the next race in the UK market are discussed in this 
section.  Table  4.3.1-19  reports  the  estimates  of  CL  models  with  the  favourite’s 
performance in the previous one, two and three races as independent variables (namely, 
F1, F2 and F3). All the three variables are positive and significant at the 1% level. This 
indicates that for the UK market as a whole, the information that the previous one, two 
or three races have been won by the favourites increases the chance that the favourite 
wins the next race.  
Tables  4.3.1-20  (1-3)  summarise  the  estimates  of  CL  models  incorporating 
bettors’ subjective probability judgements and the performance of the favourite in the 
previous one, two and three races. The coefficients of F1, F2 and F3 are all negative and 
significant at the 5% level. Compared with the positive and significant coefficients of 
these  variables  in  models  without  odds  information,  these  results  may  suggest  that 
bettors in the UK market overestimate the impact of pervious favourites’ performance 
and  therefore  demonstrate  the  existence  of  anchoring  effects  on  these  pieces  of 
information.  
It should be noted that although the favourites are the horses with the highest 
winning  probabilities  in  their  races,  the  performance  of  the  favourite  in  one  race, 
however, should be less relevant to the performance of the favourite in the next race 
(because they are different horses). Therefore, anchoring on these pieces of information 
seems to be consistent with the demonstration of anchoring on irrelevant information in 
experimental studies (e.g., Brewer et al., 2007; Englich and Mussweiler, 2001; Englich 
et al., 2006; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Wilson et al., 1996). However, previous 
literature  also  suggests  that  individuals  anchor  not  only  on  irrelevant  but  also  on 
relevant information (e.g., Joyce and Biddle, 1981; Northcraft and Neale, 1987), and 
irrelevant or implausible information cause to a higher degree of adjustment (i.e., lower 
level of anchoring) whereas a higher level of anchoring on relevant information. This is 
not supported by the betting results in this study. The results of UK market seem to 
suggest that bettors in this market anchor on less relevant information rather than on 
more relevant information such as horses’ and jockeys’ past performance or the horse’s 
post-position.  
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Table 4.3.1-19 Results of estimating CL models with favourite’s past performance 
as independent variable in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week   
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
ij F1 coef. 
a  1.4003**  1.3458**  1.4184** 
Std. Err.  0.0216  0.0434  0.0249 
Z  64.94  31.02  57.07 
LL  -22260.49  -5662.63  -85414.81 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  3497.27  798.82  2700.56 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0728  0.0659  0.0156 
No. of horses  114,414  29,160  85,254 
No. of races  10,293  2,597  7,696 
ij F2 coef. 
b  1.3469**  1.2551**  1.3754** 
Std. Err.  0.0411  0.0852  0.0470 
Z  32.75  14.73  29.29 
LL  -6249.51  -1522.19  -4726.54 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  891.64  181.55  711.64 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0666  0.0563  0.0070 
No. of horses  31,885  7,770  24,115 
No. of races  2,879  6,92  2,187 
ij F3 coef. 
c  1.3932**  1.3458**  1.4076** 
Std. Err.  0.0677  0.1407  0.0772 
Z  20.58  9.56  18.23 
LL  -2254.69  -528.06  -1726.56 
Model LR (
2
1 χ )  350.81  76.31  274.64 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0722  0.0674  0.0737 
No. of horses  11,501  2,707  8,794 
No. of races  1,046  244  802 
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a 
ij F1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous race was won 
by the favourite; equals 0 otherwise.  
b 
ij F2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous two races 
were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise.  
c 
ij F3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous three races 
were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table  4.3.1-20(1)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability  judgements  and  the  favourite’s  past  performance  as  independent 
variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 1 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
a  1.2471**  1.2286**  1.2531** 
Std. Err.  0.0213  0.0427  0.0246 
Z  58.57  28.76  51.01 
ij F1 coef. 
b  -0.0649*  -0.0597  -0.0666 
Std. Err.  0.0300  0.0596  0.0347 
Z  -2.17  -1.00  -1.92 
LL  -20043.45  -5132.31  -14910.97 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  39191.20  1859.46  6072.23 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1684  0.1534  0.1692 
No. of horses  114,414  29,160  85,254 
No. of races  10,293  2,597  7,696 
 
a  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
b 
ij F1 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous race was won 
by the favourite; equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level. * Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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Table  4.3.1-20(2)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability  judgements  and  the  favourite’s  past  performance  as  independent 
variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 2 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
c  1.2857**  1.3023**  1.2800** 
Std. Err.  0.0412  0.0844  0.0472 
Z  31.22  15.42  27.14 
ij F2 coef. 
d  -0.1234*  -0.1892  -0.1022 
Std. Err.  0.0568  0.1153  0.0653 
Z  -2.17  -1.64  -1.57 
LL  -5616.13  -1369.59  -4246.29 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  2158.40  486.76  1672.14 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1612  0.1509  0.1645 
No. of horses  31,885  7,770  24,115 
No. of races  2,879  6,92  2,187 
 
c  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
d 
ij F2 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous two races 
were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise.  
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table  4.3.1-20(3)  Results  of  estimating  CL  models  with  bettors’  subjective 
probability  judgements  and  the  favourite’s  past  performance  as  independent 
variables in the UK market 
 
Day of the Week  Model 3 
Variable 
Whole Market 
Wnd  Wk 
s
ij p ln coef. 
e  1.3873**  1.2695**  1.4251** 
Std. Err.  0.0706  0.1412  0.0816 
Z  19.64  8.99  17.46 
ij F3 coef. 
f  -0.1914*  -0.1285  -0.2108 
Std. Err.  0.0949  0.1968  0.1084 
Z  -2.02  -0.65  -1.94 
LL  -1996.60  -475.63  -1520.45 
Model LR (
2
2 χ )  867.00  181.19  686.86 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1784  0.1600  0.1843 
No. of horses  11,501  2,707  8,794 
No. of races  1,046  244  802 
 
e  s
ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j.
 
f 
ij F3 : A dummy variable which equals 1 for the favourite if its previous three races 
were won by the favourites; equals 0 otherwise. 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.  
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.  
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4.3.1.6 Discussion of the Results Related to  Anchoring Factors and Strength of 
Anchors 
 
The  use  of  five  pieces  of  information  associated  with  horses’,  jockeys’  and 
trainers’  past  performances,  horses’  post-positions  and  previous  favourites’ 
performances  by  bettors  in  the  HK  and  UK  horserace  betting  markets  has  been 
discussed  in  the  above  sections.  The  results  demonstrate  the  existence  of  anchoring 
effects in these two markets, but not on most of these factors. This result is attributed to 
the lack of explicit comparisons between the anchoring factors and bettors’ subjective 
judgements. As suggested by the anchoring literature, basic anchoring effects may occur 
in  environments  where  no  explicit  comparisons  between  anchors  and  targets  are 
required (Wilson et al., 1996). However, such effect has been demonstrated to be fragile 
and easy to disappear due to the changes of anchors or targets (Brewer and Chapman, 
2002). In horserace betting environment, although bettors make subjective judgements 
on horse’s winning probability based on the information tested in this study, they are 
not  explicitly  asked  to  compare  such  information  to  their  final  estimates  of  horses’ 
winning chance. Consequently, the impact of these anchoring factors may not be strong 
enough to lead to anchoring effects and therefore are hard to observe. 
The  only  information  on  which  bettors  in  the HK  market  are  demonstrated  to 
anchor is the horse’s post-position at ST racetrack. In particular, bettors at ST tend to 
overestimate the low draw advantage of horse’s post-position whereas bettors at HV 
appear  to  underestimate  this  advantage.  This  difference  may  be  caused  by  the 
characteristics of HK races and the configurations of the two tracks. First, in HK, races 
at ST and HV are generally run in turn and bettors go to both tracks alternatively. If so, 
bettors’ perspectives of the impact of the track configuration on horses’ performance 
obtained at one track may be taken to the subsequent meetings run at the other track and 
consequently affect their judgements of the same information at the subsequent track. 
Second, in terms of the track configuration, both ST and HV racetracks are oval circuits 
and those horses with low post-position (run on the inside of the track) will be favoured. 
However, since the bends of HV (with a circumference of only 1454 meters and the 
radius  of  the  tightest  bend  is  91  meters)  are  tighter  than  those  at  ST  (with  a 
circumference of ST is 1933 meters and an equivalent radius of 158 meters), inside 
runners at HV should have more advantage. Therefore, bettors at ST may be affected by   207 
their perspective of low draw advantage that they observe from previous meetings at 
HV and hence take too much account of it. Similarly, bettors at HV may be affected by 
the lower level of low draw advantage that they observe at previous ST meetings and 
therefore underestimate it at HV. Note that when the market is considered as a whole, 
no significant anchoring effect is detected. This implies that a mis-specification of the 
market data may mask the truth and lead to misleading perspective of the effect.  
In  the  UK  market,  the  only  information  on  which  bettors  anchor  is  the 
performance  of  previous  favourite(s)  at  a  race  meeting.  The  significant  impact  of 
performance of the favourite in the last race on bettors’ subjective judgements of the 
winning  chance  of  the  favourite  in  the  current  race  supports  the  anchoring  factor 
hypothesis.  Moreover,  the  strength  hypothesis  is  supported  by  significant  effect  of 
anchoring on the favourites’ performance in previous two and three races. It might be 
asked that why bettors in this market tend to anchor on less relevant information (such 
as previous favourites’  performance) but not on more  relevant information (such  as 
horses’  past  performance,  or  post-position).  There  are  several  reasons  which  may 
explain this phenomenon. First, the judgemental procedure in horserace betting is often 
associated with information or perspectives which are generated or achieved by bettors 
themselves.  As  suggested  by  the  previous  literature,  self-generated  anchors  have  a 
stronger impact on individuals’ absolute judgements than externally provided anchors 
(e.g., Davies, 1997; Mussweiler and Neumann, 2000; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999b, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). For example, when bettors have noticed that previous 
three  races  are  all  won  by  the  favourites  at  a  race  meeting,  they  may  generate  a 
perspective that this information is important and may affect the performance of the 
favourite in the next race. Therefore, they tend to anchor their judgements on this self-
generated piece of information. Second, the previous favourites’ performance is a piece 
of vivid information which can be easily retrieved from observation. This increases the 
accessibility  of  the  favourite’s  performance  information  in  bettors’  judgements  and 
hence  makes  it  more  likely  to  be  anchored  on  (e.g.,  Mussweiler,  1997;  Strack  and 
Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 1999b). Finally, the races concerning 
previous favourites’ performance are from the same meeting whereas races concerning 
horses’, jockeys’ or trainers’ past performances can be in any previous meeting. Again, 
the fresh and vivid information of favourites’ previous information at the same meeting 
increases its probability to act as an anchor value. This is consistent with the model of   208 
selective  accessibility  of  particular  information  (e.g.,  Mussweiler,  1997;  Strack  and 
Mussweiler,  1997;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999a,  1999b).  Therefore,  although  the 
favourite related information is considered less relevant to horse’s chance of winning 
compared to other relevant information, bettors still appear to anchor on this piece of 
information but not on others.  
In summary, the anchoring factor hypothesis is not widely supported in these two 
markets according to the factors tested in this study. The strength hypothesis is also 
rejected on most of the factors because tests associated with outcomes of previous two 
and three races do not find significant anchoring effects except pervious favourite’s 
performance.  Consequently,  bettors  in  these  two  markets  seem  to  incorporate  the 
information appropriately and do not over- or underestimate its impact when making 
judgements on horses’ winning probabilities. However, some information, namely, the 
post-position at ST racetrack in HK and favourites’ previous performance in the UK, 
does  lead  to  a  strong  effect  of  anchoring  due  to  the  higher  accessibility  of  this 
information.  Finally,  the  mis-specification  of  data  should  be  paid  attention  so  as  to 
misunderstanding of the results.  
 
4.3.2 Hypothesis Tests for Research Question Two 
 
The  second  research  question  of  this  study  is  to  ask  whether  the  degree  of 
anchoring is affected by the level of expertise of decision makers. Experimental studies 
suggest that decision makers with greater expertise are less likely to anchor or to be 
subject to a lower degree of anchoring (e.g., Bonner, 1990; Mussweiler and Strack, 
2000;  Northcraft  and  Neale,  1987).  It  is  supposed  that  this  result  also  applies  to 
naturalistic environments such as horserace betting markets.  
The  hypothesis  formulated  to  answer  this  question  is  that  bettors  with  greater 
expertise in horserace betting will be subject to a lower degree of anchoring than bettors 
with less expertise. As suggested by the previous literature (Kopelman and Minkin, 
1991; Saunders and Turner, 1997), bettors who generally bet on weekday races have 
more knowledge and experience in betting than those who bet merely on the weekend 
races. Consequently, the whole market data are split into two parts, races run on the 
weekdays  and  races  run  at  the  weekends,  to  explore  potential  anchoring  effects.  In 
addition, the literature (e.g., Benter, 1994) also suggests that bettors with more betting   209 
expertise are likely to bet late in order to avoid being followed by other market players. 
Therefore, odds at different times before the race starts are considered to incorporate the 
judgements of bettors with different levels of expertise: the earlier the odds are, the less 
experience and expertise the bettors have. Consequently, market odds at different times 
(final odds, the odds at 2 and 5 minutes before the race starts
26) are employed to test the 
expertise hypothesis. 
The results of the hypothesis testing on bettors’ expertise are displayed and are 
analysed  in  this  section  based  on  the  tables  displayed  in  Section  4.3.1.  Besides  the 
comparisons between the weekday and weekend races in each market, tests using odds 
at 2 and 5 minutes before the race are conducted in the HK markets. A summary of the 
findings will be provided in the last part of the section.  
 
4.3.2.1 Horse’s Past Performance 
 
HK Market 
The  results  related  to  an  examination  of  the  extent  to  which  professional  and 
casual  bettors  in  the  HK  anchor  their  subjective  judgements  of  horses’  winning 
probabilities  on  horses’  past  performances  are  reported  in  Table  4.3.1-1  and  Tables 
4.3.1-2(1-3). The positive and significant coefficients of variables H1, H2 and H3 for 
weekday and weekend races (see Table 4.3.1) indicate that a horse’s performance in its 
previous one, two and three races has a significant impact on the performance of the 
horse in a subsequent race.  
When the final odds information is added into the model (see Tables 4.3.1-2(1-3)), 
the horses’ performance variables (H1, H2 and H3) turn out to be insignificant for races 
run on weekdays and over the weekends. This seems to indicate that both weekday and 
weekend  bettors  fully  account  for  a  horse’s  past  performance  information  when 
estimating  the  winning  probability  of  the  horse.  No  particular  anchoring  effects  on 
horses’  past  performances  are  detected,  no  matter  what  bettors’  knowledge  and 
experience about the horserace betting are.  
In addition, the results relating to bettors’ subjective judgements at different times 
before the race starts show that bettors with different levels of expertise do experience 
                                                 
26 Note that the information of odds at 2 and 5 minutes before the race starts is only available in the HK 
market. In the UK market only final odds information is available due to the data accessibility.    210 
differences  in  estimating  horses’  winning  probabilities.  Take  the  variable  H1  in  the 
whole market as an example. The results show that the significance level of H1 changes 
in these three models along with the time at which the odds are taken: the earlier the 
odds are made, the higher level of the significance of the coefficient of H1. In other 
words, casual bettors tend to underestimate the impact of horses’ last performance in 
their judgements, whereas this bias is corrected by expert bettors who enter the market 
in the last few minutes. These results seem to confirm the belief that bettors with more 
expertise bet late and their bets correctly adjust the estimates of more casual bettors and 
therefore accurately incorporate horses’ past performance in odds. However, because 
none of these models provides evidence of anchoring on information H1 in this market, 
it cannot be concluded that expert bettors are subject to lower level of anchoring than 
casual bettors.  
Note that the information that a horse has continuously won its previous two or 
three races has been fully accounted in odds (whether these are early or late odds). This 
may suggest that when a horse has achieved a sequence of winning (two or three races), 
casual bettors are able to incorporate this information into their subjective judgements 
properly.  No  anchoring  effects  are  detected  on  these  pieces  of  information,  and 
therefore,  whether  expert  bettors  are  subject  to  lower  level  of  anchoring  cannot  be 
concluded.  
 
UK Market 
Whether  bettors  with  more  expertise  in  the  UK  horserace  betting  markets  are 
subject  to  lower  level  of  anchoring  on  the  horse’s  past  performance  information  is 
reported in this section.  
As suggested in Table 4.3.1-3, variables of a horse’s performance in its pervious 
one, two and three races are found significant at the 1% level with positive coefficients, 
for both weekday and weekend races. When the final odds information is involved into 
the model, the coefficients of H1, H2 and H3 all turn to insignificant (see Tables 4.3.1-
4(1-3)).  Therefore,  both  experts  and  non-experts  in  this  market  do  not  anchor  their 
judgements on horses’ past performance information.  
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4.3.2.2 Jockey’s Past Performance 
 
HK Market 
As shown in Table 4.3.1-5, the impact of a jockey’s performance in his/her last 
race (J1) on the probability of the horse ridden by this jockey winning a subsequent race 
is significant (at the 5% level) for races run on the weekdays and weekends. However, 
variables J2 and J3 are not significant, which may be explained by the ‘regression to the 
mean’ effect (see Section 4.3.1.2).  
In  models  associated  with  bettors’  subjective  judgements  (final  odds  implied 
probabilities) and jockeys’ past performances, the coefficients of J1, J2 and J3 are all 
insignificant for both races run on the weekdays and weekends (see Tables 4.3.1-6(1-3)). 
The  quality  of  judgements  of  bettors  with  different  levels  of  expertise  cannot  be 
distinguished, according to the days on which they place their bets; both expert and non-
expert bettors seem to incorporate jockeys’ past performance information properly in 
their judgements without over- or under-estimations. Similarly, the coefficients of J2 
and J3 for the weekday and weekend races are all negative but insignificant, indicating 
that all the bettors tend to pay attention to these pieces of information but manage not to 
over-weight their impacts. Consequently, both expert and non-expert bettors are not 
found to anchor their judgements on jockeys’ past performances.  
In addition, no significant differences are demonstrated between judgements of 
bettors who bet early and who bet late: the coefficients of anchoring variables (J1, J2 
and J3) are all insignificant in models with bettors’ subjective judgements at different 
times (see Tables 4.3.1-6(1-3)). Therefore, both expert and casual bettors in the HK 
market seem to pay appropriate attention to jockeys’ past performance information.   
 
UK Market 
Jockeys’  past  performance  in  their  previous  one,  two  and  three  races  are  all 
significant at the 1% level in models with jockeys’ performance related variables only, 
for the weekday races and weekend races (see Table 4.3.1-7). When bettors’ subjective 
judgements are incorporated into the models, jockeys’ performance in their past one and 
two races appear to be fully accounted in odds, for the market as a whole as well as for 
the weekday and weekend races separately (see Tables 4.3.1-8(1-2)). Therefore, both   212 
expert and non-expert bettors do not anchor their judgements on these two pieces of 
information associated with jockeys’ past performances.  
The  results  of  J3  in  models  for  the  weekday  and  weekend  races  are  slightly 
different. As shown in Table 4.3.1-8(3), the coefficient of variable J3 in the model for 
weekday races is negative and significant at the 5% level (coef. = -0.2970; Z = -2.08). 
This  may  suggest  that  a  jockey’s  ability  in  helping  a  horse  to  win  a  race  is 
overestimated  by  bettors  who  bet  on  weekday  races,  if  this  jockey  has  won  his/her 
previous three races. In the contrast, bettors who bet on the weekend races seem to 
account for this piece of information properly in the final odds. This result contradicts 
the expertise hypothesis which suggests that expert bettors are less likely to conduct 
anchoring on certain piece of information. In particular, the results indicate that expert 
bettors  anchor  their  judgements  on  the  information  of  a  jockey’s  past  performance, 
when s/he has won his/her previous three races. In other words, the information that a 
jockey has won his/her previous three races is so vivid that expert bettors (i.e., those 
who have more time and knowledge to study the betting information) appear to anchor 
on such information.  
 
4.3.2.3 Trainer’s Past Performance 
 
HK Market 
The results in Table 4.3.1-9 provide a confusing image of the impact of trainers’ 
past  performances.  Variables  T1,  T2,  and  T3  have  a  decreasing  impact  on  the 
performance of the horse trained by the same trainer for weekday races (from 1% to 5% 
to insignificant).  However, for weekend  races, the significance levels of these three 
variables are 1%, insignificant and 5% level.  
When bettors’ subjective judgements (measured by final odds) are included into 
the models (see Tables 4.3.1-10(1-3)), the coefficients of T1, T2 and T3 for races run on 
the  weekdays  and  weekends  are  all  insignificant.  This  indicates  that  trainers’  past 
performances  have  been  fully  accounted  by  both  expert  and  non-expert  bettors. 
Therefore, both groups of bettors do not over- or underestimate the impact of trainers’ 
performance information in their judgements.  
Models involving bettors’ subjective judgements at different times throughout the 
betting  market,  suggest  that  expert  and  non-expert  bettors  handle  trainers’  past   213 
performance information appropriately. Consequently, no anchoring effects are detected 
on the trainer’s past performances, for both expert and non-expert bettors.  
 
UK Market 
In the UK market, trainers’ past performance information has a significant impact 
on horses’ performance. As shown in Table 4.3.1-11, coefficients of variables T1, T2 
and T3 are all significant at the 1% level, for both weekday and weekend races. When 
the  final  odds  information  is  included  in  the  models  (see  Tables  4.3.1-12(1-3)),  the 
coefficients of T1 remain significant (but at a 5% level) for weekday races and for the 
market  as  a  whole.  However,  it  becomes  insignificant  for  the  races  run  over  the 
weekends. This seems to suggest that casual bettors (i.e., those who bet on weekend 
races) are able to incorporate trainers’ last performance information appropriately in 
their judgements whereas expert bettors tend to underestimate the value of this piece of 
information. Clearly, this result is in contrast with the expertise hypothesis. However, 
the  results  suggest  that  neither  expert  nor  casual  bettors  anchor  on  information 
associated with trainers’ past performances.  
 
4.3.2.4 Post-position of the Horse 
 
HK Market 
Differences in the extent to which expert and non-expert bettors in the HK market 
anchor on a horse’s post-position are explore using odds on offer at different times 
throughout the betting market. The races run at HV and ST racetracks are examined 
separately.  
 
(1) Anchoring on the Information of the Current Race 
As shown in Table 4.3.1-13, a horse’s post-position is highly significant at both 
HV and ST racetracks in determining a horse’s winning probability. At both racetracks, 
horses with low post-positions are favoured, as suggested by a negative but significant 
coefficient of PP. When the final odds information is added in the model, the results 
suggest that the betting public underestimate horses’ post-position information at HV 
racetrack and overestimate it at ST racetrack, as discussed in Section 4.3.1.4 (see Table 
4.3.14(1)).  In  addition,  the  results  of  models  associated  with  2  and  5  minutes  odds   214 
provide a similar picture as models with final odds (see Table 4.3.1-14(1)). Therefore, 
both expert and non-expert bettors anchor their judgements on horse’s post-position 
information at ST but underestimate this information at HV. The hypothesis that bettors 
with greater expertise are subject to a lower level of anchoring on the post-position 
information cannot be confirmed in relation to the HK market.  
 
(2) Anchoring on the Information of the Previous Race 
For races at HV and ST racetracks as well as the HK market as a whole, none of 
the previous winners’ post-position information (WP1, WP2, and WP3) has significant 
impact on the performance of the subsequent horse starting from the same position. 
When bettors’ subjective judgements at different times (implied by final odds, 2 and 5 
minutes odds) are included into the models, the results indicate that bettors have fully 
accounted  for  previous  winners’  post-position  information  in  their  judgements  (see 
Tables 4.3.1-14(1-3)). Once again this suggests that bettors in the HK horserace betting 
market, regardless of their level of expertise, do no anchor on the winning post-position 
for the previous race.  
 
UK Market 
As  suggested  in  Section  4.3.1.4,  bettors  in  the  UK  market  underestimate  (not 
overestimate) the impact of a horse’s post-position information on the horse’s winning 
probability  when  making  judgements,  when  the  racetracks  with  high/low  draw 
advantages  are  considered  separately.  Bettors  are  found  to  anchor  their  subjective 
judgements  on  the  independent  variable  WP1,  at  racetracks  with  high  position 
advantage, but no such anchoring is found at the racetracks with low draw advantage. 
However, because only final odds information is available at the UK horserace betting 
market,  the  degree  of  anchoring  between  expert  and  non-expert  bettors  cannot  be 
examined in this market.  
 
4.3.2.5 Performance of Previous Favourite 
 
HK Market 
Results displayed in Table 4.3.1-17 and Tables 4.3.1-18(1-3) show that bettors 
anchor  their  subjective  judgements  of  favourite  horses’  winning  a  race  on  the   215 
performance of the favourites in the last three races at a race meeting over the weekends. 
This is suggested by an insignificant coefficient of F3 in the model with out odds but a 
negative but significant (at the 5% level) coefficient of F3 in models with odds in. This 
suggests that when non-expert bettors notice that continuous three races are won by the 
favourites, they tend to overestimate the probability of the next favourite horse winning 
the race. In this situation, they forget that previous favourite horse’s performance is 
actually less relevant to the performance of the favourite horse in the next race. Bettors 
who  bet  on  the  weekend  races  are  not  found  to  anchor  on  this  or  other  piece  of 
information concerning favourite horses’ past performance.  
However,  the  results  of  models  concerning  odds  at  different  times  show  no 
difference in the way that expert and non-expert bettors incorporate the information of 
the favourites’ performance in the previous three races.  
 
UK Market 
Table  4.3.1-19  and  Tables  4.3.1-20(1-3)  show  that  although  favourite  horse’s 
performances  in  the  past  one,  two  and  three  races  have  significant  impacts  on  the 
favourite horse’s performance in the next race, bettors are not found to anchor their 
judgements  of  the  favourite  horse  winning  on  these  pieces  of  information.  The 
coefficients of the independent variables F1, F2 and F3 are all insignificant when races 
run on the weekdays and over the weekends are considered separately, indicating that 
both expert and non-expert bettors are able to fully incorporate the influence of the 
favourite’s performance in the previous one, two and three races. Note that these results 
are inconsistent with those of models when the market is considered as a whole (see 
discussion  in  Section  4.3.1.5).  Therefore,  another  evidence  of  mis-specification  of 
market data has been demonstrated.  
 
4.3.2.6 Discussion of the Results Related to Bettors’ Expertise 
 
The results exploring the extent to which bettors with different levels of expertise 
in the HK and UK horserace betting markets anchor their subjective judgements of 
horses’  winning  probabilities  on  horses’,  jockeys’  and  trainers’  past  performances, 
horses’  post-positions  and  favourites  horses’  past  performances  are  reported  in  the 
previous sections. Given the strong evidence, in previous laboratory and field studies   216 
(e.g., Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; Mussweiler and Strack, 2000b; Northcraft and 
Neale, 1987; Wilson, et al., 1996), of the use of decision makers’ expertise in reducing 
the effect of anchoring observed, bettors with more expertise in the horserace betting 
market are expected to be accounted with a lower level of anchoring. However, the tests 
conducted in these markets provide conflicting results on different factors and therefore 
do not entirely support this hypothesis. 
First, expert bettors’ judgements on the information on which anchoring effects 
have been demonstrated may be or may not be the same as those of not-expert bettors. 
For example, for the horse’s post-position information in the HK market, bettors have 
been  demonstrated  to  anchor  their  judgements  on  this  piece  of  information  at  ST 
whereas underestimate its importance at HV in HK. When the market odds 2 and 5 
minutes before that race starts are included into the CL models, the results are similar to 
those of models with final odds information, for both races at ST and at HV. This seems 
to indicate that both expert and casual bettors incorporate the horse’s post-position in 
the same way (i.e., overestimate its impact at ST and underestimate its impact at HV). 
However, when concerning the performance of the favourites’ previous three races (F3), 
bettors who bet on weekend races (casual bettors) show a significant anchoring effect 
on this piece of information whereas those who bet on weekday races (expert bettors) 
appear to fully account for this information. This may suggest that expert bettors are 
better at incorporating information than casual bettors. Finally, UK bettors who bet on 
weekday  races (experts) are demonstrated to  anchor their judgements on a jockey’s 
performance in his/her previous three races (J3) whereas those who bet on weekends do 
not appear to anchor on this piece of information. This may suggest that expert bettors 
in this market perform worse than casual bettors when concerning particular anchoring 
information. 
Second,  the  previous  favourites’  performance  information  in  the  UK  market 
provides an interesting result. In particular, the strong impact of anchoring on these 
pieces of information (implied by variables F1, F2, and F3) is demonstrated when the 
market is considered as a whole. However, when the whole dataset is split into two 
groups including weekday and weekend races, these factors are still significant at the 
1% level in models without odds, but turn to be insignificant in models with final odds 
in. This indicates that when consider the races run on weekdays and over the weekends 
separately, bettors seem to fully account for the favourite(s)’ performance(s) in previous   217 
race(s) and do not appear to anchor on any of these pieces of information. Similar as the 
horse’s post-position information in the HK market, this is another example of the effect 
of mis-specification of market data. Even so, no evidence has shown that expert bettors 
are subject to a lower level of anchoring than casual bettors.  
Third, for the information on which anchoring effects are not demonstrated, tests 
in  the  HK  and  UK  markets  also  provide  inconsistent  results.  For  example,  when 
considering the HK market as a whole, casual bettors seem to underestimate the impact 
of horse’s last performance (H1) in their judgements: the earlier the bets are placed, the 
higher the level of the under-estimation of their probability judgements. This suggests 
that  bettors  who  bet  late  (experts)  are  better  at  incorporating  the  horse’s  last 
performance information than those who bet early (non-experts).  However, in some 
other occasions, professional bettors appear to perform worse than casual bettors. For 
example, experts in the UK market turn to anchor on the performance of a jockey’s 
pervious  three  races  (J3)  whereas  casual  bettors  fully  account  for  this  information. 
Expert bettors in the UK are also found to underestimate the impact of a trainer’s last 
performance (T1) on horse’s winning probability whereas casual bettors incorporate this 
information properly.  
Taken  together,  the  results  associated  with  the  examination  of  the  impact  of 
bettors’ expertise on their subjective judgements do not support the expertise hypothesis 
developed in Chapter 3. The impacts of bettors’ expertise on their judgement accuracy 
are  complex.  Clearly,  this  is  not  in  line  with  the  findings  of  previous  anchoring 
literature which suggest that experts are less likely to encounter anchoring effects or are 
subject to a lower level of anchoring than navies (e.g., Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; 
Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Wilson et al., 1996).  
 
4.3.3 Hypothesis Tests for Research Question Three 
 
The third research question, to what extent the degree of anchoring in the real 
world is affected by different environments or markets in which decisions are made, is 
answered  in  this  section  by  comparing  the  results  of  tests  for  the  previous  four 
hypotheses in the HK and UK markets.  
The discussion in Section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 suggests that only limited anchoring 
effects are detected in the HK and the UK horserace betting markets. However, the   218 
results suggest that judgements of bettors in the HK and UK horserace betting markets 
are  different  in  two  aspects.  First,  bettors  in  these  two  markets  anchor  on  different 
factors.  For  example,  bettors  at  the  ST  racetrack  in  HK  anchor  their  subjective 
judgements  on  the  horse’s  post-position,  due  to  general  low  draw  advantage  of  the 
racetrack. In the UK, bettors do not anchor their judgements on the horse’s post-position 
information, no matter whether the racetracks have a high or low draw advantage, but 
appear to anchor on the favourite’ performance in previous one, two and three races, 
when the market is considered as a whole. This anchoring effect is eliminated when the 
market data is split into two groups (the weekday and weekend races). No anchoring 
effects are found on the other factors in either HK or UK markets.  
Second, factors which are not fully accounted for in odds are not consistent in the 
two markets. For example, bettors in the HK market seem to fully account for all the 
anchoring  factors  tested  in  this  study,  expect  the  overestimate  of  the  horse’s  post-
position information at ST racetrack. However, bettors in the UK markets have been 
demonstrated to underestimate the impact of the trainer’s performance in his/her last 
race (T1) for the whole market as well as for the weekday races (both significant at the 
5% level). Similarly, the impact of the winner’s post-position in the previous race (WP1) 
is underestimated for the whole market and the races at tracks with low draw advantage 
(both significant at the 5% level). Other information is all fully accounted.  
There might be three reasons to explain these differences between the two markets. 
First, the reason why anchoring effects occur on horse’s post-position information in 
HK rather than in the UK may be due to the differences between track configuration 
(e.g., short/long oval racetracks with sharp/modest bends) or other racetrack topography 
(e.g., faster/slower ground on the inside/outside of the track) in the two markets. For 
example, the racetracks in HK, the HV and ST racetracks, are both oval circuits and the 
track configuration suggests that those horses with post-positions on the inside of the 
track (low PPs) will be favoured, since they will be required to run less distance. HV 
has a circumference of only 1454 meters, whereas the circumference of ST is 1933 
meters. The bends at HV are therefore tighter than those at ST; the tightest bend at HV 
having a radius of only 91 meters, whereas the equivalent bend at ST has a radius of 
158 meters. Consequently, the configuration of both these tracks suggests that horses 
with a low PP will be favoured and more so at HV (Schnytzer, Liu, and Johnson, 2008). 
Although the comparisons between the two tracks indicate a larger advantage of low   219 
post-position at HV, results show that bettors anchor their subjective judgements on 
horses’ post-positions at ST racetrack. This might be that bettors in assessing the post-
position  advantage  at  ST  may  be  unduly  influenced  by  the  results  of  the  previous 
meeting run at HV earlier in the market. Therefore, bettors appear to over-weight the 
impact of low post-position of horses at ST and anchor on it. In contrast, the impact of 
horse’s post-position on the horse’s running performance has been fully accounted for 
by bettors in the UK market. This may be due to the larger variety of racetracks in the 
UK market than the tracks in the HK market, in terms of the track configuration and 
other topographies. For example, the number of racetracks in the UK (38 flat racetracks 
in the database) is much greater than that in HK (only two racetracks). Consequently, no 
clear trend or evidence of anchoring effects on horses’ post-position information in the 
UK market is detected.  
Second,  the  reason  why  bettors  in  the  UK  market  anchor  their  subjective 
judgements on less relevant information of pervious favourites’ performance has been 
discussed in Section 4.3.1.6. In particular, a self-generated judgemental procedure may 
strengthen  the  impact  of  this  piece  of  information  on  bettors’  judgements  because 
previous  literature  has  suggested  that  self-generated  anchors  have  more  impacts  on 
individuals’  judgements  than  externally  provided  anchors  (e.g.,  Davies,  1997; 
Mussweiler  and  Neumann,  2000;  Mussweiler  and  Strack,  1999b,  Tversky  and 
Kahneman,  1974).  In  addition,  the  previous  favourites  considered  in  this  study  are 
associated with races run at the same meeting. Obviously, such information is more 
vivid  and  easier  to  be  retrieved  by  the  betting  public  than  the  information  which 
occurred  in  previous  meetings.  This  effect  can  be  supported  by  the  selective 
accessibility  model  in  explaining  the  underlying  mechanism  of  anchoring  (e.g., 
Mussweiler, 1997; Strack and Mussweiler, 1997; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999a, 1999b). 
That is, a piece of information which is easy to be assessed will provide an increasing 
knowledge about such information to bettors and bettors are therefore more likely to 
pay attention to this information and anchor their judgements on it.  
However, if this is the case, one may argue that why bettors in the HK market do 
not anchor on the previous favourite’s performance which is demonstrated to be refresh 
and vivid. This might be explained by the differences of market characteristics and 
market  efficiency  between  the  two  markets.  These  differences  can  also  be  used  to 
explain why bettors in the HK market are able to fully account for more pieces of   220 
information than bettors in the UK market (related to the second difference between 
these two markets, presented above). First, the betting volume for each race in the HK 
market is much greater than that for UK races. This may indicate that HK market is 
more  efficient  than  the  UK  market  and  hence  bettors  in  HK  are  able  to  better 
incorporate the publicly available information than those in the UK. Second, the betting 
public  in  the  HK  market  has  been  widely-spread  in  all  over  the  world.  This  world 
generalisation of bettors may attract more professional bettors to bet in the HK market 
and in return, the market efficiency in HK is increased. Third, the number of runners in 
each race in the HK market ranges from 5 to 14, whereas this number in the UK market 
varies  from  2  to  38  in  each  race.  Consequently,  a  large  variety  of  races  and  track 
conditions in the UK reduce the efficiency of bettors’ information incorporation in this 
market. Therefore, bettors in the UK are less likely to fully account for the information 
and more likely to over- or underestimate it.  
In summary, the similarities and distinctions between the results of HK and UK 
horserace betting data show that the anchoring effects in a real world environment are 
far more complicated than what has been revealed by laboratory-based research. There 
is no clear trend or hint indicating that bettors in certain markets or market segments 
anchor their subjective judgements on certain pieces of information on horserace betting. 
Bettors  in  different  markets  show  their  own  characteristics  in  decision  making  and 
information handling when faced with the same type information. In terms of the tests 
employed  and  analysed  in  this  study,  the  theory  of  anchoring  developed  from  the 
laboratory experiments is not strongly and systematically supported in either of these 
two markets in the real world.  
It appears that factors which have not yet been incorporated in the previous studies, 
such as the cultural differences of decision makers and the complexity of decision tasks, 
may affect the degree of anchoring which occur in real world environments. However, 
the cultural differences between these two markets are difficult to measure. Generally, 
the markets selected to explore cultural differences should be either equal in the market 
size  or  identical  in  the products  examined  by  the  decision  makers.  Due  to  the  data 
limitation, the two markets explored in this study are in low similarities and therefore, 
further  research  is  required  to  explore  the  cultural  differences  in  horserace  betting 
markets.  
   221 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, a summary of main findings of empirical tests are highlighted in 
section 4.4.1 and implications of the study are discussed in section 4.4.2.  
 
4.4.1 Main Findings of the Study 
 
This chapter provides the empirical evidence of anchoring effects developed in a 
real  world  decision  making  environment  –  the  horserace  betting  market.  The  main 
findings of hypothesis tests using the HK and UK horserace betting market data are 
described as follows:  
First,  bettors  in  the  HK  and  UK  horserace  betting  markets  are  found  to 
appropriately  incorporate  available  information  into  their  subjective  judgements, 
implied by the market odds, of horses winning a race. The five groups of information 
selected to conduct hypothesis tests are considered fairly important in estimating the 
winning probabilities of horses. However, bettors in both two markets are not detected 
to  significantly  anchor  their  judgements  on  these  core  factors.  Only  two  pieces  of 
information are associated with a weak anchoring effect: that is when the same outcome 
occurs  three  times  (jockeys’  past  performances  for  weekday  races  in  the  UK  and 
favourite horses’ past performance for weekend races in HK). However, the anchoring 
detected on these two pieces of information is not strong (significant at the 5% level), 
and, consequently, these results cannot support a highly significant anchoring effect in 
this real world environment. The only factor which may attract too much attention of 
bettors is the post-position information of horses at ST racetrack in HK. Similar effects 
of anchoring do not occur on low position horses at the other racetrack in the same 
market, HV. Consequently, from the whole markets’ point of view, anchoring effect is 
not a phenomenon which appears to exist widely in horserace betting markets.  
Second,  to  some  extent,  the  number  of  times  that  a  piece  of  information  is 
repeated  influences  the  degree  of  attention  paid  by  bettors.  The  more  times  that  a 
phenomenon occurs, the more likely bettors are to over-weight this piece of information. 
This only applies to certain information such as jockeys’ past performance in the UK 
market  and  favourite  horses’  past  performance  in  HK.  For  other  information,  no   222 
significance difference is observed between bettors’ judgements on one race and on two 
or three similar races.  
Third, the results demonstrated that expert bettors in these two markets are able to 
better incorporate some information than the non-expert bettors. However, there is little 
evidence  that  expert  bettors  are  subject  lower  levels  of  anchoring.  Comparisons  of 
results between weekday and weekend races show that for some information, bettors 
with more expertise and experience (those who bet on weekday races) are able to better 
use some of the information than the non-experts who usually bet on the weekends. 
Similarly, the models associated with odds at different times indicate that early odds 
contain less accurate information about the horses’ winning chance; casual bettors who 
often bet early tend to over or underestimate the value of certain pieces of information 
than those who bet late. Note that for some information, such as horses’ and trainers’ 
past performances, both casual bettors and expert bettors are able to fully account for in 
their judgements. However, anchoring only appears to arise in relation to a few pieces 
of  information,  and  even  so  the  significance  levels  are  not  high.  Consequently,  the 
results do not support a general conclusion that expert bettors in these two markets are 
less likely to be subject to anchoring and more casual bettors to anchoring. Further 
studies are needed to explore this.  
Consequently, a number of conclusions emerge from the study:  
First, the caution must be exercised when anchoring effects are examined in a real 
world  environment,  since  mis-specification  of  the  problem  can  easily  occur  by 
combining data inappropriately. For example, in this study, no anchoring effects are 
observed on the post-position information of horses in HK when the market data is 
analysed as a whole. However, when the whole market data are split into two datasets 
according to the racetracks, bettors are found to anchor their subjective judgements on 
horses’  post-position  information  at  ST  racetrack,  but  not  do  so  at  HV.  The  false 
conclusion  of  ‘no  anchoring’  arose  because  bettors,  when  making  their  probability 
judgements, under-valued the advantage of a low post-position at one track and over-
valued it at another. Therefore, the effects of anchoring at one track were ‘cancelled out’ 
by the underestimates of information at another track and theses effects were masked 
when examining the market as a whole.  
Second, tests conducted in this study demonstrate that anchoring in real world 
environments is a complex phenomenon. For example, bettors in the UK market do not   223 
anchor their judgements on jockeys’ performances in their last race, whilst they tend to 
anchor on the jockey’s performance information when the success of the jockey was 
repeated  in  a  series  of  races.  For  anchoring  to  be  observed  in  this  real  world 
environment, it appears to require a strong stimulus to attract bettors’ attention (see 
Section 4.3.1). Although this confirms the strength hypothesis, similar phenomena are 
not found on many other factors. This may suggest that for most public information, 
bettors have realised the impact of a series of racing outcomes and are able to fully 
account  for  this  information  in  their  judgements.  However,  note  that  the  anchoring 
detected in this study only appears on certain pieces of information for certain races 
(e.g., jockeys’ past performances in their last three races for the weekday races in the 
UK). No strong evidence shows that the influence of a race series is significant on all of 
the key factors detected in this study. 
Third,  the  results  do  not  show  very  clear  and  strong  evidence  to  support  the 
hypothesis that UK bettors with greater expertise will display lower anchoring effects, 
whereas  bettors  in  the  HK  market  with  greater  expertise  use  information  more 
appropriately  and  are  less  prone  to  anchoring  effects.  This  might  be  caused  by  the 
characteristics of the market and bettors in these two markets. In the UK, the market 
information is much more than that in HK because a large number of racetracks with 
high variety make it far more complicated to incorporate the information of each race; 
the starting price employed in this study is not the only odds information in this market. 
In contrast, the HK market is highly concentrated and there is less variety due to the 
large betting volume and high similarity between the two tracks; more highly skilled 
bettors are involved in this market due to the simplicity of the market and of the betting 
system. However, whilst this is true for anchoring based on a recent series of previous 
races, no differences were detected between those with greater and less expertise in 
terms of the degree to which they anchor on the results of the last race encountered. 
This, to some extent, accords with expectations in betting markets, since expert bettors 
are  widely  regarded  as  being  distinguished  from  those  with  less  expertise  by  the 
considerable  resources  they  spend  in  overcoming  the  complexity  of  analyzing  the 
outcomes of previous series of races (Benter, 1994).  
In summary, this study presents evidence of subtle, complex anchoring effects in a 
real world environment. Most previous anchoring studies have been conducted in the 
laboratory on individuals. An important feature of the current study is that it examines   224 
behaviour in a financial market. In many ways one might expect markets to eliminate 
individual anchoring effects, as some individuals seek to exploit the biases of others. 
The  odds,  reflecting  the  betting  behaviours  of  those  subject  to  the  biases  and  the 
behaviours of those who seek to capitalize on the biases, should, in theory, be driven to 
a  point  where  no  bias  exists.  Remarkably,  it  is  determined  that  these  markets  still 
exhibit  the  effects  of  anchoring.  Clearly,  the  anchoring  effects  observed  here  are 
complex and more research is needed to identify the factors which influence the degree 
and nature of anchoring in real world contexts.  
 
4.4.2 Implications of the Study 
 
The  implications  of  the  tests  explored  and  analysed  in  this  chapter  lie  in  the 
complexity  of  the  anchoring  effect  displayed  in  a  real  world  decision  making 
environment – the horserace betting market.  
Firstly, anchoring effects detected on certain pieces of information such as horses’ 
post-positions at ST racetrack and favourites’ performances in the previous three races 
in the HK market indicate that some information in this market has not been properly 
used and there are some chances of making profits if aware of these biases. A strategy 
which can be used in this speculative financial market to make abnormal returns is to 
find out in what circumstances what information is overestimated (anchored) by the 
betting public and therefore try to avoid these circumstances and bet on alterative horses. 
For example, since the results in this study show that bettors over-bet the horses with 
low draw positions at ST racetrack in HK, to bet on horses with high draw positions at 
this  track  will  be  a  good  strategy  to  obtain  abnormal  returns.  Another  example  of 
anchoring is the ‘hot hand’ effect demonstrated on previous favourites’ performances. 
Bettors are found to anchor their subjective probability judgements on the next favourite 
if previous three races are all won by the favourites. Therefore, to bet on non-favourites 
after a series of favourites winning will have a higher chance of making profits. This 
strategy can also be generalised to other speculative financial markets. For example, if 
financial investors are found to overestimate the probability that a company produces 
high earnings in a financial year after a series of high earnings in previous years, it will 
be a good strategy to not to invest in this company or to reduce the investment in this 
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Secondly, the findings demonstrate that human beings’ decision making process 
and behaviour in the real world  are far more  complicated than those detected from 
laboratory experiments. Although in laboratories, experiments are designed to search 
for the influence of every single factor on decision making process and outcome, they 
cannot completely duplicate real world situations in terms of the risk or pressure that 
participants are facing, and the experience of participants in solving similar tasks.  
Thirdly,  the  behaviour  of  the  whole  market  is  not  simply  an  aggregation  or 
duplication  of  that  of  individuals.  It  is  believed  that  “the  market  represents  the 
aggregated decisions of individual bettors and will to some extent reflect individual 
decision making biases” (Liu and Johnson, 2007; pp. 74). However, it is also argued 
that  market  behaviour  may  differ  from  that  of  many  individuals  due  to  interactions 
between market participants.  In particular, although bettors do experience anchoring 
effects in horserace betting markets in certain circumstances, the information on which 
they  focus  and  to  what  extent  they  take  such  information  into  account  into  their 
decisions  vary.  When  taking  the  market  as  a  whole,  the  influences  of  different 
individuals may interact with each other and therefore compromise the aggregate degree 
of anchoring effects in the whole market.  
Finally,  the  effectiveness  of  using  whole  market  data  to  detect  potential 
behavioural  biases  of  market  participants  should  be  considered  carefully.  From  the 
results discussed above, anchoring effects may exist in certain segments of the market 
but do not show in the whole market. For example, anchoring effects are found on 
horses’ post-positions at ST racetrack but not at HV in HK. This is because bettors seem 
to overestimate the low position advantage at ST and underestimate it at HV due to the 
configuration and trophy of the racetracks. Therefore, anchoring at ST racetrack cannot 
be observed until the counterpart influence from HV is removed from the whole market 
data. Therefore, market behaviour may be misunderstood if such differences between 
the whole market and its segments are not distinguished.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis provides empirical evidence related to the exploration of anchoring 
effects in a real world environment, the horserace betting market in HK and the UK. 
The study starts with an extensive review of judgement and decision making literature, 
particularly  focusing  on  studies  on  the  anchoring  and  adjustment  heuristic  and 
anchoring  effects,  in  Chapter  2.  As  a  result  of  this  review,  three  broad  research 
questions  emerge  in  Chapter  3.  The  first  research  question  investigates  whether  the 
anchoring effects caused by relevant or less relevant information exist in real world 
environments and how strong the anchors must be to lead to these effects. The second 
research question is concerned with whether the degree of anchoring is affected by the 
degree of expertise of decision makers in real world environments. The third research 
question in concerned with to what extent the degree of anchoring is affected by the 
environment  or  market  in  which  decisions  are  made.  To  explore  these  research 
questions, positivism is considered as the most appropriate research paradigm for this 
study, a deductive research approach is therefore justified, and an empirical method 
using a large market database is eventually adopted. Consequently, four hypotheses are 
developed to help explore the research questions; each of these hypotheses is tested by a 
number of empirical tests fully outlined in Chapter 3. The results of each of these tests 
are presented, analysed and discussed in Chapter 4.  
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  structured  as  follows:  In  Section  5.2,  a  brief 
review of this research is provided by first highlighting the research questions derived 
from the existing literature and the specific research hypotheses developed to answer 
these questions. Second, a summary of the main findings and a brief discussion of the 
results are presented to explain to what extent these research questions are answered. In   227 
Section 5.3, contributions of this study are presented, in terms of the theoretical and 
methodological contributions. Subsequently, the limitations of this study are described 
in  Section  5.4,  followed  by  a  number  of  recommendations  for  further  study  on 
anchoring effects. A final conclusion is drawn in Section 5.5.  
 
 
5.2 Overview of the Research 
 
This section provides an overview of the research. First, the research questions 
which are proposed from the previous anchoring literature are reviewed, together with 
the research hypotheses developed to answer these questions. The second part of this 
section provides a summary of the main findings of this study, followed by a brief 
discussion  on  how  these  findings  explain  or  challenge  the  hypotheses  and  original 
research questions.  
 
5.2.1 Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
This study investigates the extent to which bettors in the HK and UK horserace 
betting markets anchor their subjective judgements of horses’ winning probabilities on 
particular pieces of information which are publicly available in the market. The study is 
conducted  by  exploring  three  broad  research  questions  which  are  derived  from  the 
existing literature.  
The first research question is concerned with whether the anchoring effects caused 
by relevant or less relevant information exist in real world environments and how strong 
the  anchors  must  be  to  lead  to  these  effects.  To  answer  this  question,  two  specific 
hypotheses are developed. The first hypothesis (the anchoring factor hypothesis) states 
that  bettors  in  the  horserace  betting  market  anchor  their  judgements  of  a  horse’s 
winning probability on the information associated with (i) the past performance of the 
horse, (ii) the past performance of the horse’s jockey or trainer, (iii) the post-position of 
the  horse,  and  (iv)  the  past  performance  of  the  favourite,  in  the  previous  race. 
Furthermore, the strength of anchoring factors is examined by the second hypothesis 
(the  anchoring  strength  hypothesis)  which  states  that  anchoring  on  these  pieces  of   228 
information (the ones identified in hypothesis one) occurs only when similar results are 
repeated two or three times.  
Based on the study of the existence and strength of anchoring effects, the second 
research question asks whether the degree of anchoring is affected by the degree of 
expertise of decision makers in real world environments. This is associated with the 
third  hypothesis  (the  expertise  hypothesis).  In  particular,  this  hypothesis  states  that 
bettors with greater expertise in the decision tasks are subject to a lower degree of 
anchoring than bettors with less expertise. The identification of expert and non-expert 
bettors is undertaken by separating weekday (with more expert bettors) and weekend 
(with more casual bettors) races and by examining final odds (which include experts’ 
judgements)  and  odds  2  and  5  minutes  (mainly  resulting  from  casual  bettors’ 
judgements) before the race starts.  
Finally,  the  third  research  question  is  to  explore  to  what  extent  the  degree  of 
anchoring is affected by the environment or market in which decisions are made. To 
explore this question, the fourth hypothesis (the market hypothesis) is generated; this 
states that the degree of anchoring effects varies between the HK and UK horserace 
betting markets. Similar modelling procedures are repeated for each of the anchoring 
factors investigated in previous three hypotheses, using HK and UK horserace betting 
data.  
To test all these hypotheses, conditional logit (CL) models are developed. The CL 
model is employed because it is appropriate for analysing the horserace betting data. 
Specifically, the CL method enables the competitiveness among horses according to the 
category of each single race to be accounted for, and its probability-scale outputs are 
most appropriate for the requirements of horserace outcomes. The results of estimating 
CL  models  associated  with  anchoring  factors  are  compared  with  the  results  of 
estimating  CL  models  with  anchoring  factors  and  bettors’  subjective  probability 
judgements of horses winning (implied by odds information). A significant coefficient 
of an anchoring factor which changes sign in models with and without odds related 
variable is regarded as the evidence of anchoring on this particular information.  
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5.2.2 Summary of Main Findings and Discussions 
 
The main findings of this study in testing the degree to which bettors in the HK 
and UK horserace betting markets anchor their subjective probability judgements on 
publicly available information are summarised as below.  
One of the key findings of this study is both new and surprising in relation to 
existing anchoring literature. The empirical results suggest that overall, no significant 
anchoring effects exist in the HK and UK horserace betting markets on the information 
associated with horses’, jockeys’ and trainers’ past performances in the previous race, 
or on the information concerning previous winners’ position positions and the favourite 
winners in the previous race. Clearly, this finding challenges results of previous studies 
which suggest that anchoring is a widely-spread decision bias. In fact, anchoring effects 
have been demonstrated in a range of both laboratory-based studies (e.g., Chapman and 
Johnson, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2002; Mussweiler, 1997, 2001; Mussweiler and Englich, 
2005; Mussweiler and  Strack, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b; Strack and Mussweiler, 
1997; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996; Wong and Kwong, 2000) and 
field studies (e.g., Black and Diaz, 1996; Blount, 1996; Brewer et al., 2007; Cervone 
and Peake, 1986; Chapman and Bornstein, 1996; Northcraft and Neale, 1987; Poucke 
and Buelens, 2002; Ritov, 1996; Rutledge, 1993; Whyte and Levi, 1994).  
It appears that the only factor on which bettors may anchor is the post-position 
information of horses at ST racetrack in HK. Similar effects of anchoring do not occur 
on low position horses at the other racetrack in the same market (i.e., HV). Since the 
factors selected in this study are generally considered as the key factors in assessing the 
winning probabilities of horses and therefore are believed to be heavily accounted for 
by the betting public, the absence of anchoring effects on these factors may suggest that 
anchoring effects in real world environments are weak, fragile, and difficult to observe. 
In other words, from the whole markets’ point of view, the anchoring effect is not a 
phenomenon  which  appears  to  widely  exist  in  horserace  betting  markets  and  the 
anchoring factor hypothesis is not accepted.  
Although previous, largely laboratory-based research suggested that people tend to 
be overconfident about their judgements when having high-strength (more frequent) and 
low-weight (small sample) information (Bloomfield et al., 2000; Nelson et al., 2001), 
factors associated with horses’, jockeys’, or trainers’ winning records of previous two or   230 
three races do not appear to act as anchors for bettors in either the HK or UK markets. 
This  may  suggest  that  the  strength  of  these  factors  is  still  not  sufficient  to  cause 
anchoring effects. However, jockeys’ past performances in the UK market and favourite 
winners’ past performances in the HK markets do appear to act as anchors if there is a 
consistent recent pattern of results. For example, if a jockey has won his/her previous 
three  races,  bettors  in  the  UK  anchor  their  subjective  judgements  on  this  piece  of 
information  and  over-bet  on  the  horse  ridden  by  this  jockey  in  the  current  race. 
However, no strong evidence shows that this can be generalised to the whole market on 
other factors: the anchoring detected on these two pieces of information is not strong 
(only  significant  at  the  5%  level).  Consequently,  these  results  cannot  support  a 
generalised  significant  anchoring  effect  on  the  information  associated  with  wining 
records  of  more  than  one  race.  Therefore,  the  anchoring  strength  hypothesis  is  not 
supported in this study.  
In  terms  of  the  expertise  of  decision  makers,  this  study  does  provide  strong 
evidence that professional bettors (those who bet on weekday races or bet late in a race) 
are better at incorporating publicly available information than casual bettors (those who 
bet on weekend races or bet late in a race). This is consistent with the horserace betting 
literature (e.g., Kopelman and Minkin, 1991; Saunders and Turner, 1987). However, 
little  evidence  has  been  provided  to  support  the  expertise  hypothesis  since  none  of 
professional bettors and casual bettors are found to strongly anchor their judgements on 
particular information examined in the study. Therefore, it cannot be generalised that 
expert bettors in these two markets are subject to a lower level of anchoring effect than 
casual bettors. Consequently, whether the experience and expertise of decision makers 
help reducing the degree of anchoring effects in real world environments still remains 
unclear.  
Finally, the market hypothesis, which expects differences in the degree to which 
bettors in the HK and UK markets anchor their judgements on particular information, is 
not  supported.  This  is  because  anchoring  effects  are  not  found  to  be  salient  and 
significant in either of these markets. The only difference is that there does appear to be 
a strong anchoring effect on post-positions of horses at ST racetrack in the HK market 
but not at HV or racetracks in the UK market. This may be caused by the discrepancies 
between the configuration and going of the racetracks in HK. Further studies are needed 
to  explore  whether  bettors’  judgements  on  horses’  post-position  information  are   231 
affected by the information that they obtain from the previous race meetings at the same 
and different racetracks.  
The reasons for not detecting strong anchoring effects in the horserace betting 
market might be as follows. First, this may be caused by the features of naturalistic 
environments.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  naturalistic  environments  differ  from 
experimental settings in a number of aspects, including: (i) higher level of complexity; 
and  (ii)  greater  stress  and  personal  stakes  facing  real  world  decision  makers  which 
suggest  that  individuals  may  take  their  real  world  (c.f.  laboratory-based)  decision 
making  more  seriously  (Bruce  and  Johnson,  1997;  Collis  and  Hussey,  2003;  Yates, 
1992). Consequently, individuals in the horserace betting market may account for the 
public information more carefully and more seriously when making betting decisions, 
and  therefore,  anchoring  effects  are  avoided  by  careful  incorporation  of  available 
information in the market.  
Second,  the  tests  conducted  in  this  study  actually  do  not  require  explicit 
comparison between bettors’ subjective probability judgements and specific anchoring 
information. This is the situation in which basic anchoring effects may occur (Brewer 
and Chapman, 2002; Wilson et al., 1996). According to Brewer and Chapman (2002), 
anchoring  effects  in  such  situations  are  fragile  and  easy  to  eliminate  by  changing 
dimensions  of  anchors  or  changing  anchors.  The  results  presented  in  this  study  are 
consistent with Brewer and Chapman’s (2002) study: there is no significant or clear 
trend of anchoring on any specific information; anchoring can be detected on certain 
pieces of information (e.g., the post-position at ST racetrack in HK) but not on others. 
Third,  the  data  employed  in  this  study  to  explore  anchoring  effects  are  the 
aggregate  market  data  rather  than  that  gathered  from  individuals.  As  discussed  in 
Chapter 3, the market data, on the one hand, provides a large scale data sample; on the 
other hand, it is difficult to distinguish effects caused by different individual decision 
biases. In particular, the market data are the final judgements of the betting public based 
on the incorporation of  all the publicly  available information. All these information 
come up at different time and may be presented in different ways (e.g., in a sequence or 
in a table format); these may lead to different levels of impacts on bettors’ probability 
judgements. Therefore, anchoring effects in the horserace betting market may have been 
eliminated  by  the  interactions  between  the  effects  caused  by  different  factors,  as 
suggested by the literature (e.g., Krull et al., 1993). In addition, although the market   232 
consists  of  all  the  market  participants  and  represents  the  behaviour  of  market 
participants,  individuals’  behaviour  may  vary  and  interact  with  each  other.  In  the 
markets,  each  individual  has  his/her  own  procedure  of  gathering  and  incorporating 
information  which  may  make  them  anchor  on  different  pieces  of  information. 
Eventually, the effects caused by anchoring on different information may be cancelled 
out in the whole market.  
Fourth, the environment employed in this study to examine real world anchoring 
effects,  the  horserace  betting  market,  facilitates  accurate  calibration  of  subjective 
judgements  (Bruce  and  Johnson,  1997,  200a,  2001; Johnson  and  Bruce,  2001).  The 
involvement  of  instant  feedback  for  the  outcomes  of  previous  races  is  a  unique 
characteristic  which  favours  decision  makers  in  this  market  to  make  more  accurate 
judgements. As people can learn from their experience (Rabin, 1998; Shiller, 1999), it is 
more likely that bettors learn to adjust their judgements of horses’ winning probabilities 
from observing the outcomes of previous races at a meeting and therefore, are subject to 
a lower or zero anchoring effects.  
In summary, bettors in the HK and UK horserace betting markets are found to 
appropriately  incorporate  available  information  into  their  subjective  judgements, 
implied by the market odds, of horses’ winning probabilities. It is suggested that the 
characteristics of real world environments, the situation in which judgements are made, 
the employment of aggregate market data, and  the features of the horserace betting 
market  contribute  to  the  absence  of  anchoring  effects  in  this  study.  Remarkably, 
anchoring effects do appear to exist in relation to particular pieces of information (e.g., 
post-positions of horses at ST racetrack in HK) in the markets. Therefore, the effects 
observed in this study are complex and clearly more research is needed to identify the 
factors which influence the degree and nature of anchoring in real world contexts. 
 
 
5.3 Contributions of the Research 
 
This study finds that anchoring effects in real world environments, the HK and the 
UK horserace betting markets in particular, are fairly weak and difficult to detect. A 
number of specific contributions are made in this study, which help understand the use   233 
of anchoring and adjustment heuristic. These contributions are divided into two groups: 
theoretical and methodological contributions. Each of them is discussed below.  
 
5.3.1 Theoretical Contributions  
 
This study theoretically contributes to the study of anchoring in two aspects: those 
relating to the literature review and those relating to the findings of the hypothesis tests.  
 
Contributions from the Literature Review 
1.  Although  anchoring  effects  have  been  widely  demonstrated  in  laboratory 
experiments and in a number of field experiments associated with real world decision 
tasks, no study has ever provided a systematic review of relevant literature. This study, 
however, contributes to the current anchoring literature by providing an extensive and 
systematic review of anchoring effects in both laboratory and real world settings. This 
helps to develop a betting understanding and a broader picture of anchoring effects, in 
terms of the types of anchoring, the underlying mechanisms of anchoring, and most 
importantly,  the  influential  factors  which  may  have  strong  impacts  on  people’s 
judgements.  
2.  Based  on  the  systematic  review  of  the  literature,  this  study  identifies  gaps 
between laboratory-based and real world studies. Although anchoring effects have been 
widely demonstrated by a large number of laboratory studies and delicately designed 
field studies, only one previous study has used records of decisions in an actual event 
(rather than via a designed experiments) to analyse potential anchoring (Whyte and Levi, 
1994, the case of the Cuban missile crisis). Consequently, the current study contributes 
to the existing literature as it provides the first extensive anchoring study using direct 
and instant data of probability judgements in a real world environment.  
3. Finally, the literature makes clear that this is the first study which explores 
anchoring  in  the  horserace  betting  market.  Although  numerous  studies  have  been 
conducted on the market efficiency of horserace betting markets, few of them has paid 
sufficient attention to the market behaviour and bettors’ decision making. This study 
starts a judgement and decision making research in this market by exploring anchoring 
effects.  
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Contributions from the Findings 
1. The first and the most important contribution of the current study is that the 
results challenge the existing anchoring literature by finding no significant anchoring 
effects in a real world environment, the horserace betting market. In particular, although 
a number of vivid factors which are considered important in assessing horses’ winning 
probabilities  have  been  examined,  expected  anchoring  effects  are  not  detected.  The 
impact of the strength of the anchoring factors is also investigated and similar results 
are observed, based on the HK and the UK horserace market data. These findings are 
entirely inconsistent with the existing literature which suggests significant anchoring 
effects in real world environments (based on field experiments). Therefore, the findings 
of this study may help better understand anchoring effects in real world environments: 
in particular, in which situations anchoring effects may or may not occur.  
2.  The  findings  of  this  study  confirm  the  belief  that  judgement  and  decision 
making in the real world is far more  complicated than that in controlled laboratory 
conditions. In the real world, it is difficult to control the influences of other factors so it 
is difficult to distinguish various effects from each other. Therefore, further study on 
judgement  and  decision  making,  particularly  on  the  anchoring  effect,  in  real  world 
environments is essential.  
3. Despite the ‘unexpected’ results, the current study also demonstrates that the 
horserace  betting  market  is  a  well-calibrated  market  in  which  bettors’  subjective 
judgements of horses’ winning probabilities are highly consistent with the horses’ actual 
winning probabilities, in terms of anchoring bias, at least but not the last.  
 
5.3.2 Methodological Contributions 
 
1. This is the first study using empirical models (the CL model in particular) to 
explore  anchoring  effects  on  people’s  probability  judgements  in  a  real  world 
environment. The commonly used method in analysing anchoring effects in experiment-
based  studies  is  the  one-way  ANOVA  analysis.  Although  this  statistical  analysis  is 
appropriate  in  exploring  the  variance  of  independent  variables  from  the  dependent 
variable, it is not suitable for the analysis in this study due to the characteristics of the 
horserace betting market.    235 
2.  This  is  also  one  of  only  a  few  studies  which  employ  a  very  large  dataset 
containing various market data to test anchoring biases. For the two horserace betting 
markets examined in this study, the data cover a long time period (9 years for the HK 
market  and  11  years  for  the  UK  market).  Compared  with  at  most  hundreds  of 
participants  in  experimental  studies,  the  horserace  betting  data  provides  44,620 
observations in the HK market and 556,115 observations in the UK market, together 
with a large variety of information concerning horses’ winning probabilities. This huge 
dataset is not only unique in anchoring studies, but also distinct in horserace betting 
studies. Consequently, the sample size bias which is easily encountered in experimental 
studies is avoided. In addition, the number of factors (16 in total) explored in this study 
is  large,  compared  with  2  or  3  factors  examined  in  most  experimental  studies.  In 
addition,  this study  explores  anchoring  effects  in  the  horserace  betting  market  from 
multiple-perspectives (i.e., the existence of anchoring, the strength of anchoring factors, 
the expertise of decision makers, and the influence of market difference on anchoring), 
whereas previous papers only focuses on one of these perspectives of anchoring. All 
these  unique  factors  associated  with  the  current  study  contribute  to  the  existing 
anchoring  literature,  by  providing  an  extensive  and  deep  investigation  of  anchoring 
effects in the real world.  
3. Finally, this study highlights the importance of appropriate model specification 
in the empirical analysis. For example, the results find no significant anchoring effects 
on horses’ post-positions in the HK market when the data are analysed as a whole. 
However, when the data are split into two racetracks, it is found that bettors who bet at 
ST  racetrack  behave  differently  from  those  who  bet  at  HV.  In  other  words,  the 
combination of the market data actually hides the evidence that bettors anchor their 
judgements on the low post-positions at ST racetrack. Consequently, the study simply 
demonstrated that model mis-specification may lead to misleading conclusions.  
 
 
5.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
A number of limitations which may affect the generalisation of the findings of this 
study  are  discussed  in  this  section.  Consequently,  some  suggestions  and 
recommendations for future anchoring research are generated.    236 
 
5.4.1 Limitations of the Study 
 
A number of limitations of this study are explored in this section, concerning the 
data employed, the methodology adopted, and the markets on which the study focuses.  
1.  This  study  employs  aggregate  market  data  (a  secondary  database  from  the 
racing  authority  and  publicly  available  information).  Although  the  examination  of 
market data avoids the weaknesses of laboratory studies such as the lack of reality, the 
complexity of the real world environment makes it more difficult to distinguish the 
influences of different factors and to discern the effects caused by different judgemental 
biases. Compared with highly controlled and manipulated experimental conditions, the 
influences of various factors in a real world setting are more likely to interact and it is 
difficult to discern their individual effects.  
2. Although, as indicated earlier, a large database is employed in the study for 
both the HK and the UK horserace betting markets, when races are divided according to 
certain criteria they can result in relatively small samples. For example, there are 66,244 
horses run in 5,133 races in the nine-year period of horseracing in HK, whereas only 
770 horses were left in the sample when examining anchoring on the favourite given 
that the previous three races were all won by the favourites. This may bias the results of 
analysis and dismiss potential effects due to the small sample size. 
3. In testing the impact of bettors’ expertise on reducing the degree of anchoring 
in  their  subjective  probability  judgements,  the  way  in  which  expert  and  non-expert 
bettors are defined (weekday vs. weekend bets, and late vs. early bets) may not be 
accurate. Data concerning the number of bets amd the amount of each individual bet on 
a  horse  may  also  contain  valuable  information  in  distinguishing  expert  and  casual 
bettors, but unfortunately this is not available in the current database.  
4. The markets on which this study concentrated are also limited. Only HK and the 
UK horserace betting markets are explored and no significant evidence was found due 
to market differences in susceptibility to the anchoring effect. In addition, the betting 
system  employed  in  the  HK  market  is  the  pari-mutuel  system  whist  the  dominant 
betting system in the UK market is the bookmaker system. Because the later contains 
interactions between both buy-side (bettors) and sell-side (bookmakers) of the market 
participants, the influences of anchoring factors may be different on these two markets.    237 
 
5.4.2 Suggestions for Future Research 
 
As the first study exploring anchoring effects in the horserace betting market, this 
thesis provides preliminary result to help understand anchoring effects in real world 
environments associated with ‘pure’ market data. This research can be extended in the 
following ways:  
1.   To conduct questionnaire surveys or interviews among bettors at racetracks or 
betting shops to clarify, in practice, what factors are the most likely to be anchored on 
by  bettors  in  the  market.  Bettors’  answers  may  or  may  not  be  the  same  as  those 
suggested  by  the  horseracing  literature  and  researchers.  This  would  be  a  useful 
assistance in selecting of potential anchoring factors in future studies.  
2.   More  specific  investigations  can  be  conducted  on  particular  pieces  of 
information. For example, in this study, bettors in the HK market are found to anchor on 
horses’ post-positions at ST racetrack but this effect is not found at HV. Since ST and 
HV race meetings generally alternate, but not always, it will be interesting to explore, 
for  example,  whether  bettors  at  a  given  race  meeting  anchor  on  the  results  of  the 
previous race meeting.  
3.  In this study, only a single anchoring factor is investigated in a CL model at a 
time. However, it might be possible that bettors’ judgements are merely affected by the 
interaction of certain factors. For example, a horse which has won its previous three 
races may not cause over-betting on this horse, but if its jockey has also performed well 
in his/her previous two or three races, this information may provide a distinct hint of an 
extremely  high  winning  probability  of  the  horse  and  therefore  be  strong  enough  to 
attract  bettors’  attention.  Consequently,  this  may  lead  to  anchoring.  Therefore,  the 
combination of certain (highly related) factors may be considered in future study.  
4.   This work has involved a large cross-sectional study. The data employed carry a 
long  period  (nine  years  in  the  HK  market  and  eleven  years  in  the  UK  market). 
Consequently, further analysis can be conducted to examine potential anchoring factors 
in each single year so as to explore the changes and trends of the way in which the 
betting public utilise information. It may be found that anchoring has increased and 
decreased over the period.    238 
5.   Finally, the study of anchoring effects in real world environments can also be 
extended  to  other  markets  or  settings  which  involve  numerical  assessments  and/or 
probability judgements, such as the online betting, the horserace betting market in other 
regions, or in wide financial markets.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall,  this  study  has  suggested  an  effective  method  of  exploring  anchoring 
effects in a real world setting, the horserace betting market. New evidence is presented 
which challenges the degree to which anchoring effects observed in laboratory and field 
experiments  influence  the  subjective  judgements  of  decision  makers  in  naturalistic 
environments. In particular, bettors in the HK and UK horserace betting markets are not 
found to anchor their subjective probability judgements on certain information, which is 
generally regarded as the most important information in favouring horses winning a 
race,  such  as  horses’,  jockeys’  and  trainers’  past  performance.  Although  significant 
anchoring effects have been observed on post-positions of horses in the HK market, 
they  may  merely  arise  because  of  the  specific  track  configurations  in  HK  and  no 
evidence is found that these results generalise to the UK market. Consequently, these 
findings may suggest that anchoring in real world decision making environments is not 
as strong as researchers have expected. In fact, in the environment examined, anchoring 
effects appear to be weak, fragile, difficult to observe, and easy to eliminate. Reasons to 
explain  these  discrepancies  could  be  features  of  real  world  environments  which 
distinguish  them  from  experimental  conditions,  and,  in  particular,  aspects  of  the 
horserace betting market which facilitate good calibration.  
The findings presented here represent a beginning to the study of anchoring in 
horserace betting markets. Only a limited number of potential anchoring factors have 
been  examined  and  these  need  to  be  expanded  in  future  studies  before  it  can  be 
concluded that anchoring does not exist in the horserace betting market. The fact that 
bettors are not explicitly required to compare their probability judgements of a horse 
winning with the information they use to make assessments may also contribute to the 
fact that anchoring is not detected. This may occur, because these are the conditions for 
basic (rather than traditional) anchoring and previous results have suggested that basic   239 
anchoring  effects  are  more  fragile  than  traditional  anchoring  effects.  Consequently, 
further analysis is currently being undertaken to examine the extent to which anchoring 
effects differ between casual and expert bettors.  
In summary, the results reported here challenge the consensus to emerge from 
laboratory based studies, and suggest that anchoring effects may not be as widespread in 
real  world  decision  making  environments  as  previously  thought.  Further  studies  on 
anchoring  effects  in  real  world  environments,  and  in  horserace  betting  markets  in 
particular, are necessary and encouraged.  
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APPENDIX 
Description and Sign of Independent Variables 
 
Without Odds  With Odds 
No.  Type 
Ind. 
Variable 
Description of the independent variable 
Real Sign  Real Sign 
       
Exp. 
Sign  HK  UK 
Exp. 
Sign  HK  UK 
1  Horse  H1  Give 1 to a horse if the horse won its last race; 0 otherwise  +**  +**  +**  −**  +  − 
2    H2 
Give 1 to a horse if the horse won its previous two races; 0 
otherwise 
+**  +**  +**  −**  +  − 
3    H3 
Give 1 to a horse if the horse won its previous three races; 0 
otherwise 
+**  +**  +**  −**  +  − 
4  Jockey  J1  Give 1 to a horse if its jockey won his/her last race; 0 otherwise  +**  +**  +**  −**  −  + 
5    J2 
Give 1 to a horse if its jockey won his/her previous two races; 0 
otherwise 
+**  +    +**  −**  −  + 
6    J3 
Give 1 to a horse if its jockey won his/her previous three races; 0 
otherwise 
+**  −  +**  −**  −   
7  Trainer  T1  Give 1 to a horse if its trainer won his/her last race; 0 otherwise  +**  +**  +**  −**  +  +* 
8    T2 
Give 1 to a horse if its trainer won his/her previous two races; 0 
otherwise 
+**  +*  +**  −**  +  +   241 
 
Without Odds  With Odds 
Real Sign  Real Sign  No.  Type 
Ind. 
Variable 
Description of the independent variable  Exp. 
Sign  HK  UK 
Exp. 
Sign  HK  UK 
9    T3 
Give 1 to a horse if its trainer won his/her previous three races; 0 
otherwise 
+**  +  +**  −**  +  + 
10 
Post-
position 
PP  The post-position of a horse in a race 
+**  
−** 
−**  + 
−** 
+** 
+  + 
11    WP1 
Give 1 to a horse if its post-position is the same as that of the 
previous winner; 0 otherwise 
+**  +  +**  −**  +  +* 
12    WP2 
Give 1 to a horse if its post-position is the same as that of the 
winners of previous two races; 0 otherwise 
+**  +  +  −**  −  + 
13    WP3 
Give 1 to a horse if its post-position is the same as that of the 
winners of previous three races; 0 otherwise 
+**  +  −**  −**  +  − 
14  Favourite  F1 
Give 1 to the favourite of a race if its previous race was won by 
the favourite; 0 otherwise 
+**  +**  +**  −**  +   −* 
15    F2 
Give 1 to the favourite of a race if its previous two races were won 
by the favourites; 0 otherwise 
+**  +**  +**  −**  −  −* 
16    F3 
Give 1 to the favourite of a race if its previous three race were 
won by the favourites; 0 otherwise 
+**  +  +**  −**  −*  −* 
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